Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

790.00/6–2950

Memorandum¹ by the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers (MacArthur)

top secret

[Tokyo,] 14 June 1950.

Memorandum on the Peace Treaty Problem

1. Three years ago I publicly expressed the view to the Allied Press in Tokyo that the Allied Powers should proceed at once in the formulation of a peace treaty for Japan. I pointed out that in my opinion Japan was then ready for a peace settlement and should not be called upon arbitrarily to remain under the strictures of an economic blockade with consequent limitations upon her rehabilitation because of undue delay in the restoration of peace. I warned that historically military occupations had been shown to have a maximum utility of from three to five years, whereafter people under occupation became restive and the occupying forces assumed increasingly the complex of entrenched power. I added that a post-treaty unarmed Japan should be able to look to the machinery of the United Nations for the safeguard of her political and territorial integrity.

2. Since then the issue of a peace treaty has been constantly upon the agenda of international discussion and has undergone many changes in form as the several Powers from time to time reoriented their respective viewpoints. Basically, however, since the issue was first raised, all of the Powers have found common agreement in the desirability of peace and only a procedural conflict between the Soviet and the other Powers has prevented the holding of a peace conference—the Soviet insisting that it involved a matter which should first go before the Conference of Foreign Ministers while the other Powers, including the United States, adhered to the proposition that it was an issue for direct action by the member nations of the Far Eastern Commission. It is problematical whether the Soviet would have participated in such a parley between all of the Powers as the same was never actually called.

3. During this period the United States has quietly worked upon the preparation of a treaty draft and the nations of the British Commonwealth have held three successive meetings hoping through an exchange of ideas to crystalize a firm Commonwealth peace policy. More recently the Soviet and Communist China publicly espoused an immediate peace treaty for Japan as part of their treaty of alliance and entered upon a campaign of propaganda charging that the Western Powers and particularly the United States bear responsibility for the treaty delay, alleging for its purpose the “colonization” of Japan and its use as a military base from which to mount aggressive warfare against the Soviet and Communist China. Adding to the general confusion and furnishing the Soviet and her Asian Communist satellites with ammunition of destructive value, the international press has made much of revelations that the United States is unable to arrive at a peace policy because of conflicts in viewpoints between the Defense and State Departments, giving emphasis to the idea that the conflict lies in the insistence by the Defense Department that Japan be held as a vital security adjunct of the United States.

4. Only recently the Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed their previous position on the treaty problem and reaffirmed their belief that certain conditions must be present to warrant our entry into treaty negotiations. All of such conditions may be discounted as offering no unsurmountable difficulties with the exception of one which requires that the Soviet and Communist China be among the signatories of the final treaty. This, of course, is impossible if the document is to contain adequate security reservations and we are to maintain our present political policy vis-à-vis Communist China. Indeed, if such a condition is to prevail it will foreclose any possibility of treaty action.

5. Although neither as SCAP nor as CINCFE do I share authority for the treaty making, as SCAP I have long been deeply concerned over the psychologically adverse effect upon the Japanese people of protracted delay in moving toward such a treaty, and as CINCFE I have observed with grave misgivings the progressive deterioration of our military potential under the impact of political and military reverses on the mainland of Asia, with concomitant pressure upon vital segments of our strategic island frontier off of the Asian coast. Indeed, my observation of passing events in Asia and understanding of Oriental psychology have long convinced me that it has been a fundamental error to do nothing pending assurance that we could accomplish all. Thus, even granting the soundness of the JCS premise that the interests of the United States demand inclusion of the Soviet and Communnist China as signatories to any treaty arrangement, it does not necessarily follow that all action leading to a treaty must be suspended pending assurance of their agreement to the treaty conditions we ultimately determine.

6. The Japanese people have faithfully fulfilled the obligations they assumed under the instrument of surrender and have every moral and legal right to the restoration of peace. On this point, as before stated, all of the Allied Powers concerned are in full accord and publicly committed and their failure to protect Japan in this right would be a foul blemish upon modern civilization. For this reason and irrespective of the issues joined and ultimate policy objectives, we should not allow ourselves to be deterred from moving invincibly forward along a course which we ourselves and the entire world recognize to be morally and legally right. We should proceed to call a peace conference at once, work out just and proper treaty terms among those in attendance, invite all of the nations concerned, whether participants or not, to ratify the peace formula agreed upon, and thereafter let the nation which obstructs this normal procedure in international affairs or refuses to ratify a just and equitable treaty assume the full onus for any failure to reach an overall accord. Then, not now, would be the time to determine in the light of the existing situation whether to effectuate such a treaty without the Soviet or to maintain the status quo pending Soviet ratification. Thereby Japan and all of Asia would witness the resurgence of our moral leadership and renewal of our initiative in the conduct of Asian affairs.

7. This is our most impelling need of the moment in this quarter of the globe—the regaining of our lost initiative over the events which are stirring all of the Asian peoples. For, it is in the pattern of Oriental psychology to respect and follow aggressive, resolute and dynamic leadership but quickly turn from a leadership characterized by timidity or vacillation. Only recently this found emphasis in the great harm done us in the eyes of the Asian masses by irresponsible official statements suggesting the possibility of our withdrawal from our Western Pacific positions under Soviet pressure—harm which may only be overcome through the drama of a reassertion of positive leadership, the regaining of forceful initiative. The resolute move toward the holding of a peace conference because it is morally right that such a peace conference should be held—irrespective of its potentialities—would go a long way toward reasserting that leadership and regaining that initiative.

8. On the other hand, our continued delay in calling a peace conference with a view to giving the Japanese that degree of freedom from international restraint which they have well earned and to which they are now morally and legally entitled, cannot fail to result in a progressive deterioration of our position both here and abroad—a deterioration which if long enough extended will inevitably confront us with a situation of general hostility. Soviet propaganda is already attributing to us responsibility for the delay of a treaty. It is not inconceivable that an early Soviet move may be to seize itself the initiative in calling upon the Powers to join it in such a peace conference or proceed directly toward a separate Soviet peace with Japan. In either such eventuality the United States would indeed be placed on the horns of a dilemma and our position would become virtually irretrievable.

9. To safeguard against such an eventuality and to compose the situation in Japan resulting from recent appeals to nationalist sentiment, existing conflict within the United States Government must be bridged to permit early action toward the effectuation of peace. The nature of such conflicts has only recently come to my attention, and it is encouraging to note the relatively small area of disagreement which appears now to exist, providing reason to hope that there is no irreconcilable point of difference.

10. It is my understanding that both Departments agree that the United States policy as expressed in NSC 13/3 [Here follows the first paragraph of NSC 13/3, quoted in Tab B to Mr. Rusk’s memorandum of a conversation held May 5, page 1189.], has been “overtaken by events”, although it appears to be the view of State that such events have made it mandatory that the United States now press for a peace treaty, while Defense on the other hand interprets them as necessitating a more positive prohibition against entry into any peace treaty negotations in the foreseeable future. States position is based primarily upon political considerations, while that of Defense finds its direction in overall security requirements. The solution sought is that which will serve the one without doing violence to the other.

11. Two alternative security arrangements have been proposed and currently form the basis of discussion within the government:

[Here follow two paragraphs outlining alternative security arrangements quoted from Tab B to Mr. Rusk’s memorandum of a conversation held May 5.]

12. The first proposed security arrangement, providing for a collective security agreement to be entered into concurrently with the conclusion of a treaty of peace, with bases made available to the United States, could not now fail to be interpreted as dictated by primary American security requirements—with accent upon the defense of the United States rather than the defense of Japan. Such interpretation would reflect a comparatively recent change in Japanese thinking largely brought about by ill-advised statements made by influential persons in the United States laying great stress upon the need for Japanese bases in the United States Western Pacific defense line as a means of preserving United States security. This has aroused a wave of intense nationalistic opposition within Japanese political circles which has been fanned by Communist propaganda that the reservation of such military bases to the United States would be a move toward the “colonization” of Japan and an aggressive threat against the mainland of Asia. In these circumstances, while such a collateral agreement is entirely possible of legal consummation, its value to the United States would be limited by the bitterness and resentments which would thereafter dominate the Japanese mind.

13. The second proposed security arrangement providing for a partial peace with retention under limited application of the present regime of control would be worse than maintaining the status quo, as the resulting situation would be little different from that which now exists, whereunder there has been a progressive relaxation of internal political control and the basis established for the lifting of restraint on external activity as individual nations invite resumption of bilateral intercourse, and far short of what the Japanese have a right to expect from formal treaty action. While the proposed arrangement would legalize and hasten an enlarged scope of Japanese autonomy in its international affairs, it might be viewed as a betrayal by the United States by many Japanese, who would neither understand nor voluntarily accept any formal treaty arrangement which failed to restore full autonomous authority in the conduct of Japanese public affairs. There would be no convincing argument to justify in the eyes of the Japanese the retention of such controls in a formal treaty for which they have worked, and been led to believe offered the means toward the restoration of soverign freedom. They have heretofore fully understood and accepted the fact that the delay in the restoration of such freedom has been due to the procedural difficulties preventing the holding of a peace conference, but once a formula is found for arriving at a peace settlement, even if only based upon partial representation of the Allied Powers, it would be impossible to explain with any semblance of sincerity or validity the failure to grant the same. Further than this, such failure would furnish the Communists with a propaganda weapon against which there would be no defense, and it would convince many Japanese who have loyally supported the occupation and worked diligently to achieve its stated objectives, that the aims and purposes of the United States conform indeed to the line of Communist propaganda. Such an arrangement would find little willing Japanese support and arouse much bitter opposition. Its easily discernible weakness would lie not only in its failure to accord the Japanese full political autonomy, but even more in its patent effort to mask the continued occupancy of military bases behind the pretended need for indefinite extension of the existing regime of Allied control.

14. The pertinent provisions of the Potsdam Declaration which set forth the security objective and establish the conditions prerequisite to the withdrawal of Allied forces are as follows:

. . . . . . .²

“(6) There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.

(7) Until such a new order is established and until there is convincing proof that Japan’s war-making power is destroyed, points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied to secure the achievement of the basic objectives we are here setting forth.

. . . . . . .²

(12) The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government.”

. . . . . . .²

The foregoing provisions create in themselves a legal basis for security reservations in a peace treaty which are deserving of careful consideration. Narrowly interpreted they might be construed as appertaining solely to “irresponsible militarism” in Japan, with the condition stipulated held satisfied once the same is brought under effective control. Such narrow interpretation would unquestionably be given by elements hostile to the United States. However, it is quite clear to me that a broader interpretation was intended by the framers of the Declaration, (U.S., Britain and China) who clearly sought to see arise in Japan “a new order of peace, security and justice” and correctly estimated that such a new order in an unarmed Japan would be “impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world” and so provided that “until such new order is established …² points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied.” Indeed, no other interpretation could reasonably and logically be given the language of the document. True, the framers of the Declaration probably did not then envision that so soon after the formalities of surrender the world would again be aflame in the wake of predatory forces embarked upon military conquest; that an unarmed Japan and its “new order of peace, security and justice” would lie prostrate at the mercy of such predatory forces victorious on the adjacent mainland once “points in Japanese territory” ceased to be occupied by Allied forces. But by specifically stipulating the time element for occupation as “until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world” they provided the legal basis to secure against just the threat which in such circumstances would exist, and made clear their intention that not only would “irresponsible militarism” be suppressed within Japan but that Japan’s warmaking potential would not be available for exploitation by “irresponsible militarism” on the march abroad. They thereby set the stage for a secure basis upon which an unarmed Japan’s permanent neutrality ultimately might rest, and made unequivocally clear by so doing that such a destiny alone could foster the well-being of the Japanese people and serve the essential interests of all of the other nations of the earth.

15. Some persons decry as visionary and unreal the road to ultimate political neutrality for Japan. But such persons are blind to realities. They fail to understand that Japan has been completely disarmed and demilitarized by order of the Allied Powers and consequently her neutrality in practical effect has been already decreed by Allied edict—that neutrality in such circumstances is not a concept but an actuality. Overlooking this, they see in the existing international tension mandatory requirements to guide the political pattern of Japan’s present and long range future. The exigencies of the present must, of course, be bridged to the potentialities of the future, but to ignore the realities is to plan unsoundly for either present or future. Any effort to reverse Allied policies toward the rearmament of Japan at this time would be accompanied by convulsions in Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia, the Philippines and throughout Asia, and might very well solidify a Pacific bloc against American policy vis-à-vis Japan. Any such move would be accompanied by no less convulsive reactions in Japan itself where the people with irrefutable sincerity have turned scornfully from the militarists and militarism, as the root causes of Japan’s disastrous adventure into the conquest and exploitation of others. Additionally, despite remarkable progress toward economic self-sufficiency through the redevelopment of industrial energy, Japan still requires American aid to cover its food deficit and only with greatest difficulty can obtain a bare minimum of raw materials essential to sustain industrial production. Consequently, from a practical standpoint, Japan could not rearm from her own impoverished indigenous resources but would require billions in American aid to build military strength beyond that level merely provocative of attack and exploitation by others. Moreover, from every standpoint, it is more essential that Japan be denied to the Soviet than that she be an active military ally of the United States. Such denial can best be assured through a firm political alignment resting upon the good will and faith of the Japanese people, with our access to military and naval bases and other available facilities adequate to meet the needs of our security operations. This is in complete consonance with the status of neutrality, both present and future, and Japan’s insular location renders such neutrality feasible both from a military and political standpoint. Our military policy vis-à-vis Japan, therefore, should be oriented to the denial of Japan to the Soviet through the safeguard of its neutrality, rather than an approach to something resembling an outright military alliance.

16. The referenced Potsdam conditions should be fully availed of in the shaping and implementation of treaty policy. For a treaty of peace reserving to the Allies the right to continue to occupy “points in Japanese territory” until “irresponsible militarism is driven from the world” and there is no longer threat to “peace, security and justice” in unarmed Japan would not only adhere to the conditions expressly laid down in the Potsdam Declaration but would preserve the legal continuity of Allied action. It would place the retention of military garrisons squarely up to the Potsdam Declaration upon which the Japanese Communists and the Soviet repeatedly have called in support of their position. Provision should be made in such a treaty for the relinquishment by the Allied signatories of all political power and authority over Japan not directly appertaining to security requirements, and in order to make clear such intention, it should be specifically provided that the existing regime of control, i.e., SCAP, the Far Eastern Commission and the Allied Council for Japan, shall be rendered inoperative coincident with the treaty’s effectuation.

17. To insure that such a course does not generate widespread disappointment and resentment and become a focus for destructive propaganda both in Japan and on the continent of Asia, provision should be made for the ratification of such a treaty, not only by the Government of Japan with the approval of the National Diet, but through a plebiscite by the Japanese people as well, leaving to their ultimate choice acceptance of such Potsdam-provided security requirements as corollary to the restoration of political freedom, or continued adherence to the status quo.

18. I was never in agreement with the reasoning advanced by some that a peace treaty without the Soviet would either favorably alter the Soviet’s legal position vis-à-vis the Japanese problem or be seized upon by the Soviet as the basis for intensified pressure upon Japan. The Soviet has demonstrated time and again that his decisions are based solely upon political expediency and relative military capabilities, without the slightest regard for prior commitment or legalistic reasoning. Any move which the United States makes is fraught with the danger of Soviet retaliation but hardly more so than is maintaining the status quo vis-à-vis Japan, whereunder the Soviet is smarting with a sense of complete frustration.

19. In view of the foregoing, it is believed that in the search for an acceptable solution which will make possible full accord within our own government and provide it the basis for unified treaty action; consideration should be given to the following:

Alternative Security Arrangement III—That a normal treaty be consummated embodying, however, a security reservation to the effect that so long as “irresponsible militarism” exists in the world as a threat to “peace, security and justice” in Japan, the pertinent security conditions of the Potsdam Declaration shall be deemed unfulfilled and, in view of the attendant threat to unarmed Japan’s “new order of peace, security and justice,” points in Japanese territory continue to be garrisoned by the Allied Powers signatory thereto through United States forces; that when such threat from “irresponsible militarism” ceases to exist, all provisions of the surrender terms shall be deemed fulfilled and all Allied garrisons shall be permanently withdrawn from Japan.

Douglas MacArthur

1. This memorandum is filed as attachment 3 to a memorandum of June 29 by Mr. Allison, not printed (790.00/6–2950). It was shown to Mr. Dulles by June 22.
2. Omissions in this document occur in the source text.
2. Omissions in this document occur in the source text.
2. Omissions in this document occur in the source text.
2. Omissions in this document occur in the source text.