Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

Lot 54D423: J. F. Dulles Japanese Peace Treaty File

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Butterworth)

secret

[Washington,] April 11, 1950.

[Subject:] United States Bases in Japan.

Reference is made to my memorandum to you of April 10¹ on the above subject, and, particularly, to the last paragraph wherein it is recommended that General MacArthur’s views be obtained prior to placing the proposal for United States bases in Japan before the NSC. There is attached hereto a copy of the Memorandum of Conversation between General MacArthur and Mr. Sebald on this subject which arrived just after my memorandum to you had gone forward.

According to Mr. Sebald, General MacArthur believes that American bases are unnecessary in Japan, that American insistence that bases be granted would only cause an eventual anti-American reaction on the part of the Japanese people and that insofar as the United States is concerned the real bastion of defensive strength should be Okinawa. General MacArthur also expressed the opinion that 95 percent of the Japanese people are opposed to American bases in Japan and that unless a whole-hearted request for American troops and bases is made by the Japanese, the entire proposition should be abandoned.

In the same mail bringing Mr. Sebald’s report on his conversation with General MacArthur, there also arrived an advance copy of the study prepared by Pol Ad, Tokyo,² on the whole question of American military bases in post treaty Japan in which much the same conclusion is reached as in my memorandum of April 10, although PolAd’s study goes into much more detail and makes more specific recommendations. It is a document of some 24 pages which in due course will be processed in the Department for normal distribution. However, there is given below a brief outline of the conclusions reached and of the suggestions put forward.

Mr. Sebald’s study makes the following conclusions:

1. Any suggestion that Japan might provide for its self-defense through rearmament in the immediate post treaty period must be rejected.

2. United States must, in view of its public undertakings be prepared to take positive steps to bring about future assurances of Japanese security.

3. With respect to military bases in Japan, the existence or degree of military necessity is, at least, uncertain and military necessity should not be controlling; rather the Nation’s foreign policies should be determined on the basis and principles of ideals of the American people, and military planning and strategy should be made to conform thereto. Therefore, PolAd believes that the decision as to whether the United States should seek to retain military bases in Japan in the post treaty period should not be taken solely on the basis of military need but should be made wholly compatible with American concepts of sound, principled and defensible national policy.

4. PolAd accordingly believes that the United States should not take the initiative in negotiating a separate agreement with Japan for post treaty bases and it is believed entirely feasible to elaborate plans whereby Japanese security may, without any significant sacrifices of legitimate United States defense interests, be provided for through either (a) an international guarantee of protection or neutrality to be implemented through suitable international controls or (b) the granting by the United States of a Japanese request of military protection.

PolAd then discusses in some detail how his recommendations may be carried out and suggests that if it should prove impossible to obtain a general international guarantee (although PolAd apparently believes this possible), it might be entirely logical and reasonable for the Japanese during the immediate post treaty period while the American troops were being progressively withdrawn to come to their realization for outside assistance and quite genuinely and voluntarily request the United States for protection. PolAd believes that any negotiations for military assistance to Japan should be entered into only, on the initiative of the Japanese through a request that clearly represents the will of the Japanese people. PolAd also suggests that the President or the Secretary of State seek an early opportunity to make a public statement to the effect that the United States has no desire to maintain military bases in Japan as a part of its own system of defense and would not of its own accord seek to establish such bases in Japan unless required to do so in fulfillment of its United Nations obligations or in response to a request of the Japanese Government which is clearly representative of the will of the Japanese people.

In my opinion the essential points which evolve from a reading of PolAd’s despatch and a report of General Mac Arthur’s views are that in support of my memorandum of April 10 to the effect that the possibility and desirability of obtaining American bases in post treaty Japan is extremely questionable and that some other solution to the security problem should be attempted. It remains my belief that a policy as outlined in the enclosure of my memorandum of April 10 offers the best basis for a solution to the problem and it is recommended that a close study be made of a possibility of combining the approach there suggested with that found in PolAd’s despatch herein summarized.³

[Attachment]

Memorandum of Conversation

secret

Tokyo, April 6, 1950.

Subject: American Bases in Japan

Participants:	General MacArthur
	Mr. Sebald

Among other subjects discussed with General MacArthur during the evening of April 5, was the subject of possible American bases in Japan. General MacArthur voluntarily referred to his opposition to having bases in Japan. He said that from the beginning he felt that it would be a mistake to continue the presence of American troops in Japan, but that he had to a certain extent agreed to keeping a small number of bases here under pressure from the Pentagon. Viewed in the proper perspective, General MacArthur said, bases are unnecessary in Japan and American insistence that the right of bases be granted would only cause an eventual anti-American reaction on the part of the Japanese people.⁴ On the other hand, should the Japanese Government as representative of the Japanese people formally request the retention of U.S. troops and the maintenance of bases as may be necessary, no objection would arise, especially if the bases were granted for a limited period, say, five years.

General MacArthur continued by saying that the maintenance of American bases here after a Treaty of Peace would act like a lightning rod to attract opposition to this concept from all quarters, including the Japanese. He felt that 95% of the Japanese people are opposed to American bases in Japan and that unless a wholehearted request for American troops and bases is made by the Japanese, the entire proposition should be abandoned.

I said that I had just prepared a study on this question for the Department and had arrived at almost identical conclusions, except that I felt that the period for bases should be three years and that renewals should be made at the request of the Japanese Government for some stated period, such as one year at a time. I also said that I did not quite agree with the 95% figure, as the Japanese are somewhat divided concerning this question. On the whole, however, I said that my concept regarding American bases in Japan is identical with that of the General.

General MacArthur then reverted to his previous theory of a tight guarantee of Japan’s integrity and sovereignty by all the Powers concerned, a guarantee which should be placed under the United Nations framework. He said that he could think of no stronger force than that of world opinion back by a clear United States determination to enforce the guarantee. In his opinion, this would be a much stronger method of insuring Japan’s security than would be the placing of a garrison of, say, 35,000 troops in Japan which could easily be overrun by Soviet Russia almost at will. He felt that strategically Japan is a weakness rather than a strength in so far as the United States is concerned, and that the real bastion of defensive strength should be Okinawa.

W. J. Sebald

1. Not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 1169.
2. Not printed.

3. In the paper in question, Mr. Allison had said in part:

   “It is possible, in short, that if the U.S. announced that it considered bases in Japan to be essential for the security of Japan and the Far East generally, such bases to be for a limited period renewable only with Japanese consent, and if General MacArthur expressed his strong support for this position, Yoshida would be willing to seek Diet approval of the idea and would be able to obtain that approval, with substantial popular backing. It seems clear, however, that this result is not assured, and that in the best of circumstances a heated political battle will occur in which a sizeable proportion of the population will oppose U.S. bases. Chances of the Yoshida Government’s publicly inviting the U.S. to establish bases in Japan on the private suggestion of the U.S. Government and General MacArthur seem extremely remote. In these circumstances, and with the importance which has, rightly it is believed, been placed on securing not merely preponderant Japanese approval but also Japanese initiative for U.S. bases, it would seem that the U.S. should examine very carefully whether bases in the Ryukyus and enunciation of a “Monroe Doctrine” for Japan would not suffice. Attached is a draft U.S. statement indicating how a plan along these lines might be implemented.

   “If this plan is not militarily possible, or if it is not politically feasible (exposing the Department to the charge of “throwing Japan after China”), a semi, politico-economic treaty, or, failing that, a continued, modified occupation, may be the only courses open to us. At the very least it would seem that we should get General MacArthur’s views on the aspects of the problem discussed above before placing a bases proposal before the NSC.”

   In the mentioned draft statement, Mr. Allison assumed a conference (at United States initiative) of all FEC powers to “consider” a peace treaty, towards which the United States would “… take the following stand:

   “1. Japan shall remain disarmed for a substantial period of time at the expiration of which the Japanese Government and the Governments signatory to a Peace Treaty with Japan shall determine whether and to what extent it may be advisable for Japan to resume the burden of her own self-defense.

   “2. The present Allied Occupation Forces in Japan shall begin, not later than six months after the ratification of a Treaty of Peace by a majority of the signatories, a phased withdrawal from Japan to be finally completed within a period of three years unless in the meantime alternative satisfactory arrangements for Japan’s defense shall be concluded through the United Nations or otherwise thus making possible more speedy conclusion of withdrawal of occupation forces.

   “3. United States forces shall continue in occupation of bases in the Ryukyus from which they will be in a position to ensure against the revival of aggressive elements in Japan or be able to come to the defense of Japan should that be necessary. At an appropriate time the United States will make application to the United Nations for a trusteeship for the Ryukyus with the United States as the administering power.” (Lot 54 D 423)

4. In a memorandum of May 9, not printed, which summarized several months’ developments with regard to a Japanese peace treaty, Robert A. Fearey of the Bureau of Northeast Asian Affairs indicated that previous to this conversation General MacArthur had been understood in the Department to favor United States post-treaty bases in Japan. (694.001/5–950)