694.001/4–750

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Special Assistant to the Secretary ( Howard )

top secret

Subject: Japanese Peace Settlement

Participants: Mr. John Foster Dulles
Mr. W. Walton Butterworth, S/J
Mr. John B. Howard, S

I. Review of Background

Pursuant to Mr. Dulles’ request to be briefed on the Japanese peace settlement problems, Mr. Butterworth and Mr. Howard went to New York for this purpose and met with Mr. Dulles for about four hours.

[Here follows the oral briefing given Mr. Dulles.]

III. The Views of Mr. Dulles

Mr. Dulles said that the neutralization arrangement proposed by Walter Lippmann did not make any sense to him in the case of Germany and, although he knew less about Japan, it seemed to him lacking [Page 1162] for similar reasons in its application to Japan. Neutrality had no meaning for the Russians.

With regard to bases, Mr. Dulles seemed somewhat unaware of the JCS interest in having bases on Japan proper as well as on Okinawa. He said that he was in general skeptical about the future utility of small bases scattered around the world. It was his impression that the Air Force would rely increasingly on land-mass bases such as those on the North American continent. He could, however, appreciate the usefulness of bases spread out over a considerable area such as we have in the UK. Bases on Japan proper might be comparable to these. Nevertheless bases in a hostile country would be useless and the Japanese must be willing, as were the British in the case of the UK, to request the United States to establish bases on Japan. Mr. Dulles showed no indication that he had any predisposition as to the necessity for bases but rather regarded this as a technical military problem. He was prepared to envisage an arrangement either with or without bases on Japan proper. As for the Ryukyus his views were the same as those of the Department, that an ordinary trusteeship would be as satisfactory as a strategic trusteeship.

Mr. Dulles expressed grave doubts about a Pacific Pact. His views as to the drawbacks in an extension of an Atlantic Pact2 type of commitment to the Pacific and the Near East coincided with those of the Department. He recalled his vivid impressions of the difficulties with the countries excluded from the Atlantic Pact and the enlargement of membership before the Pact was finally concluded. He said that such difficulties were inevitable when the United States through such pacts sought to draw lines which included some countries and excluded others. Discussing this problem he remarked incidentally that if an actual Soviet armed aggression took place anywhere in the world—he then chose Iran in illustration—the United States would inevitably have to go to war. He did not anticipate such an attack so long as the USSR continued to be so eminently successful in achieving its objectives by means of indirect aggression.

In explaining the lack of appeal which a Pacific Pact had for him, he recalled his meeting at Blair House with General Marshall, Mr. Lovett, and Senator Vandenberg when an Atlantic Pact was first discussed.3 On that occasion he proposed in lieu of an Atlantic Pact a U.S. policy declaration like the Monroe Doctrine. Nevertheless in his testimony [Page 1163] in the Senate he supported the Atlantic Pact out of loyalty. With regard to the Military Assistance Program, he said that it was his belief that the efficacy of military assistance lay almost entirely in the promotion of internal security. It is his belief that the primary source of external security for the other members of the Atlantic Pact lies in the strength of the United States.

With regard to a protocol on security with respect to Japan that would constitute a multilateral endorsement of a U.S.–Japan base arrangement, Mr. Dulles showed no great enthusiasm for the proposal and seemed to concur in our views concerning its weaknesses.

With regard to the stand-by SCAP arrangement and the limited political and economic treaty, Mr. Dulles felt that Messrs, Voorhees and Dorr were highly exaggerating the legal difficulties involved, which he regarded as none of the concern of the Defense Department. He said that Mr. Dorr bad been quite troublesome at Paris, was technically-minded and time-consuming. He indicated appreciation that these arrangements might fall short of meeting the requirements of the opinion of the Japanese and our Allies under present circumstances.

Mr. Dulles seemed immediately to be favorably disposed toward the proposed agreement whereby Japan would be defended against attack and the participating countries would defend one another against attack by Japan. He asked if we had a draft of the proposal with us. A draft was shown to him and he gave it his careful consideration. The manner in which he discussed the draft and the detailed character of his suggestions, which are given below, indicated that he was in general accord with the proposal and at the conclusion of our discussion of the draft he said that he thought that we were “on the right track”. He inquired more than once into the timing contemplated and was told that the timing was largely determined by the necessity for having a U.S. position before the Secretary left for the May 8 meeting of Foreign Ministers4 and that the timing of NSC action would importantly depend on how long exploratory discussions with the National Military Establishment, particularly the Joint Chiefs, took. Mr. Dulles, who was about to depart for a two week vacation in a rather inaccessible part of Canada, said that although he believed we were on the right track, he did not want to be committed to something which was firmed up in detail in his absence, especially while on vacation. He said that he would be perfectly willing to come to Washington before the end of the two weeks and asked to be notified if this were necessary, allowing several days for communication and [Page 1164] travel. He said that arrangements to notify him could be made through his New York office.

Mr. Dulles’ Comments on Draft Agreement on Security With Respect to Japan

The rough draft shown to Mr. Dulles5 contained in Article I a mutual agreement to respect territorial integrity and political independence and to settle disputes by peaceful means. In Article II the parties agreed to consult whenever the security of Japan was threatened from any source. In Article III the parties agreed that an armed attack against Japan would be considered an armed attack against them and that they would assist Japan, using armed force if necessary. This article further provided that Japan and one or more of the powers which furnished forces under SCAP shall conclude an agreement concerning the use of facilities in Japan to carry out the purposes of the article. In Article IV the parties reaffirmed their confidence in the peaceful disposition of Japan but nevertheless undertook to regard an attack by Japan on one party as an attack on them all and undertook to give assistance to the party so attacked. It was explained to Mr. Dulles that this was a very rough draft, more in the nature of an outline setting forth the essential principles and undertakings.

Mr. Dulles’ first comment was that the Atlantic Pact type of commitment to defend Japan against attack would be regarded as somewhat anomalous by our Allies because Japan, an ex-enemy country, would be obtaining a U.S. commitment which every one of our friendly Allies coveted. Mr. Dulles said that the one-for-all and all-for-one commitment of the Atlantic Pact was regarded in the Senate as indicative of a very intimate relation among the nations involved. Judging by his experience in the Senate at the time of the Atlantic Pact he doubted that the Senate would be willing to have the United States engage in a similar “brotherhood” undertaking with respect to Japan. He compared the comitments in the Atlantic Pact and the Rio Treaty,6 pointing to the less direct reference to the use of armed force in the Rio Treaty and the greater emphasis upon consultation. Because of this difference he said the Senate regarded the Atlantic Pact as carrying an obligation to use armed force in the event a member were attacked, whereas under the Rio Treaty no such obligation was automatically brought into force by an attack against one of the parties. Mr. Dulles suggested that the Article III conmmitment with regard to an attack upon Japan might be rephrased to make the commitment to use armed force less automatic.

[Page 1165]

Mr. Dulles said that he did not think the Senate would approve a commitment to defend Japan of indefinite duration. He was told that a time limit was contemplated, but the specific nature of the time limit had not been fully explored.

Mr. Dulles suggested that the commitment to defend one another against an attack by Japan should precede rather than follow the commitment to defend Japan against attack. He said that, although the present order was obviously preferable to the Japanese, the order which we should envisage is to satisfy first of all the American Congress, for Senate ratification was essential, then our Allies and the Japanese.

He suggested that reference to Japan’s constitutional renunciation of war might be useful as “scenery” in relation to the undertaking to defend Japan against attack. Mr. Howard said that such a reference was contemplated, possibly in a preamble which had not yet been drafted, as well as a reference to the role of the occupying forces in insuring Japan’s security under the occupation in relation to the provision for conclusion of a base agreement between Japan and one or more of the powers which furnished such forces. Mr. Dulles said that these two points would be helpful as scenery in getting the agreement adopted.

Mr. Dulles suggested that in the sentence of Article III now reading, “It is mutually agreed that Japan and one or more of the powers which furnished forces under SCAP shall conclude an agreement concerning the use of facilities in Japan” etc, the word “will” would be better than the word “shall”.

Mr. Dulles concurred in the desirability of obtaining General MacArthur’s views concerning the proposed agreement in conjunction with NSC consideration. He suggested however that the proposal submitted to General MacArthur should be less acceptable to the Japanese than the agreement we had in mind. He referred to his experience with General Clay, who was inclined to judge every proposal in terms of whether the Germans would like it and he felt that General MacArthur might have the same inclination in regard to the Japanese. He said that General Marshall had referred to this phenomenon, which he ran into as Chief of Staff during the war, as “localitis”.

With regard to the question of scope of signature, Mr. Dulles favored opening signature to any nation that wished to join rather than restrict membership to the FEC countries and Japan. He did not seem to think that such an extension of the U.S. commitment in respect to an attack by Japan would be objectionable to the JCS.

Mr. Butterworth pointed out that one of the advantages of an agreement of the type under discussion was that it might be possible with such an agreement to omit from the peace treaty any undertaking [Page 1166] by Japan to remain disarmed. Our Pacific allies which were concerned about Japanese aggression would be taken care of by the commitment of the United States to defend them against an attack by Japan, whether armed or disarmed.

  1. Date of conversation; the memorandum was prepared April 11 in Washington.
  2. For text of the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Washington April 4, 1949, see Department of State Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 1964, or 63 Stat. (pt. 2) 2241.
  3. Refers possibly to a meeting held April 27, 1948. For text of Mr. Lovett’s memorandum of this conversation, see Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. iii, p. 104.

    George C. Marshall was then Secretary of State. Robert A. Lovett was Under Secretary of State, Arthur H. Vandenberg of Michigan was Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Mr. Dulles was a member of the United States Delegation to the U.N. General Assembly.

  4. Documentation on the meetings of Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States held in London May 11–13, 1950, is scheduled for publication in volume iii.
  5. Not found in Department of State files.
  6. For text of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, opened for signature at Rio de Janeiro September 2, 1947, see TIAS No. 1838, or 62 Stat. (pt.2)1681.