611.941/8–2450
The Acting United States Political Adviser for Japan (Sebald) to the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison)
Dear John: I am somewhat disturbed at the persistent and fairly effective communist party line in Japan opposing a “separate” peace and the granting of bases to the United States. The communist line is being strongly advocated not only by communist leaders such as Tokuda and Nozaka, but also by leftist Korean elements, communist front organizations, and, of course, by such communist organs as the Akahata. Additionally, G–2 has uncovered a plan on the part of the communists to raise difficulties in connection with the contemplated construction work to be undertaken by Japanese contractors on Okinawa. All this adds up to a well-directed propaganda force which is not being counteracted by us in any way.
You can well appreciate the difficulty in which I find myself when it comes to taking counter-measures to the above. In so far as I am aware, United States policy on these matters has not even crystallized to the point where we know whether base rights will be negotiated at the time of the peace negotiations, or whether in fact we will even desire bases. Nor do we know whether a peace conference will be called, and if so, whether we would go ahead without Soviet Russia (and Communist China). I have, of course, consistently evaded questions put to me by the press here on these subjects.
It seems to me, however, that something should be done, and done soon, to counteract the highly effective communist propaganda line mentioned above. I appreciate that this whole subject is one of considerable delicacy, but the communists are being so successful in crystallizing Japanese public opinion against base rights and against a “separate” peace, that unless something is done to counteract this propaganda, we may be faced with a hard, hostile public opinion in Japan when these matters are eventually raised at the time of the peace conference.
There is little of a concrete nature that I can suggest as to how this propaganda can most effectively be counteracted. There is, of course, the possibility that the subject of bases and “separate” peace might be placed in their proper perspective at one of the Secretary’s press conferences—anything said along these lines would receive good play in Japan and would, I believe, tend to explain to the Japanese just what is meant by bases and “separate” peace. Alternatively, if I had some idea of the Department’s present thinking along these lines, and advice as to how far I could go, the subject matter could easily be worked into a speech here as a trial balloon. This would undoubtedly immediately be picked up by the press and act as a [Page 1155] counter to the communist (Soviet) line. (I am scheduled to give a 15–20 minute speech at a Japan-American Society luncheon on April 28.)
Another matter which gives me considerable concern is the apparent complacency with which the Occupation authorities view current communist activities in Japan. Hardly a day goes by but that Akahata carries an article which is in violation of the press code or which directly or indirectly attacks the United States. Likewise, the commies are becoming bolder in their criticism of the United States, in their activities in the Diet, in pamphleteering, soapbox orations, and in leading wild-cat strikes wherever possible. I do not mean to imply that the communists have gotten out of hand, but there is no question but that they are testing for weak spots and are working hard against the day when their trial period comes to an end and action on a national scale becomes possible.
There seems little doubt that the bolder and more anti-American and anti-Occupation character of communist activities is, at least partly, in response to the criticism the party received at the hands of the Cominform in January.1 It is only too apparent, therefore, that the propaganda lines and activities of the Japan Communist Party have been made to conform perfectly with the over-all Soviet objective in the Far East of undermining the position of the United States and directing all Asiatic grievances into channels of open hostility toward us. In this sense, we can no longer ignore the elementary fact that the Japan Communist Party is not a bona fide Japanese organization which should be accorded the status of a Japanese political party, but is an agency for implementing Soviet policy in Japan.
While I appreciate that a widespread crack-down by the Occupation might not be an unmixed blessing, I am nevertheless convinced that the Occupation should not fear criticism resulting from countermeasures, especially against the upper communist hierarchy, in particularly flagrant cases. Any hardening of the Occupation attitude would, of course, necessarily have to filter down from General MacArthur, who, in my limited discussions on the subject with him, has usually brushed off the communists as gadflies and nothing more. We are, therefore, faced with a basic decision, namely, should an attempt be made to hold the communists strictly in line, either through the Japanese Government or directly by the Occupation, or should we allow matters to drift and hope that the Japanese people themselves will solve the communist problem? I, personally, favor the former course, but would appreciate your views on this most important subject.
[Page 1156]Apropos of the above, I would appreciate being brought up to date on the status of the latest draft treaty and discussions on the problem of security provisions in the draft. We have had no current information on this subject for some considerable time.
Sincerely yours,
- Documentation regarding internal affairs of the Japanese Communist party is in file 794.001 for 1950.↩