[Attachment]
Position of the Department of State on United
States Policy Toward a Japanese Peace and Security
Settlement
This memorandum sets forth the position of the Department of State on
United States policy toward a Japanese peace and security
settlement.
It is recommended:
- 1.
- That this Government should as a matter of urgency conduct
diplomatic discussions with other friendly governments for
the purpose of obtaining their concurrence in going forward
with the conclusion of a Japanese peace treaty and a Pacific
collective security arrangement along the lines set forth
below. Such a peace treaty and security arrangement would
constitute additional elements in an affirmative and
cooperative United States policy toward Asia, other elements
of which include United States encouragement of a voluntary
regional association of Far Eastern non-Communist countries
for economic and cultural purposes, development of a
coordinated Point IV program, and United States economic and
military assistance to individual countries such as Korea,
the Philippines, Indonesia and Indochina.
- 2.
- That this Government should proceed simultaneously to
determine the precise nature of foreseeable United States
military requirements with respect to Japan under such a
security arrangement.6
general considerations
1. The Need for an Early Peace
Settlement
[Here follows a discussion under this heading.]
2. The Problem of Security
The root of the problem of proceeding with the negotiation of a peace
treaty is the problem of the security of the United States and its
friendly Allies in the post-treaty period. The essential objectives
of the United States from both the political and the military
standpoints are the denial of Japan to the USSR and the maintenance
of Japan’s orientation towards the Western powers (NSC 49 and 49/1).7
The security problem relating to Japan has two aspects. The first
aspect flows from Japan’s aggression which led to the war and from
the fear of the victims of Japanese aggression concerning its
possible resurgence in the future. The second aspect flows from the
postwar [Page 1141] threat of
aggression from Soviet-Communist expansion in Asia. The first aspect
of the problem would normally be taken care of in a treaty of peace.
The second aspect would not normally be part of a peace treaty.
However, the two aspects overlap and it may be possible that a
satisfactory security arrangement for one would materially assist in
taking care of the other.
The problem of security against Soviet-Communist expansion also has
two aspects. One aspect is defense against overt attack and
invasion. The other aspect is protection against Soviet-Communist
agitation, subversion and coup d’état. The
two aspects are, however, closely related. On the one hand, a sound
defense against armed attack contributes to the feeling of security
among the Japanese necessary to political, economic and social
stability and progress. On the other hand, rights to maintain armed
forces and military bases on Japan would not contribute to Western
military strength unless they rested on Japanese support founded on
healthy political, economic and social conditions.
The underlying problem of a peace and security settlement with Japan
is therefore to determine a course of action which will preserve or
strengthen the security of the United States and its friendly Allies
in the Far East through the creation of new and more stable
political relationships with respect to Japan which will best assure
the continued pro-Western orientation of the Japanese. It is
impossible for any treaty or settlement or any course of action or
inaction to assure unqualifiedly such an orientation of the
Japanese. Our objective should be to determine the way which secures
the greatest gains with the least risks.
Our appraisal of Soviet intentions is that the USSR would probably
now favor the early conclusion of a multilateral peace treaty if it
could thereby secure the evacuation of United States troops from
Japan, the legalization of Soviet territorial gains, a post-treaty
voice in Japan and possibly some economic gains and opportunities
for propaganda in Japan, with the ultimate objective of seizing
power in Japan through the Japanese Communist Party. But Soviet
actions, particularly the recent demand for the trial of the Emperor
as a war criminal, the Sino-Soviet treaty of alliance directed
against Japan and its Allies, and the purge of the Japanese
Communist Party, indicate that the USSR may have given up hope of
obtaining such a settlement in the near future and has determined to
participate in a Japanese settlement only on its own terms. These
actions suggest that the USSR has determined to concentrate its
attention on China and Southeast Asia rather than on Japan and is
preparing to cope with a situation formalized along the lines of an
anti-Communist bloc including a pro-Western Japan and based on
United States military power. For these purposes the USSR and
Communist China [Page 1142] have
substantial capabilities which cannot be ignored and which would be
tremendously increased should there be further substantial Communist
successes on the Asian continent.
Under these circumstances action by the United States and its
friendly Allies in proceeding with a peace and security settlement
which is acceptable to them and therefore probably not acceptable to
the USSR and Communist China would not materially alter Soviet
actions with respect to Japan or the Soviet timetable in Southeast
Asia. Indeed failure to take such action exposes the United States
and its friendly Allies to the blame within Japan for the
Soviet-Communist pressures directed against Japan, without the
Japanese at the same time enjoying the benefits and protection of
such a settlement.
This is not to say that the United States should not seek a peace
treaty with Japan which is fair and reasonable even in relation to
the USSR. But the United States is under no legal obligation to the
USSR either to sign a peace treaty on Soviet terms or not to sign at
all. Such legal pretext as the Soviets might create out of the
signature of a peace treaty without their participation would not be
necessary to or change those actions which they considered justified
in terms of political and power relationships. Should such a pretext
be absent because the United States refrained from proceeding except
on Soviet terms another pretext would be created by the USSR to
serve a similar purpose.
At the same time, if it becomes necessary to conclude a peace and
security settlement without the USSR and Communist China, the United
States should proceed with as many as possible of its friendly
allies in order to spread the burden of responsibility and to
minimize the adverse effects of Soviet-Communist pressures upon the
Japanese. Thus, in the conclusions of the NSC on the position of the United States with respect
to Asia (NSC 48/2), it is stated
that the United States should appraise the desirability and means of
developing collective security arrangements bearing in mind the
reluctance of India to join in an anti-Communist security pact and
the necessity of sharing of the burden by all participating
states.
peace and security settlement
The above considerations suggests these guides to a peace and
security settlement:
- 1.
- That an early peace treaty with Japan is in the interests
of the United States provided concurrent measures are taken
to preserve the United States military position in the
Pacific.
- 2.
- That the problem of security against Soviet-Communist
expansion, which would not normally be covered by a peace
treaty with Japan, should be dealt with separately from the
peace treaty in a security arrangement for the post-treaty
period.
- 3.
- That post-treaty arrangements should promote the
development of a framework of friendly allies for Japan so
as to promote Japan’s pro-Western orientation and its
reestablishment as a stable and peaceful member of the
family of nations.
- 4.
- That the United States and its friendly allies should, if
there is a sufficient measure of agreement among them upon
an acceptable settlement, proceed without the USSR and
Communist China should this be necessary.
1. The Peace Treaty
A peace treaty should be concluded which is designed to restore Japan
to a genuinely sovereign status with a minimum of restrictions and
special disabilities. It should be of such a character as to appeal
to Japanese interest and thus draw Japan into friendly relations
with the non-Communist nations. The treaty should be brief as
possible, but should deal clearly and specifically with all matters
involved in the re-establishment of normal relations between the
Allies and Japan. Pending the coming into force of the peace treaty
the Japanese should be prepared for the task of maintaining internal
security in Japan.
[Here follows detailed description of peace treaty desiderata.]
2. The Collective Security
Arrangement
A collective security arrangement should be concluded consistent with
the UN Charter for the purpose of maintaining peace and stability in
the Pacific area and of promoting cooperative measures among the
members for their collective self-defense. The membership would
include, initially, the United States, Canada, the Philippines,
Australia, New Zealand and Japan.
The major provisions of the arrangement would be along the following
lines:
An undertaking by the parties to settle disputes by peaceful
means and to refrain from the threat or use of force as
provided in the UN Charter.
An undertaking by the parties to contribute to the further
development of peaceful and friendly relations by the
strengthening of free institutions, bringing about a better
understanding, and promoting conditions of stability and
well being; and to eliminate conflict in economic policies
and encourage economic collaboration.
An undertaking by the parties to consult whenever their
territorial integrity, political independence, or security
is threatened.
Agreement that an armed attack against any member should be
considered an armed attack against all the members, and that
each would take such action as it deemed necessary,
individually or in concert with other members, to assist the
member attacked. All measures taken would immediately be
reported to the Security Council and would be terminated
when the Security Council had taken measures necessary to
restore and maintain peace and security.
An undertaking by the parties, by means of continuous
self-help and mutual aid, to cooperate in the maintenance
and development of measures for their defense against armed
attack. In particular the parties [Page 1144] would undertake to
conclude special agreements in accordance with which they
would make available according to their respective
capacities armed forces, assistance, and facilities,
including rights of passage, necessary for carrying out the
purpose of the security arrangement. (Note—Pursuant to this provision a special
agreement fixing such rights to bases on Japan as are
necessary could be concluded.)
The establishment of a council, on which each member would be
represented, to consider matters concerning the
implementation of the arrangement.
Provision for the admission, by unanimous agreement, of other
Pacific powers as members.
Provision for review of the arrangement at the end of every
five years or at any time requested by a majority of the
parties.
Provision of the right to cease to be a member after twenty
years upon the giving of notice of denunciation of the
arrangement.
Advantages—The advantages of such a
Pacific collective security arrangement concluded apart from
the peace treaty are briefly as follows (fuller comments are
given below):
The United States would gain allies in the Pacific area while
its own commitments would not be materially different from
existing United States responsibilities in the Pacific.
The arrangement would facilitate the signature by other
members of a non-punitive peace treaty with Japan and help
to assure them against a resurgence of Japanese
aggression.
It would strengthen Japan’s resistance to Soviet-Communist
pressures and facilitate restoration of normal political and
economic relations between Japan and other members.
India and other countries which are reluctant to join any
anti-Communist association would be enabled to participate
in an unobjectionable peace treaty with Japan and at the
same time, since they are not proposed for membership in the
security arrangement, would not be squarely confronted with
the necessity of openly choosing sides in the East-West
conflict on a military issue.
The proposed security-arrangement would reenforce measures
for the strengthening of Indochina and other non-communist
South East Asian countries and provide a backstop that would
assist in their protection against Soviet-Communist
expansion.
3. Procedure
The procedure to be followed for the conclusion of the peace treaty
and its security arrangement should, so far as the peace conference
is concerned, aim at a course in which the break to be expected with
the USSR and Communist China would probably come on procedural
issues rather than substantive issues and would come in a forum
which makes it clearly a break with a large group of nations and not
with the United States alone. Also the procedure should rest as
fully as possible on the 1947 precedent of the peace conference
proposal.
A procedure along the following lines is therefore recommended.
The first step is to arrive at a United States Government
position. This step would include Congressional
consultation.
[Page 1145]
The second step would be to negotiate as much as possible of the
peace treaty and the security arrangement with friendly FEC countries through diplomatic
channels. Such a step is necessary in any event to obtain
adequate assurance of agreement with our friendly Allies on
content and procedure before going forward. Japan’s views would
also be discreetly explored at a late stage in this step.
Third, the United States would renew its invitation of 1947 for
an FEC-power peace conference,
designating time and place and proposing again a two-thirds
voting procedure. The first task of the conference would be to
determine its voting procedure. At an appropriate stage the
non-FEC nations and then
Japan would be invited to participate in some way. The
conference would be as brief as possible with most of the time
devoted to the views of non-FEC
nations and Japan. After any modifications had been made the
ceremony of signature would take place. As many countries as
possible would be given an opportunity to participate in the
signature of the peace treaty. (Modification of the above
procedure may be required if the USSR proposes a peace
conference before the United States is ready to issue
invitations to such a conference.)
Fourth, immediately following conclusion of the peace treaty the
nations to be included in the security arrangement would proceed
with the final negotiation of the agreement for a security
arrangement. Any special agreement fixing such bases on Japan
and rights incident thereto as may be necessary could also be
informally agreed upon, possibly subject only to adoption under
the regional arrangement when that arrangement entered into
force.
Fifth, the peace treaty and security arrangement would be
submitted simultaneously to the Senate for ratification.
Finally, in order to avoid a gap in time between the entry into
force of the peace treaty and the security arrangement, the
ratifications necessary to bring both into force might be
deposited on an agreed date. Japan’s act of ratification of the
security arrangement could immediately follow its act of
ratification of the peace treaty, both acts having been
previously authorized by the Japanese Diet.
The above procedure assumes that a representative of the Chinese
Communist Government would already have been admitted to the FEC. This would be the ground for
justifying the inclusion of the Communist Government in the
invitation to the peace conference even though it might not yet have
been recognized by the United States and possibly certain other
FEC powers.
The USSR and Communist China might refuse to attend the conference
because of their disagreement with the proposed forum and voting
procedure. Or they might consent to attend, possibly with an
indication that an FEC-power
conference would be acceptable provided the big power veto were
maintained (this was the position of the Nationalist Chinese
Government in 1947). In either event, the conference would proceed
and would adopt a two-thirds voting procedure without a veto. If the
USSR and Communist China had come to the conference, they would
probably walk out of the conference at this stage. If not, their
continued presence could do little damage [Page 1146] because of prior agreement among
the friendly allies on substance and because of the brief nature of
the conference.
Signature by a large number of countries would give a solid
international backing to the peace treaty in spite of the refusal of
the USSR and Communist China to participate.
Because it is unlikely that the pre-conference negotiations with
other friendly countries could be carried out without leaks
occurring, this Government should at an appropriate time after the
initial negotiations issue a statement concerning its proposals.
4. Other Related Action
Other action related to the recommended peace treaty and security
arrangement includes:
United States encouragement of a voluntary regional
association of Far Eastern non-Communist countries for
economic and cultural purposes.8
United State assistance to Indochina (NSC 64).9
United States programs of Point IV, MDAP and other assistance to countries of the
Far East not proposed for membership in the security
arrangement.8
comments
1. The military basis of the security arrangement is principally
United States sea and air power in the Pacific and the Pacific
island bastions, on which the parties to the arrangement depend for
their security. The arrangement formalizes existing United States
responsibilities in the Pacific. The arrangement would broaden the
base of sharing in these responsibilities and would provide for
making as effective as possible use of the available security means
for the common defense, in a manner consistent with the UN Charter.
The arrangement, being designed for the Pacific area, probably would
not by its terms permit the use of bases in Japan in the event war
should break out in Europe, although a separate understanding might
be reached with the Japanese on this point.
The defense-against-Japan aspect of the security problem, as
contrasted with the defense-of-Japan aspect dealt with in the
preceding paragraph above, would be dealt with as follows. The
control over reactivation of Japanese armed forces would be
exercised through the peace treaty mechanism of review. The
mechanism of the regional arrangement would strengthen the controls
normally exercised through diplomatic channels over any activities
in Japan which might have adverse consequences in the security
field. The majority interests of the parties in both cases should be
sufficiently identical [Page 1147]
to permit the exercise of both types of controls in a consistent
manner for a common purpose.
2. Because of the regional nature of the arrangement and its
conformity with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter,
Japan’s role would be substantially different from that under a
bilateral base agreement with the United States, which would appear
to be more in the nature of an outright military alliance.
Nevertheless, in entering the arrangement Japan would have to choose
not to remain militarily neutral. This choice would be considerably
easier than it would be under a bilateral base arrangement. Japan
would be one of several members of the arrangement, contributing to
peace and stability in the Pacific. It would face the possibility of
eventual rearmament of a limited nature geared into the collective
defense of the Pacific area. Japanese interests would not under such
an arrangement appear to be subordinated to the interests of the
other Allies. The security arrangement’s regional framework of
friendly Allies would lessen any sense of insecurity the Japanese
might feel should they be cut off by the USSR and Communist China
economically and politically.
Such a security arrangement offers the best assurance available of
continued Japanese pro-western orientation, which in turn is a
prerequisite to the effective realization of any rights to maintain
forces and bases in Japan in the post-peace treaty period. Without
continuing Japanese consent, the maintenance of Allied forces and
bases in Japan would not only be ineffectual in promoting United
States security but might have an adverse effect on our security.
Thus, if sabotage and other local acts of violence against the
Allied bases on Japan were not adequately prevented by domestic
measures taken with the full cooperation of the Japanese people or
if the Japanese people became openly hostile in their attitude, a
situation would be created which would have dangerous consequences
for relations between the United States and Japan, for the prestige
of the United States among the peoples of the Far East and for
stability generally in that area.
It is proposed therefore that, within the context of the twenty-year
collective security arrangement, any special agreement with respect
to bases on Japan should be for an initial five-year period with
provision for automatic renewal for subsequent five year periods
unless Japan or a majority of the members should withdraw their
consent. It is further proposed that any such agreement, made in
pursuance of the security arrangement, should be a multilateral
agreement rather than a bilateral agreement between the United
States and Japan, and that Australia should be persuaded to continue
its forces in Japan to supplement United States forces, under the
overall direction of an American commander.
[Page 1148]
3. The peace treaty should not, for political reasons, authorize the
reactivation of Japanese armed forces. Nevertheless, the peace
treaty should not foreclose the possibility of Japanese rearmament
at some future time if this course should appear to be in our best
interests or in the event Japan should become involved in armed
conflict. Our objective under present conditions of the cold war is
the prevention of the outbreak of war rather than measures of
military defense against actual armed attack by the USSR. The
premature diversion of United States aid and Japanese efforts and
resources to the maintenance of a Japanese military establishment
would upset the balance in the concentration of such aid, efforts
and resources, on the one hand, upon the accomplishment of the
foregoing objective and, on the other hand, upon the achievement of
economic and social progress which in the long run will greatly
influence the continued orientation of Japan towards the United
States. Moreover, authorization of rearmament in the peace treaty
without the expressed will of the Japanese through voluntary
amendment of their constitution would appear to have been imposed
upon the Japanese for the purpose of promoting the strategic
military interests of the United States and would cast serious
doubts among the Japanese and other peoples in the Far East as to
the sincerity of United States purposes and the validity of the
objectives of the occupation. Both consequences would weaken United
States influence and the influence of democratic principles in
Japan, both of which are necessary to offset Communist influence in
Japan. Finally, a present proposal to rearm Japan would probably be
viewed unfavorably by the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand and
other Allied Powers that continue to fear a renascent nationalistic
and aggressive Japan.
4. It is highly important that Far Eastern countries excluded from
the security arrangement—particularly Indochina, Siam, Burma, Korea
and Indonesia—not feel that they have been abandoned to Soviet
Communism. As in the case of the exclusion of Greece and Turkey from
the North Atlantic Pact, it is important that there be advance and
tangible assurances of continuing United States interest in the
countries excluded from the collective security arrangement. It is
important that the countries of South East Asia, which are the
immediate target of Soviet Communist pressures, should have their
resistance to such pressures strengthened rather than weakened by
the conclusion of the offshore security arrangement. These countries
would have to be convinced that the security arrangement covering
the Pacific area would be a backstop that would materially assist in
the protection [Page 1149] of
continental Asian areas and would in no sense be a retreat or
abandonment of these areas to Soviet-Communist aggression.
In the case of Indonesia, it is believed that membership should be
deferred at least so long as its internal order and strength are
inadequate to enable it to make a substantial contribution to the
security arrangement. Indonesia should, however, be informed of the
proposed arrangement at an early stage.
It must be understood that the UK, France, and possibly the
Netherlands may have objections to a collective security arrangement
in the Pacific excluding them which would have to be taken into
consideration. In the case of the UK, it should be pointed out that
its interests and the interests of the Commonwealth are adequately
represented through the membership of the three Commonwealth nations
in the security arrangement; that the inclusion of the UK, France
and the Netherlands in the arrangement would require in turn the
inclusion of Hong Kong, the Malayan States, Indochina and Indonesia
with a consequent unacceptable extension of the security commitment
of the participating nations and with the consequent introduction of
an unfortunate imperialistic aspect into the arrangement; and that
British prestige in the Pacific should be adequately assured through
the security system of the British Commonwealth of nations. In the
case of France, it is believed that adequate assurance of aid to
Indochina would be sufficient to justify exclusion of both Indochina
and France. Similar considerations would appear to apply to
Indonesia and the Netherlands.
Although the Philippines and Australia in particular would probably
not relish association with Japan in the proposed regional
arrangement, their vital interest in a closer security association
with the United States and the importance of the defense of Japan
against Soviet-Communist domination to their defense might well
cause them willingly to join the arrangement after initial
hesitation. Although Canada is not a “Pacific island” power its
inclusion has the advantage that it is a western power like the
United States yet is not a target of propaganda against
imperialism.
