694.001/2–650

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth)1

top secret

Participants: General MacArthur
Mr. Butterworth
Mr. Sebald

In the course of an hour’s interview followed by a luncheon conversation, General MacArthur reiterated the views he had previously expressed to Mr. Sebald on several occasions and, more recently, to Ambassador Jessup with respect to a Treaty of Peace with Japan.

Since the Joint Chiefs of Staff had just departed from Tokyo following a three-day conference with General MacArthur, I queried him particularly as to the nature of his discussions with the Joint Chiefs and the effect which their visit to Japan might have on their previously expressed opinions.

In brief, he indicated his firm conviction that his discussions with the Joint Chiefs had a helpful and constructive result; he felt sure that the Joint Chiefs would considerably modify their previous opinion, but they should be given a little time so as not to lose face in the process of reversal.2

It is of interest that in this connection, General MacArthur referred to the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of last July3 about which, he said, he had not been consulted and said that General Bradley under questioning admitted it had been only “lightly considered”.

Among the things which General MacArthur vouchsafed he had stated to the Joint Chiefs, two points are of particular interest: one, his insistence to the Joint Chiefs that they had exceeded their terms of reference and expressed opinions which had nothing to do with the military aspects of the problem on which their advice had been [Page 1134] sought; secondly, he had emphasized the importance of not proposing to the Japanese drastic requirements regarding bases, and in this connection had cited the relationship between Egypt and the United Kingdom since 1882. He informed the Joint Chiefs that in his view a maximum five-year period was sufficient for base rights, renewal to take place thereafter by mutual agreement. He expressed the greatest confidence that the Japanese would be more than willing to undertake subsequent renewal; if anything, he said, the United States would in the end prove to be the first to seek disengagement from the agreement. I questioned him about whether the Joint Chiefs entertained the view, as Mr. Voorhees had more than once implied, that bases in Japan were to be used in the future for forward air operations against Russia in time of war. General MacArthur said decidedly not, that the bases in Japan now and for the future are and would be for defensive purposes only, and that the Joint Chiefs had no other concept in mind.

General MacArthur reiterated that he believed that the attitude of the Joint Chiefs would undergo decided modification, but it was to be expected that Mr. Voorhees would fanatically oppose any treaty in the immediate future. He felt that Mr. Voorhees entertained such exaggerated views about this matter that he would doubtless resign rather than be party to a peace treaty. He took this occasion to refer disparagingly to Mr. Voorhees, and said that he understood that Mr. Voorhees now had a fantastic scheme for Asiatic Trade which no doubt he conceived he would head.4

General MacArthur emphasized, as he had in previous conversations with Mr. Sebald and Ambassador Jessup, the importance in his view of the United States Government proceeding without delay to call a Peace Conference, thus recapturing the initiative in the Orient and, in this connection, he went out of his way to reiterate that the situation in Japan itself could not stand still; that the Japanese would not permit themselves to be controlled by an Occupation indefinitely.

In addition, he said that in his opinion the rest of Asia looked upon the Occupation as an imperialistic venture, a belief which was largely sponsored by Soviet propaganda. He felt that the United States must make good on its promise to end the Occupation to prove to Asia our lack of imperialistic ambition here.

It was obvious from General MacArthur’s account of his discussions with the Joint Chiefs that he still entertained the view that the neutralization of Japan would be of advantage to Soviet Russia as well as to the United States, and therefore should be acceptable to both countries. General MacArthur seemed moved to hold this concept of [Page 1135] Soviet interest in a neutral Japan because of his view that the Soviet positions in this part of the world are of a defensive character. Also he conceives that so profound is the anti-Russian feeling in Japan that an association between Japan and Russia would not prove on balance advantageous to Russia. Queried about these assumptions and about Soviet Russia’s desire to control the power potential of Japan, General MacArthur, without disavowing his previously expressed view, made it clear that if Soviet Russia (and Communist China) did not join in a Peace Treaty, he felt that a Treaty should nevertheless be conluded with the other concerned nations.

W. Walton Butterworth
  1. Mr. Butterworth enclosed this memorandum with a letter of February 6, not printed, to Livingston Merchant, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. On February 7 Mr. Butterworth. by then in Manila, summarized this conversation in telegram 409, marked “Eyes only for the Secretary,” not printed. (694.001/2–750)
  2. In his memorandum of the Secretary’s morning meeting held February 14, William J. McWilliams, Director of the Executive Secretariat, stated in part: “Mr. Webb said he was present when the JCS reported to the President [in Washington] on Saturday [February 11]. He said they gave General Mac-Arthur’s views on the peace treaty and on bases which were as we know them. The JCS do not agree with MacArthur on that issue since they feel the Russians could make the same claim to bases that we make.” (Executive Secretariat Files)

    In a letter to General MacArthur dated February 27, Mr. Voorhees stated in part: “Since his return. General Bradley has told me orally that the Chiefs were still strongly of the opinion that it is premature to make a treaty at this time, and that they had so orally advised the President.” (MacArthur Memorial Library and Archives, Record Group 5)

  3. The JCS report of June 9, 1949, “Strategic Evaluation of United States Security Needs in Japan,” was circulated on June 15 as NSC 49. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. vii, Part 2, p. 773.
  4. This reference may possibly be to the NSC 61 proposals. For a citation to NSC 61 documents, see footnote 2 to the memorandum by W. W. Diehl, Financial Attaché of the Mission in Tokyo, to Mr. Sebald, June 20, p. 1223.