694.001/1–1850

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs ( Butterworth )1 to the Secretary of State

top secret

Subject: Japanese Peace Settlement

Attached for your consideration are the following memoranda:

  • Tab A. Outline for Meeting with you on Japanese peace settlement.
  • Tab B. Course of Action with Respect to Japanese Peace Settlement.2
  • Tab C. Procedure for Reaching Agreement within U.S. Government Concerning Japanese Peace Settlement.3
  • Tab D. Analysis of JCS decision that a peace treaty is premature.4
  • Tab E. Memorandum from Mr. Perkins to Mr. Butterworth on Soviet Exclusion from Japanese Treaty.5

Mr. Fisher6 is submitting to you separately his opinion on the legal aspects of the problems involved.7

[Tab A]

Outline for Meeting With the Secretary on Japanese Peace Setlement

problem

To determine:

A course of action for the U.S. Government with respect to a Japanese peace settlement; and

A procedure by which agreement within the U.S. Government to such a course of action can be reached.

[Page 1118]

possible action

I. Conclusion of an “Agreement on the Restoration of Normal Political and Economic Relations with Japan” while continuing unchanged the occupation arrangements with respect to security matters.

Advantages:

1.
Would minimize political and military risks involved in proceeding without USSR and China, while at same time establishing more stable political relationships with respect to Japan.
2.
Friendly Allies in Far East would not be forced openly to choose sides between U.S. and USSR on military issue.
3.
Japanese Government would be less vulnerable (than under II) to Communist propaganda that it had sold out Japanese people to Western imperialism.
4.
Substantially satisfies primary concerns of JCS concerning effects of separate peace treaty on U.S. security.

Disadvantages:

1.
The co-existence of legal state of war and of normal political and economic relations with Japan and rather substantial nature of change in Allied occupation controls would be seized upon by USSR and Chinese Communists in charges that agreement is subterfuge and that United States and other signatory powers had violated their wartime agreements with USSR and China.
2.
Japan’s desire for total termination of occupation would be disappointed.

II. Conclusion of a Peace Treaty which authorizes the maintenance of U.S. or Western-Allied bases in Japan.

Advantages:

1.
Would be more clean-cut than Course I.
2.
Because of strong Japanese desire for peace treaty and likely acceptance of U.S. forces as best available solution of Japan’s security problem, would take advantage of unique opportunity which may not again recur to secure exclusive long-term U.S. or Western Allied bases in Japan.
3.
Would completely satisfy Japan’s desire for a peace treaty.
4.
Would from legal standpoint, if UN approval is obtained, provide broadest international basis for U.S. security forces in Japan.

Disadvantages:

1.
Would commit U.S. to long-term pattern of political relationships based on Japan’s consent to U.S. bases and nakedly military U.S. posture in Japan.
2.
Would result in break with USSR and Chinese Communists over issue of U.S. bases in Japan.
3.
Would confront friendly Far East Allies with necessity for open choice of sides in East-West conflict on a military issue.
4.
USSR and Chinese Communists would make greatest possible difficulties for Japanese Government, which would be subjected to all-out propaganda campaign of having sold out Japanese people to Western imperialism.
5.
Complete termination of SCAP controls might increase Soviet and Chinese Communist capabilities of increasing their influence over Japan.
6.
If UN consideration is sought, might well deepen issue dividing U.S. and USSR with possible harm to United Nations itself.

[Tab B]

Courses of Action With Respect to Japanese Peace Settlement

This memorandum analyzes two courses of action with respect to a Japanese peace treaty. Neither course is wholly desirable. Each involves in varying degrees difficulties with the Soviet Union and Communist China which flow from the present state of U.S.-Soviet/Chinese relations. But either course is believed preferable to other courses which have been considered, including a stand-by SCAP arrangement8 or a continuation of the status quo.

The present situation is viewed as one in which the occupation in its present form has passed its peak, the Japanese and most if not all of the friendly Allied Powers favor the conclusion of an early peace treaty if security can be maintained, the Soviet Union and Communist China together have substantial capabilities of influencing Japan’s future behavior, and it is of primary political importance that the United States be in a position of favoring and attempting to obtain a satisfactory peace treaty. At the same time it is assumed that the United States is determined (a) to maintain its forces in Japan for the purpose of helping to maintain security in that area and thereby protect the security of the United States and (b) to conduct its relations with Japan and the Far East in such a way as to promote the pro-Western orientation of Japan and of the non-communist nations in the Far East, and therefore that the Soviet Union and Communist China will probably not concur in the course of action adopted.

[Page 1120]

i

conclusion of an “agreement on the restoration of normal political and economic relations with japan” while continuing unchanged the occupation arrangements with respect to security matters

The agreement would restore to Japan the full exercise of its sovereign powers in the political and economic fields. It would contain substantially the same political and economic provisions as would a peace treaty embracing the entire scope of problems arising from the war. Following the entry into force of the agreement the signatory nations would exchange diplomatic representatives with Japan in the usual fashion.

At the same time the agreement would not deal with security matters (including occupation forces and Japanese demilitarization). It would likewise not deal for security reasons with territorial questions including the disposition of Formosa, the Ryukyus (Southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles. The agreement would expressly provide that it does not affect in any way the powers of SCAP under the Instrument of Surrender with respect to “security matters”, which would not be defined in the agreement.

Following conclusion of the agreement the United States would issue to SCAP an agreed directive which would take cognizance of the fact that with the conclusion of the agreement the Potsdam terms and the FEC 9 decisions relating to non-security matters had been fulfilled and which would direct that SCAP’s powers be thereafter restricted to matters of security. Existing FEC decisions relating to security, which are fairly clear cut in their application to the occupation forces and to Japanese demilitarization, would continue to be carried out. The activities of the Far Eastern Commission and of the Allied Council for Japan10 would also be restricted in practice to the field of security.

From a legal standpoint the agreement would purport to continue unchanged in the security field the wartime Allied agreements (the Potsdam Proclamation and the Instrument of Surrender) which constitute the international legal basis for SCAP’s powers and for the Allied occupation forces in Japan. It would not bring about a state of peace in the traditional sense and the state of war would legally continue.

[Page 1121]

Procedure

The first step would be to negotiate as much as possible of the agreement with friendly FEC countries through diplomatic channels. Such a step is necessary in any event to obtain adequate assurance of agreement with our friendly Allies on content and procedure before going further. The establishment of a Commonwealth working group reported by Bevin would facilitate this step. Japan’s views might also be discreetly explored at a late stage in this first step.

Second, the USSR and China would be given an opportunity to agree or disagree with and express their views on the resulting draft agreement. This could be done by the United States approaching the USSR and by the United States or United Kingdom approaching China through diplomatic channels. (A less attractive alternative would be for the United States, acting as a sort of spokesman for the friendly FEC powers, to submit the draft agreement to a meeting of the CFM;11 this course would have the advantage and disadvantage of meeting the USSR and China in a forum of the USSR’s own choice.) If an agreement appeared possible any concessions would of course be cleared in advance with the friendly FEC powers. If agreement were not possible we would proceed with step three.

Third, as many countries as possible would be given an opportunity to participate in the signature of the draft agreement. This would be accomplished by calling a conference for that purpose. The USSR and China would probably be invited. (Conceivably they might not be invited if a prior CFM meeting had been held, on the ground that they had already refused to concur in such an agreement.) The conference would in any event be brief: non-FEC nations and Japan would be given an opportunity to express their views and after any modifications had been made, under a previously agreed voting procedure without veto, the ceremony of signature would take place.

Fourth, following conclusion of the agreement, the United States would issue to SCAP a directive previously agreed to by the conference powers. Taking cognizance of the fact that with the conclusion of the agreement with Japan the Potsdam terms and the FEC decisions relating to non-security matters had been fulfilled, the directive would direct that SCAP powers be thereafter restricted to matters of security. (Additional steps would be taken to put the occupation forces on a pay-as-you-go basis, to limit the purge to the minimum requirements of the existing FEC decisions and to strengthen the Japanese civil police.) The U.S. representative to the FEC would notify that body of the directive concurrently with its issuance.

[Page 1122]

Fifth, when the agreement entered into force, the United States would appoint an Ambassador to Japan who would have normal ambassadorial status. SCAP, however, would continue in Japan as the ranking international representative but with functions limited to the field of security.

Justification

The U.S. position by which the above type of agreement would be justified is in brief as follows:

Responsibility for the maintenance of security with respect to Japan is currently being exercised by the powers responsible for Japan’s defeat through the stationing of Allied troops in Japan under SCAP. This arrangement arose out of the war and out of Allied wartime agreements. The United Nations Charter12 envisaged that the powers which defeated Japan would continue to bear the responsibility for security with respect to Japan until such time as the United Nations would have achieved the moral strength and armed services necessary to enable it to assume this responsibility. Similarly, the Potsdam Proclamation envisaged a more permanent security arrangement to which this security responsibility could be transferred when the occupation would be terminated. Thus the Potsdam statement of the long-term objectives of the occupation included the following terms:

“There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.

“Until such a new order is established and until there is convincing proof that Japan’s war-making power is destroyed, points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied to secure the achievement of the basic objectives we are here setting forth.”

The USSR has by its aggressive policy and intransigent attitude inside and outside of the United Nations prevented the development of a more permanent security arrangement which could be substituted for the present arrangement. Under present circumstances the withdrawal of Allied occupation forces would leave in a disarmed and defenseless Japan a vacuum into which Communist forces would not hesitate to move, with the consequent growth in Japan either of a totalitarian militaristic regime of the right or a Communist instrument of “Slav imperialism”. Under these circumstances the long-term security objectives of the Potsdam Proclamation cannot be achieved, [Page 1123] nor can the special responsibilities of the nations which defeated Japan be discharged, by the withdrawal of the occupation forces.

At the same time the Japanese people have worked diligently and faithfully to discharge their surrender commitments and the Allied purposes enunciated at Potsdam have been fulfilled in many essential respects. Thus, the physical war potential of Japan has been destroyed; the Japanese people have established in their country guarantees for the protection of the fundamental human rights; and a Japanese Government has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the people. Moreover, the Japanese people have adopted a Constitution in which they have forever renounced war as a sovereign right of the nation and have declared that the maintenance of land, sea, and air forces will never be authorized. The reason that Allied Forces still occupy Japan is itself by no means due to the fault of the Japanese since the inception of the occupation, but rather to events and circumstances which Japan’s past aggressions helped to set in motion but which are now beyond Japan’s capacity to influence or control.

The United States is, and for some time has been, persuaded that the Japanese people are entitled to have their country restored to a more normal state of international relations. In 1947 the United States proposed a conference to consider a peace treaty with Japan with such continuing controls as might be adequate to secure the conditions essential to peace.13 This proposal and this invitation of the United States were not acted upon. During the past year the United States has unsuccessfully attempted to reach agreement through the FEC that Japan should be permitted to have consular and trade representatives in the various Allied countries in order to promote the restoration of normal economic relationships between Japan and other countries.

The United States now proposes, as a basis for as widespread agreement as possible, the conclusion of an agreement to restore Japan to normal political and economic relationships with other countries. Such an agreement will enable Japan to re-enter the community of nations, to devote her full energies to the achievement of further political and economic progress and stability, and to become eligible for admission to the United Nations. These benefits should not be further denied the Japanese people because of Soviet obstruction of an adequate and more permanent security arrangement. Through the conclusion of such an agreement the Japanese people will achieve the benefits of normal international relations which they deserve while the Allied powers will be given further opportunity for the development of an effective and more permanent security arrangement which [Page 1124] will be adequate to secure these benefits for the Japanese people and for the United Nations.

Advantages and Disadvantages.

Relations with the USSR and China—The above course of action would minimize the political and military risks involved in proceeding without the USSR and China, while at the same time affirmatively coping with those factors which make desirable the restoration of Japan to a state of peace and the establishment of more stable political relationships with respect to Japan for the coming difficult period in the Far East. The course of action would avoid, or at least the United States would appear to be making a sincere effort to avoid, an open break with the USSR over the issue of long-term U.S. bases and forces in Japan. The co-existence of a technical state of war and of normal political and economic relations and the rather substantial nature of the change in the Allied occupation control would of course be seized upon by the USSR and the Chinese Communists in their charges that the agreement is a subterfuge and that the United States and other signatory powers had in fact violated their wartime agreements with the USSR and China.

Relations with Japan—Japan’s desire for a total termination of the occupation would be disappointed. On the other hand the restoration of normal political and economic relations might be realistically accepted as the maximum possible consistent with Japanese security. Disappointment over failure to achieve a complete state of peace might be more than offset by realization of the fact, which would increase in importance in the long run, that (in comparison with a complete state of peace and a separate U.S.-Japanese long-term base agreement) the Japanese Government would be less vulnerable to Communist propaganda that the Government has been in any way responsible by its own action for the continued presence of U.S. forces in Japan and had sold out the Japanese people to Western imperialism.

Relations with Friendly Far East Powers—Our friendly Allies in the Far East, particularly countries such as India, would not be confronted with the necessity at the present time of openly siding with the United States in the cold war between East and West on a military issue in which the United States would be seeking long-term bases in Japan for purposes which the USSR and the Chinese Communists would allege were aggressive and imperialistic. It is preferable that the pro-Western orientation of the Far Eastern peoples be brought about more gradually along economic and political lines. When conditions more propitious to the establishment of a Pacific security arrangement have been developed, the occupation of Japan could be finally terminated and Japan could be admitted as a member to such an arrangement with corresponding responsibilities and obligations. Although the continued presence of U.S. forces in Japan may not be [Page 1125] welcomed by certain of the Far East nations, nevertheless, the termination of the occupation controls over Japan in political and economic affairs would open the door to Japan’s independence in these fields and it is possible that in time those Far Eastern peoples not already convinced of the importance to their own security of U.S. forces in Japan would become so as they witness expansionist tendencies of “Slav imperialism”.

Relations with the U.S. Military—The above course of action copes reasonably well with the factors believed to be of primary concern to the JCS (See Tab D: note 2 attached to Analysis of JCS Memorandum). The agreement would purport to continue unchanged the legal basis for the retention of Allied occupation forces in Japan. No new agreement affecting security to which the USSR and China would not be parties would be concluded. Thus there would be less risk that Soviet harassment of Japan and U.S. protective action might make the United States appear to be the initiator of hostile military action against the USSR, thereby increasing the security risks of the United States in Japan. This course of action would also avoid the necessity for incorporating, because of uncertainties as to developments in the Far East, maximum military demands in a treaty authorizing U.S. bases.

U.S. Public and Congress—It is believed that the above course of action would satisfy the desires of the American people and the Congress for the preservation of U.S. strength in the Pacific and for the establishment of more normal relationships with respect to Japan which would permit greater Japanese political and economic self-dependence consistent with security.

Termination of the Occupation—The retention of Allied occupation forces in Japan for purposes strictly limited to security must also be considered in the light of possible changes in the Far East which may make possible, in the long run, a change in the U.S. military posture in the Pacific without loss of security. The occupation might be wholly terminated in a number of ways: (a) by unanimous consent, although this appears unlikely; (b) by agreement between Japan and the United States or Western Allied Powers to the retention of long-term U.S. or Western Allied bases in Japan; although the opportunity for obtaining Japanese consent to such an arrangement would appear to be much more favorable now than subsequently after Japan had already received many of the benefits of a state of peace, at the same time it is possible that friendly Far Eastern peoples including the Japanese may with time become more convinced of the necessity for having Allied bases in Japan; (c) by development of Article 43 forces of the United Nations, although this possibility appears somewhat remote at present; (d) by a UN guarantee of the demilitarization and neutralization of Japan, although the [Page 1126] United States does not regard this favorably under present conditions and would not be obligated to accept any such determination by the General Assembly; (e) by UN action regularizing the presence of Allied occupation forces in Japan, although the Soviet Union would not be obligated to accept any such determination by the General Assembly; or (f) by the development of a Pacific regional arrangement for security purposes in accordance with Article 51 or Article 53 of the UN Charter. Such a regional arrangement, which could be coupled with the reactivation of Japanese armed forces if this appears desirable in conjunction with Japan’s admission as a member of the arrangement, appears to be a most likely possibility and one toward which the United States should with caution and proper timing bend its efforts.

[Here follows a detailed exposition of alternative “II”.]

Conclusion.

It is believed that course of action I would, on balance, promote U.S. interests in accordance with our Asian policy better than course of action II.14

Course II is more clean-cut than course I. It would, however, commit the United States to a long-term pattern of political relationships based on Japan’s consent to U.S. bases and, in Far Eastern eyes, a nakedly military U.S. posture in Japan. It is believed that Soviet reaction to such a situation formalized along pro-U.S. lines would be to adopt the tactic of making the greatest possible difficulties, economic and otherwise, for the Japanese Government, which it would accuse of having sold out the Japanese people to Western military imperialism.

Course I leaves the United States in a more flexible position. It leaves open the possibility of developing a more permanent security arrangement with respect to Japan at a future time under more propitious circumstances and attitudes which it should be our business to help bring about. The retention of U.S. forces in Japan as forces of the occupation, although by no means a happy necessity, has its roots in the past war and the unique U.S. contribution to the restoration of peace and security in the Pacific, and is less imperialistic-looking than course I [II?]. If Australia could be persuaded to continue its occupation forces in Japan, the psychological effect in the Far East would be further improved. The Soviet reaction would probably be to continue their drive to get occupation forces out of [Page 1127] Japan, with Soviet fire directed more against the United States than against Japan.

[Tab D]—Note 1

It is not clear what the JCS had in mind in making their statement that, in arriving at their conclusion, they have taken note of the fact that a treaty consistent with the terms of surrender “could not at this time assure the denial of Japan’s ultimate exploitation by the USSR or assure her orientation toward the western powers”. They may have had in mind one or more of the following points:

1.
Since the Potsdam Proclamation requires the removal of U.S. forces when the objectives of the Proclamation have been achieved, the JCS may have concluded that with the signing of the peace treaty U.S. forces would have to be removed from Japan if the surrender terms were not to be violated. Such an interpretation of the Proclamation would not take account of (a) the fact that authority for the continued presence of U.S. forces in Japan in the post-treaty period could be derived from Japan’s consenting a separate simultaneous agreement, or (b) the fact that there is nothing in the Proclamation that precludes the signing of a peace treaty in advance of the accomplishment of the objectives of the Proclamation and the withdrawal of occupation forces.
2.
The JCS may have assumed that under the surrender terms joint action is required in the signature of a peace treaty and that to proceed without the USSR, because it would not agree to the continuation of U.S. forces in Japan, would be a violation of the obligation of joint action and therefore would involve unacceptable security risks. The Department of State does not agree with this conclusion and has concluded that a separate treaty could be legal and if properly brought about would not give the Soviets a solid legal basis for charging violation of U.S. obligations.
3.
The JCS may have reasoned that with the signing of a peace treaty SCAP’s command relationship with the Japanese Government would terminate, whereas the continuation of this relationship is essential to U.S. security interests. This would indicate a skepticism concerning the adequacy of normal political relationships to assure Japan’s behavior in accordance with U.S. security interests.

All of the above factors are by their nature unchanging and therefore suggest the impossibility of having a peace treaty in the foreseeable future consistent with U.S. security.

[Tab D]—Note 2

Check list of factors which have troubled the JCS and Department of Defense officials concerning the possible effects of a peace treaty upon U.S. security:

1.
Uncertainties in the Far East in the face of a growing Soviet-Communist menace, as a consequence of which the U.S. military does not want any change in the situation that might increase U.S. security risks.
2.
The lack of a guarantee of continued pro-Western orientation of the Japanese once the SCAP command relationship over the Japanese Government is broken.
3.
The lack of a guarantee against increased Soviet influence in a Japan free to determine its own foreign political and trade relationships and the related possibility of Soviet-Communist out-bidding of the United States for bases on Japan or other security advantages.
4.
The loss of the presently predominant U.S. position with respect to Japan which permits the United States largely to dictate Japanese behavior.
5.
Legal and political difficulties in proceeding with a peace settlement to which the USSR and Communist China are not parties.
6.
The dissolution of SCAP and the Far Eastern Group in the Office of the Under Secretary of the Army and transfer of responsibility from the Defense Department to the Department of State.
7.
The possibly adverse effect upon the Allied High Commission in Western Germany through the premature whetting of the desire of the Western Germans for a peace treaty.
8.
The lack of compelling positive reasons for an early peace treaty and the feeling that the Japanese are not ready politically for post-treaty freedom.15

[Page 1129]

In contrast to the above points the following factors relating to security have impressed Defense Department officials as favoring an early peace treaty:

1.
The strong Japanese desire for a peace treaty.
2.
The fact that the occupation has probably passed its peak and will continue to run down hill.
3.
The fact that the conclusion of a peace treaty will hasten the time when the rearming of Japan will be politically feasible.

  1. Tabs A through D were drafted by John B. Howard, Special Assistant to the Secretary.
  2. Earlier versions of Tabs A and B dated January 9, not printed, are enclosed with Mr. Howard’s memorandum of January 10 to Mr. Butterworth, also not printed. (694.001/1–1050)
  3. Not printed.
  4. Only the notes to this paper are printed.
  5. In this memorandum of December 30, not printed, George W. Perkins, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, had argued in part that conclusion of a Japanese peace treaty from which the Soviet Union might be excluded would not of itself provoke Soviet action vis-à-vis Japan or the Far East generally. Important decisions of Soviet foreign policy would continue to be based on the Kremlin’s estimate of its own and its adversaries’ strengths and weaknesses, and it would be the power-political implications of such a treaty that would be of interest to it. EUR did not believe that there were elements in United States relations with the Soviet Union which, if the United States considered a treaty desirable on political grounds, should compel it to refrain from proceeding with such a treaty.
  6. Adrian S. Fisher, Legal Adviser.
  7. See p. 1124.
  8. Refers to an approach which prescribed discontinuance on a broad scale of the exercise of detailed SCAP controls over the Japanese Government but retention of formal SCAP powers as a basis for maintaining United States forces in Japan and allowing the United States to intervene in Japanese affairs in time of crisis. This approach was discussed, but not recommended, in the memoranda mentioned in footnote 2, p. 1117. See also footnote 15, p. 1128.
  9. The Far Eastern Commission. It was established by, and its functions were set forth in, the Communiqué of the Moscow Conference, issued December 27, 1945, by the representatives of the United Kingdom, United States, and the Soviet Union. Text is printed in Department of State Bulletin, December 30, 1945, p. 1027. For the activities of the FEC, see Department of State, The Far Eastern Commission: A Study in International Cooperation, 1945 to 1952 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1953).
  10. Also established and structured by the Communiqué cited in the previous footnote.
  11. The agreement establishing a Council of Foreign Ministers (of China, France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union) is contained in the Protocol of August 1, 1945, and the Communiqué of August 2, 1945, both signed in Berlin by the Heads of Government of the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union. Text is printed in Foreign Relations, 1945, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), vol. ii, pp. 14781479 and 15001501.
  12. For text of the Charter of the United Nations, opened for signature at San Francisco June 26, 1945, see Department of State Treaty Series (TS) No. 993, or 59 Stat. (pt.2) 1031.
  13. For pertinent documentation on efforts of the United States in behalf of a peace treaty with Japan, see Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. vi, pp. 446 ff.
  14. Course of action was discussed at a meeting held January 18. Present were the Secretary, Deputy Under Secretary Dean Rusk, Mr. Butterworth, Mr. Howard, and possibly other officials. The proposal was rejected. Mr. Howard touched on the meeting in three memoranda: March 9, to Mr. Butterworth; March 24, to Ambassador Jessup; and March 31, to Charles Bohlen, Minister at Paris, pp. 1138, 1150, and 1157, respectively.
  15. In a memorandum of his conversation held December 8, 1949, with Mr. Goldthwaite Dorr, Consultant to Under Secretary Voorhees, Mr. Howard had stated:

    “In a lengthy conversation, Mr. Dorr expounded the non-legal thinking which underlay his legal views as expressed in recent conversations. The most significant of these in relation to the thinking of Mr. Dorr and Mr. Voorhees on the merits of a stand-by SCAP proposal in preference to a peace treaty, were the following.

    “Mr. Dorr indicated that he did not believe Japan was ready for a peace treaty. He believed that the objectives of the Potsdam Declaration had by no means been fulfilled and that informal advice and direction of the SCAP Staff to the Japanese Government might be beneficial for some years to come in developing the type of Japanese Government which the United States would favor.

    “Although Mr. Dorr shared to some extent the fears that a separate peace treaty might provoke Soviet action inimical to U.S. security, which Mr. Voorhees has advanced as a primary reason for the stand-by SCAP proposal, nevertheless Mr. Dorr indicated that he differed with Mr. Voorhees on this point in that he did not believe that the primary justification for the stand-by SCAP arrangement should grow out of the cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union. He regarded as the main justification for the stand-by SCAP arrangement the fact that Japan is not yet sufficiently stable economically, either internally or in relation to other countries, and that to free Japan from our control prematurely before it has become an accepted and integral part of a Far East economic international system might lead to consequences not desirable from the U.S. standpoint.

    “He said that he regarded the proposal for a peace treaty without the Soviet Union and Communist China as a purely negative approach growing out of the cold war whereas the stand-by SCAP arrangement would permit the achievement of something constructive and would give the United States greater flexibility of action. Indeed he suggested that if U.S.-Soviet relations were not as they are, then a stand-by SCAP arrangement looking toward the gradual fading out of occupation controls and the gradual re-emergence of Japan as a member of the community of nations would be the ‘normal’ process.

    “When I pressed him on the possible timing and method of termination of the stand-by SCAP proposal his answers, although not clear cut, indicated the possibilities of never having a peace treaty as may be the case with Western Germany, of continuing the stand-by SCAP arrangement for perhaps some five years, and of an amelioration in U.S.-Soviet relations which might at some time in the future render unnecessary the retention of U.S. bases and forces in Japan.” (740.0011 PW (Peace) /12–849)