[Tab B]
Courses of Action With Respect to Japanese
Peace Settlement
This memorandum analyzes two courses of action with respect to a
Japanese peace treaty. Neither course is wholly desirable. Each
involves in varying degrees difficulties with the Soviet Union and
Communist China which flow from the present state of
U.S.-Soviet/Chinese relations. But either course is believed
preferable to other courses which have been considered, including a
stand-by SCAP arrangement8 or a continuation of the status quo.
The present situation is viewed as one in which the occupation in its
present form has passed its peak, the Japanese and most if not all
of the friendly Allied Powers favor the conclusion of an early peace
treaty if security can be maintained, the Soviet Union and Communist
China together have substantial capabilities of influencing Japan’s
future behavior, and it is of primary political importance that the
United States be in a position of favoring and attempting to obtain
a satisfactory peace treaty. At the same time it is assumed that the
United States is determined (a) to maintain
its forces in Japan for the purpose of helping to maintain security
in that area and thereby protect the security of the United States
and (b) to conduct its relations with Japan
and the Far East in such a way as to promote the pro-Western
orientation of Japan and of the non-communist nations in the Far
East, and therefore that the Soviet Union and Communist China will
probably not concur in the course of action adopted.
[Page 1120]
i
conclusion of an “agreement on the restoration
of normal political and economic relations with japan” while
continuing unchanged the occupation arrangements with respect to
security matters
The agreement would restore to Japan the full exercise of its
sovereign powers in the political and economic fields. It would
contain substantially the same political and economic provisions as
would a peace treaty embracing the entire scope of problems arising
from the war. Following the entry into force of the agreement the
signatory nations would exchange diplomatic representatives with
Japan in the usual fashion.
At the same time the agreement would not deal with security matters
(including occupation forces and Japanese demilitarization). It
would likewise not deal for security reasons with territorial
questions including the disposition of Formosa, the Ryukyus
(Southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles. The agreement would expressly
provide that it does not affect in any way the powers of SCAP under the Instrument of Surrender
with respect to “security matters”, which would not be defined in
the agreement.
Following conclusion of the agreement the United States would issue
to SCAP an agreed directive which
would take cognizance of the fact that with the conclusion of the
agreement the Potsdam terms and the FEC9 decisions relating to
non-security matters had been fulfilled and which would direct that
SCAP’s powers be thereafter
restricted to matters of security. Existing FEC decisions relating to security, which are fairly
clear cut in their application to the occupation forces and to
Japanese demilitarization, would continue to be carried out. The
activities of the Far Eastern Commission and of the Allied Council
for Japan10 would also be restricted in practice to the
field of security.
From a legal standpoint the agreement would purport to continue
unchanged in the security field the wartime Allied agreements (the
Potsdam Proclamation and the Instrument of Surrender) which
constitute the international legal basis for SCAP’s powers and for the Allied
occupation forces in Japan. It would not bring about a state of
peace in the traditional sense and the state of war would legally
continue.
[Page 1121]
Procedure
The first step would be to negotiate as much as possible of the
agreement with friendly FEC
countries through diplomatic channels. Such a step is necessary in
any event to obtain adequate assurance of agreement with our
friendly Allies on content and procedure before going further. The
establishment of a Commonwealth working group reported by Bevin
would facilitate this step. Japan’s views might also be discreetly
explored at a late stage in this first step.
Second, the USSR and China would be given an opportunity to agree or
disagree with and express their views on the resulting draft
agreement. This could be done by the United States approaching the
USSR and by the United States or United Kingdom approaching China
through diplomatic channels. (A less attractive alternative would be
for the United States, acting as a sort of spokesman for the
friendly FEC powers, to submit the
draft agreement to a meeting of the CFM;11 this course
would have the advantage and disadvantage of meeting the USSR and
China in a forum of the USSR’s own choice.) If an agreement appeared
possible any concessions would of course be cleared in advance with
the friendly FEC powers. If
agreement were not possible we would proceed with step three.
Third, as many countries as possible would be given an opportunity to
participate in the signature of the draft agreement. This would be
accomplished by calling a conference for that purpose. The USSR and
China would probably be invited. (Conceivably they might not be
invited if a prior CFM meeting had been held, on the ground that
they had already refused to concur in such an agreement.) The
conference would in any event be brief: non-FEC nations and Japan would be given an opportunity to
express their views and after any modifications had been made, under
a previously agreed voting procedure without veto, the ceremony of
signature would take place.
Fourth, following conclusion of the agreement, the United States
would issue to SCAP a directive
previously agreed to by the conference powers. Taking cognizance of
the fact that with the conclusion of the agreement with Japan the
Potsdam terms and the FEC decisions
relating to non-security matters had been fulfilled, the directive
would direct that SCAP powers be
thereafter restricted to matters of security. (Additional steps
would be taken to put the occupation forces on a pay-as-you-go
basis, to limit the purge to the minimum requirements of the
existing FEC decisions and to
strengthen the Japanese civil police.) The U.S. representative to
the FEC would notify that body of
the directive concurrently with its issuance.
[Page 1122]
Fifth, when the agreement entered into force, the United States would
appoint an Ambassador to Japan who would have normal ambassadorial
status. SCAP, however, would
continue in Japan as the ranking international representative but
with functions limited to the field of security.
Justification
The U.S. position by which the above type of agreement would be
justified is in brief as follows:
Responsibility for the maintenance of security with respect to Japan
is currently being exercised by the powers responsible for Japan’s
defeat through the stationing of Allied troops in Japan under SCAP. This arrangement arose out of
the war and out of Allied wartime agreements. The United Nations
Charter12 envisaged that the powers which
defeated Japan would continue to bear the responsibility for
security with respect to Japan until such time as the United Nations
would have achieved the moral strength and armed services necessary
to enable it to assume this responsibility. Similarly, the Potsdam
Proclamation envisaged a more permanent security arrangement to
which this security responsibility could be transferred when the
occupation would be terminated. Thus the Potsdam statement of the
long-term objectives of the occupation included the following terms:
“There must be eliminated for all time the authority and
influence of those who have deceived and misled the people
of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist
that a new order of peace, security and justice will be
impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the
world.
“Until such a new order is established and until there is
convincing proof that Japan’s war-making power is destroyed,
points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies
shall be occupied to secure the achievement of the basic
objectives we are here setting forth.”
The USSR has by its aggressive policy and intransigent attitude
inside and outside of the United Nations prevented the development
of a more permanent security arrangement which could be substituted
for the present arrangement. Under present circumstances the
withdrawal of Allied occupation forces would leave in a disarmed and
defenseless Japan a vacuum into which Communist forces would not
hesitate to move, with the consequent growth in Japan either of a
totalitarian militaristic regime of the right or a Communist
instrument of “Slav imperialism”. Under these circumstances the
long-term security objectives of the Potsdam Proclamation cannot be
achieved,
[Page 1123]
nor can the
special responsibilities of the nations which defeated Japan be
discharged, by the withdrawal of the occupation forces.
At the same time the Japanese people have worked diligently and
faithfully to discharge their surrender commitments and the Allied
purposes enunciated at Potsdam have been fulfilled in many essential
respects. Thus, the physical war potential of Japan has been
destroyed; the Japanese people have established in their country
guarantees for the protection of the fundamental human rights; and a
Japanese Government has been established in accordance with the
freely expressed will of the people. Moreover, the Japanese people
have adopted a Constitution in which they have forever renounced war
as a sovereign right of the nation and have declared that the
maintenance of land, sea, and air forces will never be authorized.
The reason that Allied Forces still occupy Japan is itself by no
means due to the fault of the Japanese since the inception of the
occupation, but rather to events and circumstances which Japan’s
past aggressions helped to set in motion but which are now beyond
Japan’s capacity to influence or control.
The United States is, and for some time has been, persuaded that the
Japanese people are entitled to have their country restored to a
more normal state of international relations. In 1947 the United
States proposed a conference to consider a peace treaty with Japan
with such continuing controls as might be adequate to secure the
conditions essential to peace.13 This
proposal and this invitation of the United States were not acted
upon. During the past year the United States has unsuccessfully
attempted to reach agreement through the FEC that Japan should be permitted to have consular and
trade representatives in the various Allied countries in order to
promote the restoration of normal economic relationships between
Japan and other countries.
The United States now proposes, as a basis for as widespread
agreement as possible, the conclusion of an agreement to restore
Japan to normal political and economic relationships with other
countries. Such an agreement will enable Japan to re-enter the
community of nations, to devote her full energies to the achievement
of further political and economic progress and stability, and to
become eligible for admission to the United Nations. These benefits
should not be further denied the Japanese people because of Soviet
obstruction of an adequate and more permanent security arrangement.
Through the conclusion of such an agreement the Japanese people will
achieve the benefits of normal international relations which they
deserve while the Allied powers will be given further opportunity
for the development of an effective and more permanent security
arrangement which
[Page 1124]
will
be adequate to secure these benefits for the Japanese people and for
the United Nations.
Advantages and Disadvantages.
Relations with the USSR and China—The above
course of action would minimize the political and military risks
involved in proceeding without the USSR and China, while at the same
time affirmatively coping with those factors which make desirable
the restoration of Japan to a state of peace and the establishment
of more stable political relationships with respect to Japan for the
coming difficult period in the Far East. The course of action would
avoid, or at least the United States would appear to be making a
sincere effort to avoid, an open break with the USSR over the issue
of long-term U.S. bases and forces in Japan. The co-existence of a
technical state of war and of normal political and economic
relations and the rather substantial nature of the change in the
Allied occupation control would of course be seized upon by the USSR
and the Chinese Communists in their charges that the agreement is a
subterfuge and that the United States and other signatory powers had
in fact violated their wartime agreements with the USSR and
China.
Relations with Japan—Japan’s desire for a
total termination of the occupation would be disappointed. On the
other hand the restoration of normal political and economic
relations might be realistically accepted as the maximum possible
consistent with Japanese security. Disappointment over failure to
achieve a complete state of peace might be more than offset by
realization of the fact, which would increase in importance in the
long run, that (in comparison with a complete state of peace and a
separate U.S.-Japanese long-term base agreement) the Japanese
Government would be less vulnerable to Communist propaganda that the
Government has been in any way responsible by its own action for the
continued presence of U.S. forces in Japan and had sold out the
Japanese people to Western imperialism.
Relations with Friendly Far East Powers—Our
friendly Allies in the Far East, particularly countries such as
India, would not be confronted with the necessity at the present
time of openly siding with the United States in the cold war between
East and West on a military issue in which the United States would
be seeking long-term bases in Japan for purposes which the USSR and
the Chinese Communists would allege were aggressive and
imperialistic. It is preferable that the pro-Western orientation of
the Far Eastern peoples be brought about more gradually along
economic and political lines. When conditions more propitious to the
establishment of a Pacific security arrangement have been developed,
the occupation of Japan could be finally terminated and Japan could
be admitted as a member to such an arrangement with corresponding
responsibilities and obligations. Although the continued presence of
U.S. forces in Japan may not be
[Page 1125]
welcomed by certain of the Far East nations,
nevertheless, the termination of the occupation controls over Japan
in political and economic affairs would open the door to Japan’s
independence in these fields and it is possible that in time those
Far Eastern peoples not already convinced of the importance to their
own security of U.S. forces in Japan would become so as they witness
expansionist tendencies of “Slav imperialism”.
Relations with the U.S. Military—The above
course of action copes reasonably well with the factors believed to
be of primary concern to the JCS
(See Tab D: note 2 attached to Analysis of JCS Memorandum). The agreement would purport to
continue unchanged the legal basis for the retention of Allied
occupation forces in Japan. No new agreement affecting security to
which the USSR and China would not be parties would be concluded.
Thus there would be less risk that Soviet harassment of Japan and
U.S. protective action might make the United States appear to be the
initiator of hostile military action against the USSR, thereby
increasing the security risks of the United States in Japan. This
course of action would also avoid the necessity for incorporating,
because of uncertainties as to developments in the Far East, maximum
military demands in a treaty authorizing U.S. bases.
U.S. Public and Congress—It is believed that
the above course of action would satisfy the desires of the American
people and the Congress for the preservation of U.S. strength in the
Pacific and for the establishment of more normal relationships with
respect to Japan which would permit greater Japanese political and
economic self-dependence consistent with security.
Termination of the Occupation—The retention
of Allied occupation forces in Japan for purposes strictly limited
to security must also be considered in the light of possible changes
in the Far East which may make possible, in the long run, a change
in the U.S. military posture in the Pacific without loss of
security. The occupation might be wholly terminated in a number of
ways: (a) by unanimous consent, although this
appears unlikely; (b) by agreement between
Japan and the United States or Western Allied Powers to the
retention of long-term U.S. or Western Allied bases in Japan;
although the opportunity for obtaining Japanese consent to such an
arrangement would appear to be much more favorable now than
subsequently after Japan had already received many of the benefits
of a state of peace, at the same time it is possible that friendly
Far Eastern peoples including the Japanese may with time become more
convinced of the necessity for having Allied bases in Japan; (c) by development of Article 43 forces of the
United Nations, although this possibility appears somewhat remote at
present; (d) by a UN guarantee of the
demilitarization and neutralization of Japan, although the
[Page 1126]
United States does not
regard this favorably under present conditions and would not be
obligated to accept any such determination by the General Assembly;
(e) by UN action regularizing the
presence of Allied occupation forces in Japan, although the Soviet
Union would not be obligated to accept any such determination by the
General Assembly; or (f) by the development
of a Pacific regional arrangement for security purposes in
accordance with Article 51 or Article 53 of the UN Charter. Such a
regional arrangement, which could be coupled with the reactivation
of Japanese armed forces if this appears desirable in conjunction
with Japan’s admission as a member of the arrangement, appears to be
a most likely possibility and one toward which the United States
should with caution and proper timing bend its efforts.
[Here follows a detailed exposition of alternative “II”.]
Conclusion.
It is believed that course of action I would, on balance, promote
U.S. interests in accordance with our Asian policy better than
course of action II.14
Course II is more clean-cut than course I. It would, however, commit
the United States to a long-term pattern of political relationships
based on Japan’s consent to U.S. bases and, in Far Eastern eyes, a
nakedly military U.S. posture in Japan. It is believed that Soviet
reaction to such a situation formalized along pro-U.S. lines would
be to adopt the tactic of making the greatest possible difficulties,
economic and otherwise, for the Japanese Government, which it would
accuse of having sold out the Japanese people to Western military
imperialism.
Course I leaves the United States in a more flexible position. It
leaves open the possibility of developing a more permanent security
arrangement with respect to Japan at a future time under more
propitious circumstances and attitudes which it should be our
business to help bring about. The retention of U.S. forces in Japan
as forces of the occupation, although by no means a happy necessity,
has its roots in the past war and the unique U.S. contribution to
the restoration of peace and security in the Pacific, and is less
imperialistic-looking than course I [II?]. If
Australia could be persuaded to continue its occupation forces in
Japan, the psychological effect in the Far East would be further
improved. The Soviet reaction would probably be to continue their
drive to get occupation forces out of
[Page 1127]
Japan, with Soviet fire directed more against
the United States than against Japan.
