756C.00/12–3150: Telegram
The Ambassador in Indonesia (Cochran) to the Secretary of State
865. Secretary to Prime Minister Natsir came my home night the twenty-ninth. Said before Prime Minister’s departure for Bandung that afternoon he had instructed secretary tell me he thought it might be helpful if I saw Surkarno, but he left it to my judgment. I gave no definite answer but have preferred not seek appointment except as planned final paragraph Embtel 857.
Cabinet scheduled meet 9 morning thirtieth but postponed until 2 p. m. awaiting Natsir’s return. President Sukarno attended that part of Session wherein NNG was discussed. Consensus of opinion seemed to be that since Hague negotiations had failed to achieve one point pledged in Natsir’s political platform government should resign unless it can come forward with proposed solution and then risk vote non-confidence by Parliament thereon. It was agreed no firm decision should be taken pending return Ministers Roem and Leimena with remainder Indonesian delegation from NNG conference. They scheduled arrive 2 p. m. January 1. Cabinet meeting will be held immediately thereafter.
[Page 1107]Addressing gathering on occasion birthday Prophet Mohammad, President Sukarno night thirtieth said he had to disappoint his audience because he was not able to make his long-awaited speech on New Guinea. Said he had much desire to give his opinion on this question but he was President with parliamentary Cabinet and this Cabinet has to account for its activities to Parliament. He added however “as soon as Cabinet has received Minister Roem’s report and Cabinet has decided its standpoint I will raise my voice-over New Guinea.”
Am told in strictest secrecy that Cabinet meeting thirtieth practically decided on denouncing Netherlands-Indonesian union, with it remaining only to formalize such decision after Roem has been heard. Masjumi Party leaders preferred to formulate this definite decision for submission to Parliament rather than to resign without doing anything and leaving way open for leftist government and outbreak boycott, sabotage and perhaps, even more serious violence. But as counterpart to this decision which will be communicated to President after Cabinet’s meeting with Roem, or will be learned directly by him if he attends, Cabinet will establish firm policy toward keeping law and order and avoiding such excesses as boycott, sabotage, strikes, etc., and will insist that President support such policy in speech which he is to make on night first, and in his future acts.
Cabinet’s legal expert bases propriety of denunciation of union upon fact that Indonesian constitution includes west New Guinea within sovereign Indonesia; that in remaining in NNG Netherlands union partner violates territory Indonesian partner, so latter has right abrogate union. Cabinet members have already seen growing demand in press for end of union and it is fairly certain that many of their respective party leaders with whom they are conferring today will agree that present deadlock constitutes not only justification but also opportunity for breaking union that Netherlands have permitted to develop unhappily principally through maladroit handling of military and political issues this past year. Ministers realize they are taking serious chance in such decision. They know they would be badly hurt if Netherlands should in return withdraw communications, capital, etc., from Indonesia. Ministers believe, however, that Netherlands’ business interests are sympathetic to their position. They would rather take risk of Netherlands reprisal and condemnation by foreign opinion and international groups than simply give back their mandate to President and leave way open to leftism and violence. Ministers are advised by their legal expert that union can be denounced without destroying agreements under RTC that do not pertain directly to matter of union. Majority of them definitely want to continue economic and related agreements provided for in RTC, and think Netherlands will come to same decision. They realize that Indonesia will not acquire NNG by policy of denouncing union. They will not send forces to try [Page 1108] to capture NNG. They will be reconciled to leaving NNG matter in dispute, after union denounced, with hope that with passage of time, certainly not more than few years, Indonesia will have become consolidated internally and will have established such diplomatic relations with Netherlands and Australia that recognition of Indonesia’s claim to NNG will be forthcoming.
I was asked by my high-placed informant what reaction of UN and US would be to Indonesian denunciation of union. I said I had no instructions or authority to speak for either. I said, however, that we naturally desired to see international undertakings respected and difficulties worked out by bilateral rather than unilateral decisions. I knew that my people would deeply regret scrapping of entire RTC agreement. My friend thought this would not come. In answer to my question whether intervention immediately by UNCI or foreign representatives, including myself, could stop move toward denouncing union, he replied that it definitely could not. I have been of this opinion for some time. I hope I may be able, however, helpfully to counsel law and order, and perhaps to contribute to better understanding between President and his Cabinet. Ministers feel Sukarno has learned lesson as to dangers to his own policies and his own country of some of his statements and will work more harmoniously with his government in future. I am informed Vice President Hatta was present at Cabinet meeting and did not raise his voice once against trend of debate, apparently reconciled to this as best way out.
Please handle foregoing most cautiously. Incidentally Netherlands’ edition of ANETA on thirty-first carried UP story dated Washington thirtieth speculating whether US would now intervene on NNG question and reporting that I had asked Department pressure Van Royen to get Netherlands yield to Indonesia on NNG.