Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

357.AA/12–850: Telegram

The Ambassador in Indonesia (Cochran) to the Secretary of State

confidential   priority

Djakarta, December 8, 1950—6 p. m.

764. Visited President Sukarno forenoon eighth my request. He particularly interested in story Roem’s visit US and warm welcome extended, including reception by President and Secretary of State.¹ Sukarno asked US attitude on NNG. I reminded him we participated in UNCI when latter assisted draft provisions RTC agreement with respect NNG. US steadfastly maintained position two parties to dispute should negotiate solution amicably. I told him of conversation with Roem and NNG (reported by me from Brussels November 30²). I said today’s press reports indicated agreement under consideration somewhat along lines envisaged by Roem, involving de jure transfer sovereignty end 1950, and various separate agreements to be consummated thereafter with respect transferring administrative and other functions gradually.

President had received no word directly from Roem as to present status negotiations. He said arrangement such as Roem described would be acceptable to him. He would not agree, however, to joint control or trusteeships for NNG. He stressed importance which Indonesian people attach sovereignty transfer. He asked if US could take active part in behalf Indonesians. I again repeated we adhered firmly to position taken at The Hague and hoped two parties would soon settle differences through friendly negotiations, without drawing others into controversy. I said if agreement now concluded along lines envisaged by Roem, I would not hesitate recommend my government express its satisfaction that such amicable arrangement had been achieved. I pointed out that Australia had risked destroying its usefulness on UNCI by practically becoming a party to NNG dispute. I thought Sukarno would see propriety of US refraining from any statement favoring either side while negotiations in progress, particularly when good friends of US are involved on what might be called three sides, namely Netherlands, Australia and Indonesia. I particularly expressed hope solution would be reached without Indonesia resorting to such measures as boycott and sabotage.

We discussed Indonesian internal situation. President assured me that with return Indonesian troops from Ambon, effort would be concentrated on eliminating armed bands and marauders and on establishing security for life and property.

Sukarno raised question Korea and sought my views thereon. I admitted situation grave but reminded him US history showed we always emerged satisfactorily in end. I did not yet know results Washington conference with British³ but reports so far of mutual determination and cooperation were highly encouraging. I told Sukarno we had definite knowledge of heavy Chinese troops movements towards Korea border many weeks before MacArthur’s last push toward border, so that allegations of this had precipitated Chinese offensive action were false. He admitted Communist explanations of Chinese “volunteers” completely absurd. When I mentioned our suspicion Chinese had Soviet inspiration and support, Sukarno quickly replied this was no “suspicion” but “fact”. Sukarno said Chinese Communists Indonesia becoming increasingly [impudent?]. Said government endeavoring obtain proofs of use gold from Shanghai and from Chinese Ambassador Djakarta for financing trouble-making Surabaya and elsewhere. Still not permitting opening of Chinese Consulates.

I told Sukarno it was well Roem had taken group of associates to Lake Success to participate in UN activities and learn issues on which Indonesia as new member state must indicate position. I said move of 13 Arab and Asiastic states, including Indonesia, in petitioning Communist Chinese for halting at 38th parallel evidence desire to be of assistance. I was worried however by fact Indonesia joined three other Asian countries in abstaining from vote in which 51 UN members favored discussing six-power resolution on withdrawal Chinese from Korea, with five Soviet member states opposing. Sukarno assured me that one great desire of Indonesian Government is to help prevent Third World War. I made clear to him that, however noble this motive may be, there is certainly ground for misunderstanding thereof by fellow members of UN when a newly-admitted member of the body, particularly a member owing its sovereignty so importantly to UN action, fails to support resolution in defense of principles upon which UN founded. I had not endeavored at any time draw Indonesian Government publicly into taking position, but now that membership in UN entails voting on contentious issues, Indonesia would have to realize that philosophy of its government and orientation of its foreign policies will be judged importantly by their voting at UN. I did not mean to criticize, since I have full understanding of difficult stage through which Indonesia still moving and of disaster that might come from getting involved when desperately unprepared.

On other hand, I stressed US had not hesitated taking lead within UN toward stopping brutal aggression in an area far removed from our shores. I said we could still withdraw to our own land and defend ourselves against any enemy if we were motivated solely by self-protection, and not dedicated and devoted to principle, of defending free peoples against aggression. We had risked and are still risking our best fighting forces against tremendous odds, supported by contributions from fellow UN members which are little more than token in most instances. I pointed out that some countries more closely exposed than Indonesia to danger from Communist China, such as Thailand, have not hesitated to indicate how they stand and contribute to cause of defense. I said Indonesia should realize Chinese move into Korea is part, of overall Soviet plan to control Asia and that resolute defense on continent of Asia is vital if Indonesia itself is to be spared. I said Indonesia must be awake to and admit danger of Communist movement southward and formulate its policies accordingly.⁴

Sukarno again insisted position, Indonesian Government is taking is that which they conscientiously feel will best contribute to preventing Third World War. He said I should know Prime Minister Natsir hates anything that “smells slightest of communism.” I said that while I had entire faith in attitude of moderate Indonesian Government toward communism, many peoples might not be convinced Indonesian Goverment unalterably opposed to communism if it hesitates even to vote against specific aggression so obviously stemming from communism.

I told Sukarno how Roem had raised question of military assistance with Secretary of State in my presence, how we had studied best possible means of meeting Indonesia requirements and sensibilities. I revealed information which I had given Roem on my return to Europe for his guidance in dispatching military purchasing mission to US. I pointed put, however, increasingly heavy demands upon US production for our own needs and those of our Allies participating in Korean struggle, and consequent difficulty in making equipment available outside MDAP program to non-participant. I hoped, however, that his government would find acceptable some sort of arrangement only slightly modifying that which I had consummated with Hatta on civil police equipment.

Sukarno is suffering from sinus trouble. He said that at much inconvenience to President, Quirino, he has cancelled his trip to Philippines scheduled for December 10. No future date is set and postponement is indefinite. He was not sure whether Cabinet would give out statement alteration of plan due to President’s illness. He Wanted me to know it came primarily from realization gravity world situation and feeling his duty is to be in his own country. Sukarno thanked me warmly for my visit and expressed his satisfaction I had returned Indonesia at this time.

He urged I keep closely in touch with him and give him benefit of any information and advice possible in the circumstances.

Met at airport this afternoon Djuanda and Pringgo Digdo returning from Hague Conference. Arrange for Djuanda meet with Griffin and me Saturday morning. Pringgo is to bring me to date on Hague developments soonest.

Cochran

1. Foreign Minister Roem and six other Indonesian officials were in Washington on November 15 and 16 following a visit to the United Nations. Roem met with President Truman on the 15th and with Secretary Acheson on the 16th. No record of either of these meetings has been found in the Department of State files, but a background paper prepared for Secretary Acheson by Rusk, dated November 15, not printed, is in file 756D.00/11–1550.
2. No record of Cochran’s report has been found in the Department of State files.
3. Documentation on President Truman’s talks with British Prime Minister Attlee, December 6–8 at Washington, is scheduled for publication in volume iii.
4. In telegram 596 (Usgoc 491), December 9, to Djakarta, not printed, Cochran was advised that the Department of State fully supported his position on the Indonesian attitude toward Korea. Cochran was to impress on Indos necessity free world united in its determination resist aggression and maintain principles UN Charter and that best evidence this unity and determination can be expressed in overwhelming vote in GA.” (357.AA/12–950)