Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

611.90/8–3050

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Matthews)

top secret

[Washington,] August 30, 1950.

Subject: “A New Approach in Asia”.

I attach a paper entitled “A New Approach in Asia”, which is a revision of an earlier paper entitled “A New US Policy toward Asia”. The latter was submitted to you and discussed in your office early this month. The present version has been drafted in the light of comments within the Department on the previous paper, the responses from Ambassadors Henderson and Warren¹ to our query concerning the desirability of closer consultation with Asian governments,² and recent developments in the Korean and Formosan situations.

I am circulating the attached paper to various officers of the Department for comment. I do not think that a meeting is necessary at this stage, although I may wish to impose upon you when the comments are in.³

I should, of course, welcome any views you may wish to express on the paper or its handling.

[Attachment]

Policy Paper by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (McGhee)⁴

top secret

[Washington, August 30, 1950.]

A New Approach in Asia

The Issue

Much of Asia is unconvinced of our devotion to peace, our lack of imperialist ambition and our interest in Asian freedom and progress. These doubts derive in large part from Asian misunderstanding and suspicion of our decisions and actions, in Asia and elsewhere in the world, directed toward containing Communist expansion. The free Asian governments resent what they conceive to be our disregard of their views and interests, particularly with respect to problems arising in Asia. This conception of the US attitude is in part a consequence of the fact that our moves in Asia frequently take the form of hasty responses to Communist initiative and that we seek the support of the free Asian governments after we have decided and acted.

Unless we can establish a more intimate relationship with the free Asian governments and convince them, and through them the Asian peoples, of the true nature of US interests and intentions, Asia will continue to be unsympathetic to our actions and unresponsive to our needs. Should the present estrangement between Asia and the US grow rather than diminish, the whole of Asia, except those areas where we or our non-Asian allies can maintain direct military control, can fall to Communism. If we are to avert this disaster, we must seize the initiative from the Communists and win the support of free Asia.

The Objectives

1. To increase free Asian participation in and responsibility for the solution of problems arising in Asia.

2. To strengthen the ability and determination of the free Asian countries to maintain peace and resist Communism in Asia.

3. To minimize direct US military involvement in Asia west of the Japan-Okinawa-Philippines defense line.

4. Eventually to eliminate Communism as a force in Asia.

The Assumptions

1. We should risk serious over-commitment if we undertook to contain and eventually to eliminate Communism in Asia by force, whether by ourselves or with the assistance of our non-Asian allies.

2. Certain of the free Asian countries, particularly India and Pakisthan have the capability of controlling Communism in their own territories and of making a significant contribution to its elimination elsewhere in Asia, provided that they receive assistance from the US and other free nations in their efforts to build economic and political stability and military strength.

3. Nationalism is the strongest force in Asia. The free Asian governments and peoples have as their primary goal the prevention of foreign interference in their affairs. They are becoming increasingly aware of the foreign inspiration of domestic Communist activities and of Soviet imperialism’s threat to national independence in Asia. Their attention is, however, still diverted from the Communist threat by their preoccupation with the Asian remnants of nineteenth century colonial empires and their suspicions of the Western European colonial powers. The potential strength of nationalism as a force against Communism cannot, therefore, be fully realized until the US and other Western countries commit themselves to eliminating all vestiges of colonialism in Asia.

The Plan of Action

1. Pursue studies within the Department and consultations with Congressional leaders, both now in progress, looking toward (a) Congressional acceptance of the concept of an expanded Asian economic aid program, (b) discussions with appropriate free Asian Asian governments on the nature and scope of such a program and (c) the preparation and submission of the program to the Congress for legislative action early in the next session.

2. Undertake on an informal basis more intimate consultation with key free Asian governments on our foreign policies and contemplated actions in the foreign field, and encourage those governments to consult more frankly with us.

3. As part of the foregoing consultations, explore with the free Asian governments at appropriate times possible solutions, where practicable within the UN framework, of such problems as the future of Korea, the future of Formosa, a peace treaty with Japan and arrangements for Japanese security, Chinese representation in the UN and the future of Indochina.

4. Keep the UK Government and, to a lesser extent, certain other Commonwealth governments and the French currently informed of our progress under this plan of action. At an appropriate stage, possibly in early 1951, hold top secret discussions with the UK Government looking toward the maximum practicable coordination of US, UK and Commonwealth policies and actions with respect to South and Southeast Asia.

5. Step up official output on Asia for the US public stressing the determination of the Asian peoples to control their own destinies, our historic interest in the political and economic progress of the peoples of Asia, and the current, urgent need of the free Asian countries for assistance in carrying out their plans for such progress. In the foreign field, intensify USIE operations in free Asia and covert psychological warfare activities in Communist China emphasizing the following themes: US interest in the welfare, progress and freedom of the Asian peoples, Soviet imperialism, and the importance of the UN as a growing force for world peace and progress.

6. Meet the most urgent requirements of the free Asian countries for military assistance not available from other sources and required to maintain internal stability and to strengthen resistance to Communism.

7. Encourage the free Asian governments to persuade the Chinese Communist regime that cooperation with the free nations of Asia is the only way to escape domination by the USSR, to participate in an Asian development program and to assure independence of all Asia from outside domination.

1. Avra M. Warren, Ambassador to Pakistan.
2. Documentation on this question is scheduled for publication in volume v.
3. During September and early October, the officers who received copies of the attached paper commented upon it. Their replies are located in file 611.90. On October 6, the paper was considered by the Under Secretary’s Committee, the forum for general discussion between the Under Secretary and other principal officers of the Department. The paper was not rejected by the Committee, but neither was it formally approved. It was not subsequently endorsed as official Departmental policy. (Executive Secretariat Files: Lot 53D250: Under Secretary’s Meetings)
4. Drafted by Elbert G. Mathews, Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs.