Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

357.AA/10–1850: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Indonesia

secret   priority
niact

Washington, October 18, 1950—7 p. m.

430. For Amb Cochran. As you know, the Dept has been bending every effort to get the Ambonese affair settled out of court. We are not, of course, in a position to block consideration of the question by the Council. It wld also be contrary long standing US policy for our Rep to attempt to prevent discussion on technical grounds. In the normal course of events, the matter will come up for discussion shorts We thus have to concentrate our efforts toward getting the Indos themselves to help find some way to make Council consideration unnecessary.

We have already exerted very considerable pressure on the Dutch and have paraded before them all of the disadvantages they can expect to encounter if this matter is debated in the Council. They have already taken these disadvantages into consideration and appear to have pretty much discounted them in advance.¹

If, however, the Dutch were to decide to stop pressing for Council discussion of the Ambonese situation, we wld still be left with the fact that UNCI has referred the matter to the Council for its consideration. In the final analysis, it will be necessary for UNCI to find a basis on which it can advise the Council it no longer believes Council discussion is necessary.

We believe that the only way in which UNCI can honestly advise the Council that Council consideration is unnecessary is for it to base such advice on a move on the part of the Indos.

We are aware of the considerations which you have reported which operate against a conciliatory gesture on the part of the Indos toward UNCI’s offer to assist in a settlement and we agree with you that the possibilities of the Indos accepting such an offer are negligible. We believe, therefore, that the best chances of getting a conciliatory gesture out of the Indos may arise from their being willing to make such a gesture in the direction of the Ambonese themselves.

If mil operations against the Ambonese are going as well as Roem reports to you they are going, then it seems to us the Indos cld, without loss of any face or prestige, offer the Ambonese certain terms such as we have suggested earlier that UNCI might come up with. (Deptel 382, Oct 10²)

There is no doubt in our minds that if this matter goes to the Council, the major arguments of the Indos and of the Sovs will necessarily show a marked parallelism. Undoubtedly both will direct their fire toward the Dutch, toward the RTC agreement, and likely also they will touch on the Council’s “jurisdiction”. Results of this wld strengthen Commie cause in Indonesia and harm Western interests.

We are therefore convinced that the best interests of the US require an avoidance of a public display in the Council of Indo-Sov agreement on such issues, provided, of course, this can be avoided by proper means. Also, as you know, we are convinced that no constructive result can come from Council debate on Ambon question.

We wld rather run the risk involved in your making a strong, private démarche to the Indo Govt, asking that they make a conciliatory gesture toward the Ambonese, than be faced with the public display of parallelism with the Sovs mentioned above. We are, therefore, convinced that you shld go to Roem and tell him privately that if he can now get his govt to offer honorable and substantially conciliatory terms to the Ambonese, that we on our part will undertake not only to urge the Dutch again to stop pressing for Council consideration, but that we will, in addition, assuming the offer warrants it, instruct our Rep on UNCI to ask UNCI to advise the Council that consideration of the matter by the Council is no longer necessary. Dept has full confidence your ability to persuade Indos to make the necessary move in this case.

Sent Djakarta, Repeated The Hague 460, Brussels 505, London 1998, Canberra 97, and USUN, New York 407.

Acheson

1. The Department of State had called Ambassador van Royen in on October 16 and informed him that if the Ambon question reached the Security Council the results would: “(1) Damage Dutch-Indon Union; (2) Wld lead to inconclusive but bitter recriminations between Indos and Dutch; (3) Might result serious loss to Dutch econ interest in Indo; (4) Wld give Russians chance attack HRTC agreements and to weaken Natsir Govt.” Van Royen had said he would pass these views on to The Hague, but doubted whether they would be sufficient to deter his Government, (telegram 421, October 17, to Djakarta, not printed, 357.AA/10–1750)

2. Not printed. These proposals were:

   • “(a) Territory of so-called ‘Rep of South Moluccas’ must be made to form an integral part of RI;
   • “(b) Effective anmesty for South Moluccas;
   • “(c) Territory involved shld be granted broadest autonomy within RI consonant with RI constitution and with maintenance of security and polit stability in area …;
   • “(d) Proposals shld be drafted to guarantee minority rights and freedom from reprisal and terrorization for South Moluccas.” (357.AA/10–1050)