357.AA/10–1450: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations 1
400. Re SC consideration Ambonese question.2 As indicated in Dept tel 392 to Djakarta repeated to USUN,3 we are endeavoring to induce Indoes take action along certain lines and thus make debate in SC unnecessary. We understand SC meetings scheduled 16 October and probably 18 October to deal with other matters. On other hand, since UNCI communication contains express suggestion by subsidiary body of SC for SC consideration and deals with situation where fighting is in progress we doubt that US Rep as current Pres of SC will be in position to refrain from placing it on provisional agenda for meeting, in near future unless UNCI able inform Council new development make SC consideration unnecessary.
If SC discussion comes up our objectives shld be (1) minimum debate, (2) reaffirmation UNCI position in offering Good Offices and asking parties to cease hostilities and settle question by peaceful means. This could preferably be accomplished by statement of Pres interpreting the sense of Council that (a) UNCI’s offer of Good Offices to Indo Govt deserves latter’s most serious consideration in order to stop bloodshed, (b) SC concurs with UNCI’s action, (c) Council is confident Indos, having been recently accepted in UN, and owing in large degree their existence as sovereign independent state to past efforts SC will give favorable consideration to utilizing services Comm Abonese affair. Sovereign State RI includes area of Ambon difficulty.
Dept believes it would be undesirable if res calling upon Indos accept Good Offices is submitted to the Council which wld make full debate unavoidable. We do not see how Council debate can have truly constructive effects on situation in Ambon. We are concerned that when Indos and Neth Reps invited to Council table, they will engage in exchange which might have serious effects on Indo-Neth relations. While we believe Ambon problem is partially outgrowth [Page 1083] of HRTC agreements, and properly within UNCI scope, we wld prefer avoiding a debate on question of jurisdiction.
There is further consideration that Sovs will undoubtedly utilize SC discussion to play role champion Asian nationalism against “imperialist west” of which they wld claim UNCI a “tool”. Further Sovs likely utilize this opening to castigate HRTC agreement, Neth union, etc., as settlement accepted by Indos under duress, thus attacking the whole foundation of HRTC. Sovs most likely veto any res asking Indos accept Good Offices Comm. Therefore, Dept anxious that, if Council action necessary, it take form of statement of Pres along lines outlined above.
- Repeated for information to Djakarta as 408 for Cochran and Doolittle, The Hague as 434, London as 1985, New Delhi as 566, and Brussels as 486.↩
- On October 11 the UNCI had sent a telegram to the United Nations, tracing the course of the Ambon situation and its efforts to act as mediator. In the last two paragraphs of the cable the UNCI reported that it had exhausted all its means to achieve a peaceful solution and was referring the question back to the Security Council with the suggestion that the Council reinforce the authority of the UNCI by calling on Indonesia to utilize the UNCI for a peaceful solution of the problem. (Telegram 676, October 12, from Djakarta, not printed 257.AA/10–1250)↩
- Not printed; it asked Cochran to impress on the Indonesians the desirability of accepting UNCI good offices lest a full discussion of the Ambon situation be detrimental to Indonesian prestige and raise the question of the fulfillment of the Round Table Agreements. (357.AA/10–1250)↩