756D.00/9–2550: Telegram
The Ambassador in Indonesia (Cochran) to the Acting Secretary of State
418. Received forenoon twenty fifth by President Sukarno his request. He was most appreciative US intervention with Nationalist China to prevent latter vetoing Indonesian application UN. He agreed with me he had been correct to refrain from making declaration in favor admission Communist China into UN (Embtel 2841). He [Page 1067] brought up again, however, argument which he said Nehru was strongly pressing, namely, of admitting Communist China at once into UN since it is obviously de facto authority. I reminded him overwhelming vote in UN had opposed such admission.
Sukarno then asked whether US was “betting on a dead horse” in Nationalist China. I replied that to back Communist China at this minute would certainly be to bet on wild horse that might harm you. I stressed our position as being that of not wanting question of Chinese Communist admission to UN mixed with Korean problem. I said US had been supported in UN thereon. I said Chinese question could be settled later. I reminded him of efforts both President and Secretary of State have recently made to assure Chinese people we do not want them drawn into war.
Sukarno asked what I thought would be outcome of Chinese question. I said diversity of opinion on this even in American circles. I said we did not think, however, that communism was very deep in China and believe that there is reasonable possibility freedom-loving Nationalists might overthrow thin layer of communism imposed upon them. Furthermore, there was always possibility communism in China is not bona fide Moscow communism and that Tito’s example might some day be followed. I said we would be foolish, however, to stake too much on this possibility. I said better watch China carefully until Korean matter settled with restoration peace and security. By that time we may be in better position to judge true character present Chinese leaders, acceptance of their regime by Chinese people, and their attitude toward free world.
Sukarno was worried over Chinese infiltration into Sumatra and West Borneo which he had seen on recent trip. Said British Borneo also penetrated by Chinese Communists from Malaya some even landing with jeeps. Indonesian authorities West Borneo concerned since these infiltrants moving into their area from British territory. Sukarno said 80 percent Chinese in West Borneo flew Indonesian flag on occasion his visit and none Communist flag.
Sukarno asked re Melby Mission. I told him this due thirtieth and was seeing Roem at noon re plans for its reception. Sukarno emphasized need for means to defend Indonesia stressing lack of patrol boats. I told him his people should be prepared to state their precise needs when Mission arrives.
Re Chinese I said I would do my best to support Indonesian request for defensive equipment particularly seacraft, well as receipt of additional 2 million dollars of equipment allocated for police. I advised Sukarno have his people exercise caution after entry UN. I reminded him of extent which sovereignty of Republic is due to UN effort and of strong majority therein against Communism. I said Indonesia [Page 1068] should he modestly silent unless and until able take strong position with such majority.
Sukarno said step most urgently needed to strengthen Indonesia in [is?] settlement Irian question. He said USA by one sentence in favor Indonesian position on NNG would obtain lasting friendship and gratitude of this nation. He asked if such statement could possibly be made. I reminded him US representative had active part in drafting paragraph of RTC agreement on NNG and that US still represented on UNCI. I said we had strictly adhered to RTC agreement idea, and strongly hoped that two parties would work out problem through amicable discussions. I said Indonesians and Dutch representatives were still to get together at Hague next month for negotiations and it would be wrong for US make any statement in anticipation of outcome. Furthermore, Sukarno must realize both Netherlanders and Australians who are vitally interested in NNG question, are our allies and fighting by our side in Korea.
Sukarno made one last plea that we endeavor see his side and help him even “behind closed doors” if a public statement was impossible. He said Stikker and Van Maarsevaan are adamant on question for purely political and prestige reasons. He said not only ex-High Commissioner Hirschfeld2 but practically every Netherlander having business interests in and associations with Indonesia prefer see question resolved in favor RI government. He said Catholic Bishop of Indonesia favors NNG being part of Republic. He hopes agreement may be worked out but admitted both sides are so deeply entrenched, this will be exceedingly difficult. I said I would see if I could think of anything to help later if their negotiations seemed on point of failing. Sukarno said meeting at Hague next month would almost amount to a second RTC.
Sukarno said his government has taken up with Fockema Andreae, who arrived from Holland with Roem question of settling question ex-KNIL Ambonese soldiers now in various army camps in Java. His government wants F. Andreae take these either to Netherlands or to Surinam. F. Andreae has not yet agreed thereto. Sukarno said impossible his government agree to their return to Ambon in present circumstances. Did not see what UNCI could do to settle Ambon question unless it could convince Ambonese to surrender to recognized central government. Said RI government has constantly endeavored approach Ambonese peaceably but are always rebuffed. Said military action would be taken very reluctantly.
Sukarno opposed idea suggested some circles that better order could be maintained if Netherlands troop withdrawals delayed. He said [Page 1069] Indonesian army now actively fighting various bandit groups and he sure it could restore order. Said had photographic proof that some such gangs included Dutch soldiers.
I told Sukarno happy to see progress his country has made in nine months and good economic outlook therefor. I feared, however, that world would get bad impression of Indonesia if his political leaders did not shortly quit their maneuvering and get to work. I stressed this is a serious time for whole world and Indonesia can lose much of its gains unless strong central government takes authoritative measures shortly. I said weakness must result from government depending upon consolidation of numerous small undisciplined parties. Sukarno was much annoyed with his own party PNI and said he intended take vigorous measures shortly to get sound leaders to play proper role. I said all Indonesians should take pride in their achievement of sovereignty and support strong central government without political bickering or personal ambitions at this stage young nation’s life. I told him I would like to see such intelligent leader as Sjahrir take proper responsibility in Government and not sit back and let this young man play politics [sic?]. Sukarno said this had always been Sjahrir’s tactic. Sukarno thought Natsir would win initial vote of confidence. He asked me see Natsir much as possible and work closely with him and Roem.