756C.00/9–150: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Chapin) to the Secretary of State
357. Re Deptel 241, August 251 requesting Embassy suggestions most practicable solution NNG problem. As Department well aware uncompromising and unflattering statements by Indonesian leaders have perceptibly stiffened Dutch position on NNG. Stikker’s remarks (Embtel 324, August 281) that his government “not even considering possibility of relinquishment” sovereignty over NNG came on [Page 1061] heels Surkarno’s pronouncement that unless Indonesians obtain NNG by end this year would be a “major conflict”. By this Embassy does not mean imply that had it not been for these Indonesian statements Dutch would have given in on NG issue, nevertheless there is no doubt that direct relation exists between jingoistic Indonesian declarations and present Netherlands attitude.
Unfortunately present position is that the two parties to dispute, Dutch and Indonesians, plus Australians (who have now spelled out in detail their NG policy) all have publicly entrenched themselves behind fixed positions from which very difficult retreat. While number high ranking Dutch officials infuriated by Indonesian diatribes which are rapidly and successfully poisoning atmosphere surrounding prospective New Guinea conference to begin September 30, Dutch have at least restrained themselves in public. In spite numerous inquiries and unquestionably considerable pressure on Foreign Office issue statement or make observations or comments, et cetera, on NNG issue Foreign Office continues state that since future status Netherlands NG will be subject this conference, Netherlands Government has no comment. It will be recalled, however, that in strictest confidence for information US Government only Stikker made position Netherlands Government absolutely clear to Embassy Counselor. It may be noted Dutch Government resisted strong pressure on part of Australian Foreign Minister Spender to issue accompanying statement at time Spender issued his.
While foregoing complicates already existing tension obvious atmosphere must be cleared before any compromise can be reached by two parties to this dispute and projected Netherlands-Indonesian NG conference bound end in deadlock unless both sides show more compromising attitude. Should be pointed out that one tempering factor which may possibly prove conducive more compromising Netherlands frame of mind is that Hirschfeld has presented his case before Cabinet; also business interests in Amsterdam are known to be opposed any Netherlands-Indonesian split for fear it will endanger their investments there, number of which in healthy economic condition. I believe that both parties could be more reasonable but that much of Hague reasonableness depends chiefly on Indonesian leaders demonstrating more restraint. To effect this, we offer suggestion that Sukarno, Yamin and other Indonesian leaders be told quite bluntly that they are successfully making impossible any solution as called for by RTC agreements. I see Netherlands case as follows: Netherlands’ contention NG Papuans are not racially part of Indonesia irrefutable. People of NNG are same as people of Australian NG and Australian Papua and are completely different from Malaysians. Geographically NNG not part Indonesia and of course areas are separated by over 1,000 miles.
[Page 1062]Admittedly one weak spot Netherlands’ argument is that for 300 years have done virtually nothing with NNG and only within recent years have developed oil fields. Yet obvious that of two contestants, Netherlands in far better position develop NNG today and in future. Yet in view virtually uncivilized conditions in NNG even Netherlands in weak position undertake anything but modest scale administration NNG. Investments or public works would be dependent on US funds. While public statements by both sides professing great interest in welfare Papuan natives may be for purposes UN consumption, incontestable that Indonesians wish incorporate NNG within Indonesian state. On other hand Netherlands Government, as member UN, is bound by Article 73 requiring it submit reports concerning administration NNG due to latter’s status non-self-governing dependent area. Furthermore, such status gives NNG certain other guarantees. It follows, therefore, that transfer NNG to RI would place its inhabitants in less favorable position making known any grievances they might wish to air against RI administration. Would follow that Indonesians themselves would become colonial nation and this, of course, is current anti-Dutch charge which Indonesians so loudly proclaiming today.
As to possible solution problem Embassy sets forth below several thoughts, gist of which are:
- 1.
- While Spender apparently does not believe that this issue, if raised in UN would necessarily create white-Asiatic division (Embtel 334, August 20) seems generally agreed by British Embassy and Netherlands Foreign Office that debate might well result in this very cleavage. This greatest concern of Netherlands Government. As temporary measure, therefore, possible that were issue raised now, it could be kept off Security Council agenda on grounds that until deadline December 31, 1950 reached, no reason for SC action. (Re this point of existence deadline interesting note August 31 statement NNG Van Waardenburg, who contends if September 30 NNG conference fails that Netherlands jurisdiction “will continue”’. He argues that December 31 deadline as such does not exist because (1) clear wording RTC agreements and (2) record of RTC negotiations during which Netherlands rejected Indonesian proposal that Netherlands’ jurisdiction over NNG be continued single year only.) While admittedly unrelated matter could also be argued that full attention should be paid Korean situation and until North Korean aggressors withdrawn or driven back to 38th parallel, SC should not divert its attention to NNG dispute.
- 2.
- Without some sort mediation seems clear at this point that Dutch and Indonesians will be unable solve problem before December 31 deadline. View prospective deadlock one suggestion, admittedly purely temporary nature, is to persuade Dutch and Indonesians postpone RTC deadline for fixed number years during which time Netherlands’ jurisdiction would continue alongside the Netherlands-Indonesian negotiations re this issue.
- Foreign Office says that next to Indians or others not raising NG issue in SC this postponement deadline most important goal. From Netherlands and NNG standpoint this would have disadvantage holding in abeyance Netherlands investments in NNG until status area settled.
- Expanding this thought of postponing deadline, mediator could suggest that both parties prepare study setting forth positive and documented evidence their respective capabilities administer, develop and defend NNG stressing that respective countries specify in detail their financial resources and plans for implementing their respective studies.
- 3.
- While Embassy doubtful that Netherlands Government would find it acceptable another possible solution is that Indonesia cede NNG to RI on condition it be leased to Netherlands Government, say for 99 years.
- 4.
- Re UN Trusteeship, most serious disadvantage seems to be that its creation presumably would require that it be passed upon by SC. This would mean that such proposal would be subject Soviet veto thereby enabling them demand as a price for their support, such conditions as participation in the Trusteeship or in some sub-commission of such significance that the Soviets would be given, if not foothold at least, and entrance into sub-continent of NG. This, of course, would stir Australians into active opposition. As possible alternative to avoid hazards UN Trusteeship might be that another round table conference (but on smaller scale) could be held between Netherlands and Indonesians only but under auspices UNCI or some third mediator.
- 5.
- In view developments of post-sovereignty Netherlands-Indonesian union, a joint Netherlands-Indonesian trusteeship or condominium of NNG seems almost certainly doomed failure and would almost certainly be rejected by Netherlands. In this connection high-ranking Foreign Office officials said such solution would mean mass Indonesian immigration to NNG followed by “infiltration” into key positions so that Indonesians would simply “take over” in relatively few number years (Embtel 355, September 12).
- 6.
- Reports that joint Netherlands-Australian sovereignty under consideration seem largely based upon press speculation. While it may have considerable merit it seems illogical that Dutch would cede complete sovereignty any third power since repercussions from Indonesians would be same as continued Netherlands’ jurisdiction and, of course, Netherlands’ sovereignty over NNG would be reduced by half. In other words, this solution would seem peculiarly unsatisfactory to both Dutch and Indonesians. Of course Netherlands could simply give area away to Australians but there, too, they would probably receive almost as much Indonesian criticism as if they were to keep it themselves.
- 7.
- Union Court of Arbitration still an untried institution and probably too feeble and not sufficiently recognized by parties concerned so that its decision would be accepted. Jurisdiction of International Court of Justice restricted to juridical matters and NNG regarded as one of international politics.
- As to method of mediation, a third party, possibly Nehru, could be approached to act in the interest of the Papuan natives to offer his “good offices” to mediate this issue.
- He might also be approached to keep issue from arising in SC or UNCI might make its good offices available. Should be pointed out that acceptability to Dutch of selection Nehru is debatable. For a time Foreign Office seemed look upon him as moderating influence in Indonesian politics yet today are indications India viewed by Dutch with more skepticism, at least as far as Indonesian affairs are concerned.
Embassy’s considered opinion of arguments presented by two parties is that factually Netherlands have clearly presented a slightly better case. Indonesian claim seems be based solely on contention that it should inherit NNG simply because it formed part of ex-NEI. While Embassy fully aware US efforts bring about stable RI Government and not antagonize it, does not believe delivery NNG into hands present RI Government would serve any other useful purpose than to appease Indonesian leaders into remaining silent. Furthermore it would transfer half of a sub-continent into hands of government of doubtful stability and one which in view of Far East conditions might conceivably drop into laps Communists. On other hand, as pointed out, Netherlands also in weak position develop NNG. Business arguments that area not worth fighting over may prove of increasing influence in official circles.
In conclusion, therefore, Embassy suggests that: (1) Indonesian leaders be told to keep still. (2) That in strictest confidence US and British Governments support some sort of continued Netherlands’ jurisdiction over NNG. (3) Through mediation see that December 31 deadline is extended.
As Department will note, no suggestion offered here with regard to strategic importance NNG insofar as military defense of Australia concerned or, in fact, of importance this territory in maintaining general Pacific military and political defense line against possible Communist expansion in Asia. It is assumed Department and Joint Chiefs have carefully evaluated pros and cons our position as so affected.