Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

756D.00/7–2950: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Indonesia ¹

secret

Washington, July 29, 1950—3 p. m.

113. Asst Secy Hickerson invited Neth Chargé to call on him for purpose of receiving oral replies to Neth note of June 23 (Usgoc 462 June 26²) and to Neth request of July 12 for US intervention in Ambon difficulty. (Deptel 72 July 19). Due other emergency business interview postponed until Mon.

Asst Secy will make statement along following lines re Neth note:

a. UNCI obligated by its terms of reference observe implementation of Hague Round Table Conference Agreements by parties.

b. Commission, in carrying out its responsibilities, already made interpretation Article 2 of Agreement on Transitional Measures, concerning plebiscites on issue of separate component states and concerning rights of such component states, as well as interpretation of procedures to be followed under Article 2. This interpretation affirmed right of Commission, shld initiative be taken by either Govt or population of any terr, and in appropriate circumstances, recommend to RUSI that plebiscites be held. The interpretation also declared that if plebiscite held and favors creation of autonomous terr, that terr will retain right ratify final constitution and also negotiate about special relationship with RUSI and Neth Kingdom. We agree with this interpretation; and Neth Govt, as evidenced by its most recent note (Gocus 873³) of July 15 to UNCI and to RUSI seems concur with Commission.

c. In our opinion, it wld be in interest of harmonious relations between Union Partners if Dutch and Indonesian cld agree between themselves on interpretation of Hague Round Table Conference Agreements. Our rep UNCI is under standing instructions that we consider that UNCI shld be of every possible assistance to parties in this and any other matter which falls within scope of its jurisdiction.

Re request for US intervention in Ambon matter Asst Secy will make statement along following lines:

a. Shortly after outbreak of Ambonese difficulties US requested its rep UNCI follow carefully developments and consider advisability UNCI’S offering its assistance to RUSI Govt if and when there shld be indications such assistance wld contribute to satisfactory settlement of this question. Similarly US Ambassador in Djakarta discussed problem on numerous occasions with responsible RUSI officials. In these discussions RUSI authorities indicated their strong desire obtain peaceful settlement of difficulty.

b. We understand that RUSI Govt at this time undertaking renewed effort achieve peaceful solution this question. It is view of Dept that full opportunity shld be given development this effort for peaceful solution. Pending outcome present effort Dept believes intervention on part of US not useful. However, Dept following developments with utmost attention and will keep request of Neth Govt in mind in case present efforts for peaceful solution shld fail.

c. Dept read with sympathy message by Prime Minister Drees to Premier Hatta and feels this appeal shld contribute toward intensification RUSI endeavors for peaceful settlement. End Ast Secy’s statement.

Dept notes your view that if instead of domestic revolt Ambon difficulty were issue between two parties to HRTC agreement normal procedure wld be for one or both parties appeal to UNCI (urtel 92 July 21). In previous correspondence UNCI agreed initiative under HRTC for claim of self-determination may be taken also by “population of any terr” (Gocus 867⁴). A technical argument cld be made that Ambon rebellion has aspects going beyond internal affairs of RUSI. Since rebellion involves claim for grant of self-determination it cld be argued technically matter falls within UNCI jurisdiction in spirit if not letter of HRTC agreement.

Whatever legal position under HRTC may be and whether or not Dutch cld make out good case before UNCI Dept believes UNCI as subsidiary body of SC stationed in area wld come in for considerable criticism if large scale fighting shld break out in Moluccas without any effort on UNCI’s part to bring about peaceful solution. Unless prof erred informally any UNCI offer to assist RUSI in settling Ambon revolt wld pose question of status Ambonese rebels in the dispute. A rejection of such offer by RUSI might affect adversely RUSI’s international position. Moreover use of armed force particularly if large scale and prolonged hostilities result wld endanger internal prestige RUSI and might create complications elsewhere in area.

Dept gratified your efforts facilitate RUSI peace mission to Ambon (urtel 119 July 27⁵). Dept. notes your suggestion you undertake exercise good offices if projected peace mission fails and if situation may develop in such fashion RUSI Govt might call on you prior launching attack Ambon. Dept fully agrees any such offer must be divorced from any Neth initiative.⁶ Shld present peace mission fail, however, and further indications point to impending armed attack on Ambon it might be advisable for you offer officially good offices even without prior RUSI request to you. We believe you cld play constructive part in settlement and in this connection note terms of settlement mentioned to you by Lemeina (urtel 97 July 23⁷). Dept believes risks of repercussions of large scale armed action by RUSI such as to call for strongest effort on our part facilitate peaceful settlement.

In this connection, Dept assumes you will bear in mind possibility of Indo Military officials such as Sultan Jogja ordering assault on Ambon without knowledge or consent of RUSI cabinet particularly during period preceding formation Govt of unitary state.⁸

Acheson

1. Repeated to The Hague as 132 and to the United States Mission at the United Nations as 76.
2. Not printed; the Dutch note, transmitted in Usgoc 462, asked that the Netherlands Government be informed “whether Govt of US prepared instruct its rep on UNCI lend his assistance in promoting satisfactory solution problem of right self-determination Indo.” (257.AA/6–2650)
3. Not printed.
4. Not printed.
5. Not printed; it reported various conversations Cochran had had with Indonesian officials from July 25 to 27 concerning the peace mission to Ambon (756D.00/7–2750).
6. At this point in the source text the following sentence had been deleted before transmission: “We also agree US must refrain from committing itself to either party to dispute or from being used improperly.”
7. Not printed; the terms included maximum autonomy within the unitary state (756D.00/7–2350).
8. In telegram 115, August 1, to Djakarta, not printed, Cochran was informed that Hickerson had made a statement to the Dutch along the lines of this cable on July 31. (756D.00/8–150)