It seems to me that we may not get much sympathy in the United Nations
with our Asiatic policy unless we emphasize that the colonial struggle
for political independence has now been won and that the present danger
is that the independence will be lost to the aggressive imperialism of
Russia, using communism as a bait.
This is a point of view which you have already developed, but now it has
become somewhat obscured by our reluctance to use Korea as a case
exhibit.
I suggest that it may be useful for you, either in the Security Council
or elsewhere, to develop this thesis again in a major, documented
speech. I have discussed this idea with Matthews,1 Hickerson,2 Kennan and others who seem to think favorably of
it.
You could start with Stalin’s program of 1924, incorporated in the
current communist “Bible” which deals with the two stages of (1)
arousing the spirit of nationalism in the colonial and dependent peoples
of Asia so that they will fight the West and then (2) subverting this
nationalism into “amalgamation” with the Soviet socialist regime.
It is this second phase, long foreseen, that is now in process. I believe
that we can effectively demonstrate that fact and thereby have a
platform that will attract more support from the newly independent
governments and peoples of Asia.
I attach a memorandum of August 4th which develops this thesis somewhat
more fully.
[Annex]
Memorandum by Mr. John
Foster Dulles, Consultant to the Secretary of State
3
confidential
[Washington,] August 4,
1950.
I think we should consider whether, from the standpoint of Asiatic
policy, we ought not now to stand on the proposition that we are defending the independent nationalism
of the new Asiatic states, whereas
[Page 129]
Russia is seeking to destroy that
independence, using communism as the device.
Our present policy of attacking communism and not attacking Russia
seems to me to be doomed to failure. There is no particular
opposition to communism among the peoples of Asia, indeed it has
quite an appeal. To the peoples of the West communism is abhorrent
because it destroys personal freedoms which are dear to them—freedom
of speech, freedom of religion, freedom of the press, etc. However,
these freedoms as yet mean little to the peoples of Asia and we
cannot expect that loyalty to them will produce a willingness to
fight. What they will fight for is their national independence from
whatever quarter it is threatened.
In reality the threat to their independence comes from Russia and
what is going on in Asia is little more than a recrudescence in a
new guise of the aggressive ambitions of the Czars.
For example, Russia has been trying to get control of Korea ever
since the beginning of this century and what is going on there now
is a projection of the Czarist policy. The same is true of
Manchuria, Port Arthur, Dairen, etc.
It can be shown that the present communist regimes in China and
Viet-Nam are in effect puppets of Moscow, taking orders from it and
being “assisted”—really dominated—by Russian military, technical and
political advisers. The independence of these countries is being
threatened by Russian imperialist ambitions to dominate Asia. It is
this ambition that threatens and frightens India, Burma, etc.
Stalin, in his lectures on “The Foundations of Leninism” (1924)
recognizes how delicate will be the task of first fomenting
revolution and then producing what is called “amalgamation” in favor
of “true internationalism” represented by “the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics—the living prototype of the future union of
nations into a single world economic system”. (Problems of Leninism, p. 56)
Asia is now in fact in the position which Stalin foresaw would create
embarrassment for Soviet Communism, namely nationalism has already
been largely achieved and the Soviet effort now is to “amalgamate”
the independent nations into the framework or orbit of the USSR.
Stalin foresaw the difficulty and delicacy of this phase of Soviet
policy and it seems to me that we would be remiss in not exposing
the real threat that it involves to independence—a threat which
Stalin himself did not ignore.
The western powers have granted independence, and because of their
foresight and statesmanship it has, in the main, come about without
that fighting and bleeding of the western powers that Stalin wanted.
Now that the “national” phase has largely been completed, Russian
policy is seeking, as the second phase, to pervert it into
“internationalism”
[Page 130]
which
will in effect end independence and increase Soviet dominance.
The events in Korea are a remarkably effective exhibit, showing the
destruction of real independence. The ruling elements in North Korea
have been made part of the Soviet Communist system, taking orders
from the Moscow Politburo and accepting its “iron discipline”. They
are fighting and dying, and indeed ruining the whole country, to the
end that Russia may achieve its Czarist ambition of dominating this
strategic area.
I realize that to take this position tends to identify the Soviet
Union with the North Korean military effort and this might
conceivably lead it to give the effort more open support than would
otherwise be the case. This, however, is highly speculative. It is
equally arguable that to charge the Soviet Union with responsibility
in Korea would lead it not to give open
support. In any event I think the essential thing is to talk in the
Security Council the language that the Asiatic peoples understand
and which exposes the real threat of Soviet Communism to their
independence—a threat which was conceived many years ago and is
inherent in the very nature of Soviet Communism.
