856D.10/1–950
Memorandum by the Secretary of
State to President Truman
secret
Washington, January 9,
1950.
Subject: Allocation of Section 303 Funds to Provide
Police Equipment for the Indonesian Constabulary
The Department of State and the Department of Defense have agreed that a
program of military assistance for the new Indonesian State is needed
for purposes of providing military equipment to maintain the internal
security of that country against communist encroachment. (Annex A,
attached, gives supporting background prepared by the Department of
State.) The staffs of the two Departments have estimated that the
initial amount of funds required for this purpose is approximately $5
million. The Department of State believes that for urgent political
considerations this equipment should be made available as quickly as
possible, and proposes that the funds be obtained under authority of
Section 303 of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949.
While the general objectives of the proposed program of military
assistance to strengthen the Indonesian constabulary have been jointly
agreed upon between the two Departments, the exact content of the
program has not yet been formulated by the staffs of the interested
agencies. Therefore, it is requested that the President at this time
approve a program of military assistance to Indonesia, and that $5
million be reserved for this purpose, under Section 303 of the Mutual
Defense Assistance Act. As in the case of assistance to other countries
under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, it is proposed that
this assistance be administered by the Secretary of State in
consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the appropriate
agencies.2
Annex A
We are recommending immediate aid to Indonesia because that country
is facing serious internal Communist threat which can best
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be dealt with by
strengthening the Indonesian constabulary. The program requested by
the Indonesian officials would provide necessary police equipment
for 20,000 members of the constabulary. This was considered to be
the irreducible minimum for maintenance of law and order in the new
republic. The equipment proposed under this program together with
their own resources and what we understand the Netherlands
Government will provide would give the Indonesians an equipped
constabularly of 100,000 men.
The Indonesian Nationalist movement, both Federalist and Republican,
is at present non-Communist in character. The Indonesian Republic
successfully liquidated a full-scale Kremlin-directed Communist
revolt in September and October of 1948. During the disorder which
followed the Netherlands police action in December 1948, however,
large numbers of Communist operatives imprisoned by Indonesian
Republic authorities regained their freedom and presumably are
prepared to resume activities in the near future. Present Indonesian
Nationalist leadership, having taken a strong anti-Communist line,
is regarded as a dangerous enemy by world Communism which will spare
no effort to destroy this leadership and to replace it by leadership
which will respond to Communist direction.
Since Indonesia is separated from the Asiatic mainland by water, the
immediate Communist threat to the Archipelago is internal in
character. Therefore, the type of assistance which the Republic of
the United States of Indonesia will need is characteristic of police
equipment traditionally used in a jungle country. The Indonesia
Communist movement is in possession of Japanese arms; it probably
receives arms from Communist centers on the mainland and it has in
the past manufactured its own ammunition. It can be assumed in any
event that Communist forces in Indonesia will be at least as well
armed in the future as they have been in the past. Their activities
will, of course, increase as Communist forces in other parts of Asia
are increasingly successful.
The political, strategic and economic importance of Indonesia to the
United States is well known. This vast Archipelago, supporting a
population of some 75 million people, lies athwart the principal
lines of communication between the Pacific and Indian Oceans. It
produces commodities necessary to American industry, some of which
are requisite to the United States strategic stock-pile program.
Because of the dynamic character of its Nationalist movement,
because of its great wealth and because it is the second largest
Moslem country in the world, its political orientation has profound
effect upon the political orientation of the rest of Asia.
As the Communist gains on the Asiatic mainland increase, the
importance of keeping Indonesia in the anti-Communist camp is of
greater and greater importance. A continuation in power of the
present
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anti-Communist
leadership in Indonesia will have a most profound effect upon
leadership elsewhere in Asia. The loss of Indonesia to the
Communists would deprive the United States of an area of the highest
political, economic and strategic importance and would doubtless
result in economic difficulties in the Netherlands which would be
unable to retain its beneficial interests in Indonesia on the basis
of the Hague agreements of November 2, 1949.3 This development would have a serious effect upon
Benelux and consequently upon our North Atlantic arrangements.
