751G.5/10–2450: Telegram
The Minister at Saigon (Heath) to the Secretary of State
657. Section I. Letourneau, Juin, Pignon, Carpentier held two-hour conference this morning with me, Blum, Brink and Gullion. Letourneau opened meeting expressing gratitude to US for its help and for the interest and assurances given by Secretary Marshall and Department of State in past month. Resume of his impression of situation in Indochina as follows:
1. Military: No longer question of guerrilla war. Viet Minh was new army with advantage of proximity to unassailable bases behind Chinese frontier and access to materials freely supplied by China.
In circumstances French by themselves could not meet their obligations both in IC and in Western Europe within the framework of the North Atlantic defense pact.
French asked from US material and moral aid to meet the new military threat. They needed military equipment immediately particularly in airplanes and artillery. US could be of assistance also in increasing the number of men under arms in IC which meant particularly the establishment of Vietnamese national army. He, Juin, Pignon and Carpentier all stated positively that no reinforcements could be expected from French at this time, even though Viet force could not be created in time to meet immediate threat its creation was vital for long term result of campaign. Difficulties with respect to establishment Viet force were in recruitment, organization of cadres and in financing. Letourneau claimed adequate number of men could be recruited but conscription impracticable because many Viets now fleeing from VM territory as result VM “national mobilization”. Thus impolitic for Viets and French to declare conscription in non-VM territory.
With respect to formation cadres, French were willing to take risks to obtain soonest an armature for army but the “Viets bourgeoisie were not ready to furnish the necessary effort”. He cited difficulties in persuading Viet doctors to join national forces.
Most difficult problem was financing. French saw no possibility resolving it with means available to them and Viets. Letourneau indicated his mission would recommend considerably greater increase in [Page 907] number of Viets battalions than the extra 18 previously seen for the next year (Legtel 475 October 4).1 Cost of subsistence, pay of Viet forces for 1951 was estimated at 37 billion francs of which Viets could offer no substantial amount. Moreover, Viets not prepared to furnish even what one might expect of them. (Letourneau digressed to point out that Viets could hardly talk of independence, nor of Viet army as vessel of that independence, so long as they dependent on another country for existence this army.)
In Washington discussions, Departments State and Defense had indicated that despite absence provision of US laws permitting furnishing direct financing foreign troops, nevertheless effort was being made find some formula. Whoever financed Viet army should realize lack of probity and efficient controls in Viet Government created special difficulties.
2. Political. Letourneau made bitter references to Huu interview (Legtel 626 October 22).2 Letourneau–Juin mission returned from Tonkin where saw remnant shattered French battalions. In these circumstances Huu interview “indecent” and calculated undermine morale of French troops.
French had no intention whatsoever hold back Viet independence. Concerned only lest morale of their forces in IC be shattered and lives sacrificed. World could be sure that when war was over independence for Vietnam would be total. In interim stage French had two concerns: (a) that their expeditionary forces not be jeopardized; (b) that Viets realize their financial dependence on France as members of franc zone and be guided accordingly. Beyond these two points, France had no other conditions to pose with respect to Vietnam’s independence. US moral aid, Letourneau strongly indicated, consisted in backing French policies with Viets, bringing them down to brass tacks with reference their dependence French finances and French power to protect them from Communist imperialism.
Letourneau strongly expressed intention recommend to French Government withdrawal of expeditionary force if Viets or others continued misunderstand French motives in IC and to attribute “idées perverses” to French. French had no interests here which were not shared by western world and certainly no financial or other interests which would keep them in IC forever. If French were to continue bear this burden alone without material assistance or without Viet appreciation of what France was doing, he would have no hesitancy in recommending to French Government that French troops be withdrawn to bases and prepared to embark for France.
Section II. Following were remarks of General Juin briefing yesterday: (reference section I).
[Page 908]Present moment turning point in campaign IC. VM could supply all its military if not its subsistence needs in China. French troops in Tonkin found themselves in “state of inferiority”.
As classically the case, battle for Indochina must be fought in Tonkin. Now battle for southeast Asia must be fought in Tonkin. His main strategy would therefore be effort in Tonkin.
Following reverses in the mountainous region, French dispositions had been brought back to cover delta but—Juin insisted with fervor—French did not plan merely to hold delta but go over to offensive soonest possible moment.
French Union forces had mission of defending frontier. Accordingly positions taken up along RC Number 4. Position now radically changed by factor Chinese aid. With present equipment and effectives only about one-tenth of Franco-Vietnamese forces in Indochina could be actively brought to bear against Viet Minh forces in Tonkin. Combat effectives must therefore be radically increased, especially if rear deteriorated.
Juin believed solution like that found by US in Korea must be reached. Vietnamese national army must be raised as soon as possible, although the force would have to be brought into being progressively as areas were pacified and troops were trained. To degree areas were taken over by Viet forces, French Union forces would be released for operational reserve.
What French expeditionary forces needed was “a powerful machine”, specifically, aviation (including two squadrons light bombers promised by US); landing craft, and, in lesser but important category, napalm.
French did not need “US divisions for the moment”. Given troops and task, this was campaign French knew how to fight. “No country in the world could have done what France has done in maintaining 150,000 men for five years at the end of the world”. This effort has made it impossible for France to assume all missions which ought to fall to it in framework of European defense.
Section III. Following is report on discussion period following remarks of Letourneau–Juin:
(1) Political evaluations: In response to my question as whether Letourneau mission or French Government had under consideration any modification accords or further political concessions or declaration of intent to do so, Letourneau replied he would have been glad to seize on something like conclusion of Pau conference to give general statement French intentions. Difficulty in making statement was that Viets looked on such statements as weakness and would bargain for further concessions. However, he found it very difficult to get statement from Viets about what further concessions they really desire.
There did not appear to be team in Vietnam capable of taking over real duties of government if cut loose completely from France: As instance liberal French intentions he pointed out that French had already gone beyond provisions of March 8 accords in widening framework [Page 909] of diplomatic representation allowed Viets but that Viets so far had failed to provide men for posts open to them.
[Here follows discussion of the Vietnamese internal political situation, the national army, French military advisers, defensive prospects, the position of China, the role of the United Nations, possible tripartite strategic conversations, and possible French personnel changes.]
Sent Department 657, repeated info Paris 319.
- In telegram 475 from Saigon, October 4, not printed, Heath reported a briefing which he, Melby, and General Erskine had received on September 30 from Pignon, General Carpentier, and their assistants. Melby and Erskine were in Saigon on a short return visit. The mission departed for Manila on October 1 and subsequently stopped in Paris en route to the United States.↩
- Telegram 626 from Saigon, October 22, is not printed. Reference is to the Premier’s interview with correspondent Tillman Durdin which appeared in the New York Times on October 21. To Huu was attributed the comment that the March 8 agreements limited Vietnamese sovereignty and should be replaced by a treaty based on French-Vietnamese equality. (Telegram 407 to Saigon, October 21, 751G.00/10–2150)↩