Office of the Historian

751G.00/10–1950

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant) to the Assistant Secretary (Rusk)

top secret
[Washington,] October 19, 1950.

Summarizing the meetings yesterday on French Indochina:1

(1)
The military situation is extremely serious and there is no assurance that the French can hold Tonkin.
(2)
An appeal to the UN by Vietnam and/or the French in our view would inevitably result in improvement to the position of Ho Chi-minh. Virtually no Asian support would rally behind Bao Dai and the French. To date the French have given no indication of intending to place a charge of aggression against the Chinese Communists or to seek UN mediation. When informally queried as to our views, we have in effect told them that the decision is one for the French to make but we have pointed out some of the problems which would be created.
(3)
Greatly increased U.S. military assistance in matériel has been promised the French. Existing programs have the highest priority (Ohly was to check yesterday with General Lemnitzer to see if there was anything further we could do to expedite the B–26’s from the Korean pipeline).
(4)
Given the existing circumstances, the time factor and our operating assumption that under foreseeable circumstances the U.S. will not directly intervene militarily in Indochina and in the absence of rabbits, we will pursue the following course:
(a)
Assure maximum speed on fulfillment of our military aid program (See No. 3 above).
(b)
Hold Bao Dai’s feet to the fire in order to extract from him the maximum effective native leadership (The stiff message of greeting to be delivered him in Saigon left yesterday). The purpose is to stimulate by this and every other means formation of the National Armies.
(c)
Consideration with EUR and Ambassador Bruce the wisdom and consequences of telling the French that their essential choice in Indochina lies between pulling out and providing adequate military force to hold it (note the last half of this proposition would have to be checked with JCS for its bearing on NATO plans)
(d)
Keep full steam behind the ECA program, recognizing however that its functioning is confined to a contracting area which is militarily secure.
(e)
Ascertain whether the battalion destined for Korea (sailing date from France October 25) could and should be diverted to Indochina (letter for Mr. Matthews’ signature to General Burns has been prepared to secure U.S. military views on this).2
(f)
Intensify efforts to strengthen the second line of defense, specifically Thailand, Malaya (reverse FE position on grant aid?), Laos, Cambodia, the Philippines and Indonesia.3
(g)
Keep before the French and the world public the fact that Indochina is and has been a French responsibility.

The military problem divides into matériel and men. We are supplying the former. The latter can come only from France, the US and National Armies. For obvious reasons best hope is to concentrate on formation of latter.

[Here follows a one-page outline of the points made in this memorandum.]

  1. The meetings under reference presumably involved the individuals mentioned in the memorandum by Deputy Under Secretary Matthews to Secretary Acheson, supra. ↩
  2. Following United States-French discussions on this question, the battalion proceeded to Korea as planned. Documentation on this subject is found under file numbers 795B.5 and 357.AD.↩
  3. For documentation on United States aid to the Southeast Asian region, see pp. 1 ff.↩