Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

751G.00/10–1550: Telegram

The Minister at Saigon (Heath) to the Secretary of State

top secret
niact

Saigon, October 15, 1950—3 p. m.

556. For Rusk and Jessup.

A. Military and political situation in Indochina demands highest level consideration US Government with respect to what immediate steps may be taken here to prevent loss of Indochina and with it, all of SEA.

1. Consequences French defeats in Northern Tonkin are far graver than indicated by loss of 9 battalions with 7,000 men and key positions along Chinese frontier. We believe:

(a) Loss of entire mountainous frontier region from Lao Kay to Mon Cay is now almost inevitable. Highly problematic if French can withdraw or link up garrisons, and losses might involve as much as 20 percent all French union forces (exclusive of Viets) in Indochina. At this writing several additional posts surrounded and preparations for withdrawal from Langson bastion are almost certainly underway.

(b) French offensive plans scheduled for north next month cannot now be implemented in view elimination strategic reserves and loss of pivotal positions.

(c) In these circumstances and while build-up of new model VM army in southern China continues, control of all Tonkin delta including Hanoi and Haiphong and of northern Indochina including Laos can no longer be assured.

2. Prime source of danger is snow-balling effect produced by impacts of defeats on already deteriorating political situation. We fear continuation of defeats may set up chain reactions in rear areas where fence-sitting Viets will be tempted to seek an accommodation with Ho Chi Minh.

3. Successes so far obtained by VM who have only committed about third of elements trained in China doubtless have exceeded even Chinese and VM expectations. Chinese participation will surely take ample forms. We look for much-increased flow of Viet recruits to China training camps and before long their new forces may well be able to hurl tank-led plane-covered assault against delta which French have no means to resist.

4. If French reveal no better military form than in past 10 days, then we must also add deficient French generalship and military intelligence to debit side of ledger for which we seek balancing factors. In spite of our constant warnings, they do not up to present time appear to have grasped full implication of practical disappearance of Chinese border as line of demarcation between Red China and Ho Chi Minh. Moreover, they have shown continuing squeamishness about taking any action which would provoke Chinese Communists, even including necessary high level aerial frontier reconnaissance.

5. Although French knew and informed Legation months ago that attack on RC 4 line possibly impending, they neither withdrew nor reinforced their positions. Apparently no one wished to take responsibility for hauling down flag. French insisted that fall of Dongkhe was an isolated action and failed to admit connection between gathering threat in north and increasing terrorist preparations in large cities and around airports. They woefully underestimated the enhancement of Viet combat efficiency due to addition automatic weapons and an adequate field artillery. Although France’s great hope is to induce US to undertake eventual air intervention, they have neglected to inform us currently and completely of recent actions in time for our government to make estimate of situation which would be required to move carriers or air into position if indeed such were our intention. We now fear that the situation may be gradually sliding into one of all-out Sino-Viet general offensive without French recognizing it as such and sending up in time the necessary danger signals to the world.

B. In this situation most measures now being applied by US are little and late. Our small program of economic aid is just beginning to take hold. Military aid is too little and is so far based on what we in Saigon believe to be an inadequate appreciation of dangers of present situation in Indochina and importance of Indochina to eventual defense of US. Although we understand Indochina in “highest priority” for MDAP assistance, measure of urgency secured by such priority is fact that vitally needed fighter aircraft demanded in February are arriving only in November.

We have lately placed much hope in rapid formation of Viet national army. This cannot happen in time to affect present situation nor can it have the same appeal as it would have had before recent defeats.

C. In view of these inadequacies, we therefore propose following for earliest high level consideration:

1. Although formation of Viet army promises less than formerly, nevertheless decision and declaration for formation of such an army might put spirit in Viets provided that such an army has its own commander, nucleus of its own staff and supply services, and that it will cooperate with French as an ally and associate rather than as tutelar. Also that its numbers will constitute a set increase in forces under arms in Indochina. These conditions do not appear to be adequately met under present French plans. As we have indicated in previous telegrams, we believe that US will be called on for some direct financing of this force.

2. Scale of urgency for delivery of US aid must be completely transformed. With all respect, we suggest that most urgently needed items should be moved to this theater with same rapidity as they would be moved under directions of JCS to a US force engaged in Pacific area. Although this may be outside the framework of MDAP procedures, I have directed MAAG to prepare with the French topmost priority list needed today, to meet a massive VM thrust. French understand this not in pursuance of instructions US Government.

3. Newspapers report that Indochina is on agenda of meeting in mid-Pacific.¹ We do not know whether or not this be the case. Legation has long urged, and at Foreign Minister’s conference it was decided to hold, earliest strategic conversations in this area. It would have been better had these been held before present difficulties but they now all the more necessary. Respectfully suggest that both in US and, at conclusion of mid-Pacific meeting, statements to effect that US line of defense runs through chain of islands off shore from Asia should be avoided. Each time this thesis has been stated in last year, we have had perturbed reaction [and] would be critical blow to Western Power interests.

4. Also believe time has come, as Legation has recently urged; for need French-US consultation in military planning in this area.

5. We hope some way can be found to apply some of resources of UN to this theater. Arbitration or good offices now seem out of question, not only because Soviet bloc interference but because proposal of cease fire and conciliation would now seem be impossible for French to accept or for US to propose. Moreover, such interposition would confer cloak of legality on Ho Chi Minh and weaken world-wide front against Communists. Furthermore, any engagements taken as result such intervention would not be respected by Communists.

We assume, however, Department considering possibility of UN border commission operating under Assembly mandate with terms of reference restricted to establishing responsibility for border violations and actively abetting aggression on a neighboring state. We realize, of course, that Soviet bloc is, in its view, holding commerce with legally recognized Ho Government.

Fact is that Russia-China is invading Indochina using VM forces they are rapidly training and equipping as an invasion force. We must now reckon with possibility that it may be only question of weeks or even days before China overtly participates in this aggression.

Department pass Paris; sent Department 556, repeated information Paris 266.

Heath

1. See editorial note, infra.