Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

Department of State Executive Secretariat Files: Lot 62D1

Memorandum by the Southeast Asia Aid Policy Committee to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)¹

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SEAC D–21, Rev. 1

[Washington,] October 11, 1950.

Proposed Statement of U.S. Policy on Indo-China for NSC Consideration

The Committee is submitting, for approval by higher authority, the attached draft joint memorandum to the National Security Council on Indochina. This draft joint memorandum contains a statement of U.S. policy with respect to Indochina. It is the Committee’s view that the U.S. Government should decide, in principle, to contribute, in whatever ways are feasible and desirable, to the formation of national armies in Indochina. Such a contribution appears to the Committee as the most effective method by which the U.S. can, at present, strengthen the security of Indochina and add to its stabilization.

The Committee would like to point out that the extent and character of the contribution which the U.S. might consider furnishing for the formation of national armies in Indochina can only be determined by negotiations between officials of the French and U.S. Governments, on a ministerial level. During the course of those negotiations French officials may be expected to present, for the first time, detailed information on their plans for the formation of these armies. Approval of the draft joint memorandum would provide the authorization from the President for U.S. representatives to consider and act with full knowledge of the plans of the French.

It is recommended that, if negotiations are conducted with representatives of the French Government, U.S. representatives secure French acceptance of the following conditions which shall attach to the extension of U.S. assistance in the formation of national armies in Indochina: (1) French Union forces would not be withdrawn from Indochina until such Associated States armies were fully trained and ready to act effectively in replacement; (2) France would not decrease its outlays for Indochina below the 1950 rate during the period of the American military aid requested; (3) the national armies projects would have the approval of the three Associated States governments; (4) the High Commissioner for Indochina, the French Command, and the three Associated States would maintain full consultative relations with the Legation and MAAG during the period of the formation of the armies.

If approved, this joint memorandum would provide the measures called for by NSC 64—“Position of the U.S. With Respect to Indochina”,² approved by the President on 23 [24] April 1950. It is understood that the draft of this joint memo will be reviewed by the JCS before it is finally approved by the Secretary of Defense.

[Annex]

Draft Statement of United States Policy on Indochina for National Security Council Consideration³

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[Washington, October 11, 1950.]

(Reference NSC 64, NSC 73/4)⁴

1. Firm non-Communist control of Indochina is of critical, strategic importance to U.S. national interests. The loss of Indochina to Communist forces would undoubtedly lead to the loss of Southeast Asia as stated in NSC 64. In this respect, the National Security Council accepts the strategic assessment of Southeast Asia which the Joint Chiefs of Staff made on 10 April 1950 (Annex No. 1).⁵

2. Regardless of current U.S. commitments for provision of certain military assistance to Indochina, the U.S. will not commit any of its armed forces to the defense of Indochina against overt, foreign aggression, under present circumstances. In case of overt aggression, the Department of Defense will immediately re-assess the situation, in the light of the then existing circumstances.

3. To strengthen the security of Indochina against external aggression and augmented internal Communist offensives, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are authorized to conduct military talks with U.K. and French military commanders in the Far East. Such talks would seek, first, an agreed military plan for the internal defense of Indochina and, second, the coordination of operations in Southeast Asia in the event of invasion. Such talks should clearly indicate to French authorities that increases in U.S. military aid will be provided in accordance with operational plans which are acceptable to the U.S. and are compatible with U.S. capabilities in the light of other U.S. commitments.

4. The U.S. should secure plans from the French and the Associated States for, and assist the French and the Associated States in the prompt acceleration of the formation of new national armies of the three Associated States (Annex No. 3 contains descriptive information on the magnitude of such plans). The employment of such armies would be for the purpose of maintaining internal security with a view to releasing the bulk of the French forces in Indochina for other duties, in accordance with the strategic plan for the defense of Indochina. In due course, as these national armies are able to assume responsibility for the functions of national defense, the U.S. will favor the phased withdrawal from Indochina of French forces in order to strengthen the defense of Metropolitan France under the NATO arrangements. U.S. and French support for the formation of national armies in. Indochina should be given wide and vigorous publicity. Since it is a policy of the United States (NSC 48/2)⁶ to use its influence in Asia toward resolving the colonial–nationalist conflict in such a way as to satisfy the fundamental demands of the Nationalist movement, while at the same time minimizing the strain on the colonial powers who are our Western allies, the U.S. should, for the time being, continue to press the French to carry out, in letter and spirit, the agreements of March 8, 1949 and the conventions of December 30, 1949 providing for self-government within the French Union.

5. Since the security of the Associated States of Indochina wall be affected, to some extent, by the capabilities of neighboring or nearby countries to resist Communist encroachments, the U.S. should use its influence, wherever appropriate, to promote close relations and firm understandings, in political, military and economic fields, among the Associated States and Thailand, Burma and the Philippines. In particular, the U.S. should seek to envelop full diplomatic relations between the Associated States and other countries in Southeast Asia, collaboration among military staff officers of these countries on the security of neighboring or adjacent frontiers, and effective agreements on the control of arms smuggling and the movement of subversive agents. The U.S. continues to favor the entry of the three Associated States into the United Nations. As a culmination of these efforts the U.S. should encourage the Associated States, in due course, to participate in such arrangements for regional security under Articles 51 and 52 of the United Nations’ Charter, as will effectively contribute to the common defense of the area.

6. The U.S. will have to devote substantial resources if the policies stated above are to be carried out effectively enough to assist in strengthening the security of Indochina. It is impossible at this time to set the exact cost in dollars to the United States of the formation of the national armies. When the details of the U.S. contribution have been determined, after discussions with representatives of France and the Associated States, the U.S. plan for assisting in the formation of the National Armies of Indochina will be submitted to the National Security Council for approval.

[Here follow annex 1, “Strategic Assessment of Southeast Asia” (see letter from the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of State, page 780); annex 2, “Military Situation in Indochina”; and annex 3, “Information on the Formation of the National Armies of the Associated States.” For the texts of annexes 2 and 3, see United States–Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967, Book 8, pages 358–368.]

1. The Southeast Asia Aid Policy Committee was established pursuant to a suggestion contained in a letter from Secretary of Defense Johnson to Secretary of State Acheson, April 14 (p. 780) Which was accepted in principle by the Department of State in Acting Secretary Webb’s letter to Secretary Johnson, May 16 (p. 816). Initial members of the Committee were Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs; Maj. Gen. J. H. Burns, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Foreign Military Affairs and Military Assistance; and Harlan Cleveland, Acting Chief of the Far East Program Division, Economic Cooperation Administration. Subsequently, Maj. Gen. Harry J. Maloney replaced Major General Burns, and B. Allen Griffin replaced Cleveland.

   The record of the First Meeting of the Committee, July 20, read in part as follows: “It was stated that the agencies had agreed that the Committee was to be responsible for the coordination of general policy for political-military-economic aid from the United States to Southeast Asia. It would be primarily a policy consultation group which would have no direct operational responsibility but would see that major policy directives with respect to Southeast Asian aid programs were being carried out” The Committee held nine meetings in 1950. Documentation of the Committee is located in Lot 53D255, Department of State. For additional information on the operations of the Committee, see pp. 1 ff.

   This paper was circulated in the Committee on October 11 under the cover of the following note: “The attached paper, prepared by the Department of Defense and the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs of the Department of State, is a revision and expansion of the brief draft statement [not printed] considered by the Committee on October 6. It is now being considered by the JCS.”

2. Dated February 27, p. 743.
3. For comments on this draft by Kenneth T. Young, Far Eastern Adviser in the Office of Foreign Military Affairs, Department of Defense, see memorandum for Maj. Gen. Harry J. Maloney, Defense Department Representative On the Southeast Asia Aid Policy Committee, October 13, 1950, see United States–Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967, Book 8, pp. 369–370.
4. NSC 73/4, “The Position and Actions of the United States with Respect to Possible Further Soviet Moves in Light of the Korean Situation,” a report by the National Security Council, August 25, is scheduled for publication in volume i. NSC 73/4 stated that Communist China had the military capability to initiate military action against Indochina and that an attack was possible. It further stated the following: “In the event of overt attack by organized Chinese communist forces against Indochina, the United States should not permit itself to become engaged in a general war with Communist China but should, in concert with the U.K., support France and the associated states, and accelerate and expand the present military assistance program.”
5. For text, see letter from the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of State, April 14, p. 780.
6. For NSC 48/2, “The Position of the U.S. with Respect to Asia,” approved by President Truman on December 30, 1949, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. vii, Part 2, p. 1215.