Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

751G.5/8–2350: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation at Saigon

top secret

Washington, September 1, 1950—8 p. m.

238. Dept has viewed growing signs of polit and mil deterioration in Indochina with increasing concern. The failure of the Vietnam Govt and its leaders to inspire support, the slow pace of the Pau Conf and inability or disinclination of Bao Dai to assume leadership as exemplified by his prolonged stay in Fr are among disturbing polit factors. Of even greater immediate import are mil considerations—the increasing indications of Chi Commie–Viet Minh military collaboration and ever present threat of Chi invasion.

Whatever prompt action we can take ourselves or recommend to Fr to stem unfavorable tide must bear fol objectives in mind:

1) Have sufficient dramatic impact to stir all factions of Vietnamese polit thought, preferably to extent of swaying fence sitters;

2) Serve to repudiate claim that Fr are not sincere in implementing Mar 8th Accords and are using “independence within Fr Union” as a cloak for colonialism;

3) Have sufficient psychological attraction to nationalists to appease, at least temporarily, their hunger for further evidences of autonomy;

4) Will not in any way jeopardize the already inadequate Fr and allied mil potential in Indochina;

5) Attract other potential non-Commie combatant units (Cao Daists, Hoa Hoa, Catholics) to side of Fr Union troops;

6) Cause no further depletion of West Eur mil potential and even improve it by releasing Fr troops from service in IC.

Dept concurs fully with Paris and Saigon that formation of natl army, at least in Vietnam and possibly to lesser extent in Laos and Cambodia, is action which approaches closest to these requirements while still remaining within realm of possibility.

We are, nevertheless, conscious of complexity of technical and other problems involved in accomplishing task and aware that it might be matter of years before armies actually exist in usual sense. We, therefore, are seeking means whereby psychological benefits of action may begin to be harvested immed even though full realization must, in fact, be delayed. The fol plan is therefore submitted for your study, comment and discussion with appropriate Fr authorities and possibly Bao Dai.

1) At earliest moment it be solemnly (and stimultaneously) declared by Fr (Auriol?) and Bao Dai that in keeping with provisions of March 8 Accords, Vietnam Natl Army under command of Emperor will become fact and that all indigenous troops then serving in Fr Union forces are incorporated into new Natl Army.

2) That pursuant to Art 3 of Mar 8 Accords¹ it is declared that a state of natl emergency exists and that His Majesty as Commander in Chief has therefore placed natl forces under command of Fr High Command in the face of threat of fon invasion.

3) That fol emergency Natl Army will be released from service under Fr command to resume fundamental task of assuring internal order, etc., and that in meanwhile officer and NCO training program will proceed.

These are bare outlines which if found feasible may later be enlarged to include invitation to other partisan forces to join colors, provide for Viet staff officers on Fr staff, devise program for replacement Fr officers by Viets, etc.

In suggesting such a plan Dept does not seek to oversimplify problem or overlook drawbacks. It is realized that for the time being this will only be a paper transfer which will be subj to customary Viet criticism of another meaningless gesture. However, it wld legally establish a Viet Army presumably with distinctive insigne and to this extent represent a step forward. We believe need for action so great we must give consideration every possible action within practical limitations.

Nor does Dept intend ignore obvious corollary Alphand Pleven request 200 billion francs two year period for establishment Natl Army. Paris may inform French this question receiving active consideration and comment thereon will be forthcoming soonest.

For ur conf info matter of formation Natl Armies will be brought up in conjunction our discussions IC at FonMinConf preliminaries of which commence today. Ur and Paris recent reporting this related subjs of which ur 265 Aug 23 outstanding have been very helpful.

Acheson

1. Section III of the March 8, 1949 agreements, which dealt with military affairs, included the provision that in time of war, the Vietnamese army and the army of the French Union would be pooled, with a French general officer assuming command, assisted by a mixed general staff.