Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

751G.5 MAP/8–750: Telegram

The Minister at Saigon (Heath) to the Secretary of State

top secret

Saigon, August 7, 1950—3 p. m.

171. Tomap. No distribution. For Rusk and Lacy from Melby. In appraising Indochina situation certain facts stand out which highlight important facets of Indochina problem and may be suggestive of helpful course of action. This telegram is based on collected observations by all survey mission members, as well as conversations with wide variety of individuals. Erskine concurs with it.

1. Indochina is keystone of SEA defense arch. Failure here will inevitably precipitate balance of SEA mainland into Communist orbit with excellent prospect of similar eventuality in Indonesia and Philippines, barring American occupation of latter. Within Indochina complex, Vietnam is the crisis point whose resolution will largely determine outcome in Laos and Cambodia.

2. French are dedicated, at least officially, to proposition problem can be solved by military means and that this is only hopeful course. Pignon has agreed that political and economic measures should accompany or follow but his agreement lacks ring of conviction. Unfortunately his departure for Paris has denied opportunity for genuinely frank and confidential discussions with him. On other hand some other French in private talks, notably Carpentier, have revealed a conviction that although there is no reason why proper application of force cannot break military back of Viet Minh, such course will not solve basic Vietnam problem which will only re-emerge later in same or other form. Carpentier insists French are incapable of applying requisite complementary political action. Vietnamese state, and many French reluctantly agree, that hatred and distrust of French so deep-rooted that no basis for long-range cooperation exists or can exist on present basis.

3. French military effort despite some successes in Red River Delta, has so far failed to break Viet Minh military strength. High local French commanders even state basic Viet Minh military strength actually increasing rather than decreasing. French entranced with analogy of tapping on a jar which later suddenly shatters. This doubtless had nineteenth century validity and might even today if Vietnam could be totally isolated; but given what we know of Communist hydra-headed policy of force, terror, propaganda, penetration, and cynical exploitation of any opportunity this concept would appear fatuous, even dangerous. French strategy largely one of static defense accompanied by disturbing amount of apathy. Division of opinion now centers around whether post-rainy season operations, should concentrate on expansion of Tonkin pacified area for Chinese reasons or on cleaning up Mekong Delta area for economic reasons. Defensive attitude only encouraged by woeful lack of matériel. French also fail make proper use Vietnamese troops apparently on hypothesis, as Commanding Officer Langson put it, if more use made then greater concessions to Vietnam would also be required. Obvious French also fear armed Vietnamese might turn on them—surely a confession of something and perhaps not wholly without warrant under present conditions. Our evidence is that Vietnamese troops properly trained and equipped could make major contribution. Growth Viet Minh military strength is a demonstration native troops can be rapidly and effectively organized for combat.

4. Erskine convinced Chinese border could be made impregnable and coastline sealed off from external aid to Viet Minh. Present forces on border insufficient to prevent increasing arms traffic or stop any major invasion effort. It has been suggested locally that Japanese troops experienced in warfare in this kind of terrain might be used. Once border sealed Viet Minh problem would be immeasurably simpler with proper combination of military and political activities.

5. Illustrative of difficulties confronting French militarily is Red River Delta situation. To French pacification seemingly means control of certain strongpoints, absence of important enemy armed action, and ability of peasants to cultivate their fields by day unmolested. Balance of picture as we saw it in Tonkin in an area French cleaned out one year ago was our inability to move anywhere without armed guards, failure to restore and maintain minimum adequate road system, endless series of assassinations even in Hanoi, continuing and increasing volume of Communist propaganda without corresponding and effective counter-effort. French state Viet Minh are everywhere. I agree what has been done represents improvement but it is neither sufficient nor decisive especially considering lapse of time involved. I have no evidence anyone knows what Viet Minh does by night in Delta area. In absence of evidence to contrary and in light our Chinese experience, evidence recent Huk expansion in Cagayan Valley, and general knowledge of Communist methods, I believe we must assume Viet Minh actively engaged in organizing and disciplining peasant lowest common denominator for opportune use. In this connection recall December 19, 1946.¹ Only ally French armed force has had in this nocturnal warfare appears to be Viet Minh excesses. I also partially discount muchly touted Tonkinese dislike of Chinese, especially in contrast to attitude toward French. Rude noises were once made that Chinese dislike of Russians would prove stronger than ideological pull.

6. As for Vietnamese attitudes and aspirations, Governor Tri, a truly impressive person, gave the best synthesis of statements by other responsible Vietnamese. He and others protest that total French withdrawal at this time would be disastrous and result only in Communist victory, due in major part to French failure to assist in establishment of Vietnam armed force adequate to its internal responsibilities. French can never genuinely pacify Viet Minh areas, and as noted above some French agree. Only Vietnam can do this. (One Mission member who participated in Vietnam night raid on a Viet Minh village was shocked and impressed by thoroughness and savagery with which patrol was carried out.) French should assume responsibility for protection against external threat or aid to Viet Minh and proceed rapidly to enable Vietnam to handle internal situation. There must also be some assurances concerning what future thereafter would hold. Primary Vietnam concern is eventual independence. Vietnam will have it regardless of anything else and will seek allies wherever it may be necessary. Other problems can be handled after that. Most Vietnamese secretly admire the Viet Minh for having fought the French to standstill and by the same token are not wholly displeased with North Korean successes. (Carpentier has expressed his and Pignon’s fears that under certain circumstances Vietnam will reach some agreement with Viet Minh.) No French guarantee can ever be acceptable, since post-war developments have made it abundantly clear that France intends to re-establish itself in Indochina as far as possible. Any guarantee must be countersigned by someone in whom Vietnam has confidence. (Having a dirty mind, one presumes this means US.)

7. Line of reasoning in paragraph 6 has certain obvious gaps and deficiencies. I also assume a certain percentage of it is designed for our benefit. Still, the Vietnam attitude is a political reality which can hardly be ignored. Inevitably the confidence with which they speak of their own abilities leads to the naughty suspicion that they are overestimating themselves. This however is no reason we should underestimate them. If the border were effectively closed, it might matter relatively little what happened inside, except to the French who might rather understandably take a dim view of having to shut up on top of all they have already put up.

In summary then there is good reason to believe that proper application of sufficient military force, plus goading the French into a more offensive spirit, can hold the aid on the Indochinese kettle for the predictable, if relatively limited, future. It will not however solve the long-range problem. Neither can the French do it on their present promises or without a radical change of heart and approach. If American interests can be served by the short-range approach then the rest need not concern us. This must be determined with relationship to over-all world situation, prospects, and time factors. If however the longer alley is important, then Franco-Vietnamese behavior in that alley, to borrow from the Churchillian analogy of the gorilla in the jungle, is a matter of the gravest concern.

If the latter be the case and the foregoing analysis valid, a satisfactory solution can only be found when the French have been persuaded to sweeter reasonableness and the Vietnamese firmly led by the hand through the growing pains of adolescence. Recent Korean precedent may be suggestive. I could propose consideration of following: French undertaking for Vietnam independence within specified period of 5, 10, 20, or 30 years with certain special compensations for French such as are found in Philippines-American arrangements.²

French would undertake to guarantee inviolability Indochina border. Vietnam national army would be rapidly created to assure responsibility internal situation and as this progressed French forces would withdraw to border areas or where unnecessary depart. Civil administration would increasingly be Vietnam responsibility. All such agreements would have UN public guarantee and such supervision as necessary. Assumably [sic] US would as usual pay most of bills. If US can bring its Korean responsibilities within UN framework, there is little solid reason why French cannot do same for Indochina.

Ever recognizing that this form is hardly likely to provoke dancing in the streets of Paris, it may well be that this or something similar is only real prospect for salvaging anything and French must be coerced into realizing it and behaving accordingly. If Vietnam as determined on complete independence as all evidence suggests, it probably cannot get it for a long time in face of French opposition, but it can create the kind of uproar which will constitute a continuing drain on French strength and in end benefit only Communists. Coincidentally, American identification with French in such eventuality will further weaken American influence in Asia. Historically no ruling group has ever remained more or less indefinitely in power in face of active or even passive resistance from the governed, or without ruining itself in the process. There is no convincing evidence Nationalism in Indochina proposes to be an exception. [Melby.]

Heath

1. For reports on the outbreak of hostilities in Tonkin on December 19, 1946, see Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. viii, pp. 15 ff.
2. For documentation on United States relations with the Philippines, see pp. 1399 ff.