751G.00/6–1850: Telegram
The Chargé at Saigon (Gullion) to the Secretary of State
476. 1. Audience which Bao Dai gave Blum and me in Saigon was held at his request to replace meeting originally scheduled for Dalat June 14 which we unable attend because bad weather conditions Dalat air strip. Bao Dai had come Saigon for ceremonies marking unification Vietnam by Gia Long founder of dynasty.
2. When I presented ECA letter of intent to Bao Dai, May 25 [24], I expressed hope Bao Dai would have opportunity see progress made Tonkin delta. He said he had every intention of going and asked me accompany him saying he also planned go into mountain regions. This invitation was later confirmed but Bao Dai subsequently cancelled his visit and came directly Saigon. In view of his disillusioned remarks to us and his non-appearance to official ceremonies scheduled for him Saigon, it is possible that he cancelled his appearance in Tonkin as part of a demonstration of estrangement from current Franco-Viet policies and that he conceives of his return France in same way.
3. He received us in Palais la Grandiere in native dress which he rarely wears but which presents him to advantage and which is in [Page 824] keeping with commemorative purpose of his Saigon visit. It is also much cooler. He looked unwell and said he had been suffering from boils in addition to malaria and liver attacks which have afflicted him past several months.
4. Blum spoke of preparations for Tonkin relief and Bao discussed possible projects with interest and discernment of detail.
5. I asked if he had set date for his return from France. He said he had not and that he would see how matters turned out before returning. I asked him how he would assess military and political situation on eve his departure. He thought political outlook was fair but that military situation was disquieting. The rest of conversation was devoted examination this assessment in course which it developed that what he really meant was that French were losing ground militarily, that they seemed have abandoned all plans of political solution, that they were making it impossible for any real Vietnamese Government function or for it to have popular support. He talked with utmost frankness and a times, it seemed to us, on verge of tears.
6. He pointed out that his return to Vietnam was not at his request but on French urging. The French could not forgive him for this. He returned only because he had assurances from French that seemed promise independence for Vietnam. “But”, he said, “This independence, what is it? Where is it? Do you see it? Is a government independent without a budget? When it has to beg 20,000,000 piastres a month for its existence?”
7. He no longer thought French had any intention leaving country. He put himself in their skin in considering the question. Would they or any whites support such struggle for sake of yellow race? Morale of French Army depended on less than real independence for Viets. French were afraid institute real Vietnamese Army for fear that it might be used against them. I referred French speed-up of Viet battalions equipment but he replied that there could be no real national army unless it had Viet command; under the accords direction of armed forces was French in time of war and as long as it was French the war was bound to continue and so on in a vicious circle. The French troops had been unable conquer this country and never could. The principal thing they should do was to go into mountains and clear out Ho Chi Minh and they seemed incapable of that. They were not aggressive and would not move at night.
8. With the enemy it was not only question of Communist discipline which had been strengthened lately, but also of an ideal, however misguided. He could call for people rally to him but he understood quite [Page 825] well that they were considered deserters by other side. Recovered populations I had seen Tonkin were not fighting men but non-combatants. Nevertheless situation in north caused him consider political situation fair because they wanted no more of Viet-Minh. In south people were inconstant; Saigon was gangster city.
9. If French thought things were going well with Huu Government that would only confirm them in staying on. He was willing stay within French Union. He did not even want disturb French capital investment here, French rubber, or plantations, or factoring trade. But he had to have administrative responsibility and beginnings National Army. His situation with his people was precarious. He was gambling on being able secure genuine nationalism by his methods. No gambler could even begin lay his bets unless he had chips and French refused to give him chips.
10. He was trying an experiment with Huu, one who loved French well. If it failed—and he did not see exactly how it could succeed—that meant a failure for French policy.
11. French simply afraid to take real steps resolve Indochinese problems. Attitude on US aid was example. They wanted it as means engaging US responsibility out here but the moment it began take concrete form they had become frightened. They feared US sought supplant them which he of course knew was not case. He understood our delicate position since France was friend in Europe. But we must see this as Asiatic and Vietnamese problem and one of our own security. We might yet have send troops here. French had used pure blackmail on us threatening withdraw troops which they would never in world do not only because of interests in Indochina but because it would mean end French Union and falling away of African colonies. We had fallen for blackmail and not put one single condition on aid to French nor pressed any of our requests.
12. I contested these promises [premises?] and conclusions as energetically as I could and in friendly manner. I asked how he could say French military effort was lagging when it had been responsible for gains in Tonkin which we thought constituted element of optimism in political scene. He seemed discount change which US aid was already bringing in both military and economic side of picture, nor did he give us credit for the amelioration of French aid formulas which our mediation had secured. Aid was going directly to people and Viet Army was getting as much equipment as it could use. I knew he agreed that Communism could not be kept out of control without French support and/or power. We of course understood his need to [Page 826] have means govern and I thought French intended provide them in increasing measure. The Interstate Conference1 would almost surely take decisions on control of customs and financial matters which would make it possible for him control his revenues. Control of Army was coming to Viets in increasing measure where regions were pacified. We believed and had assurances on highest level of French good faith and intentions. I realized that there had been a moment when French thought Viets were acting in headlong manner at opening aid discussions and they got nervous during Cabinet crisis. But since Huu Government had come in French surely had less to fear. We had reason believe French could now resume process of building Viet independence in French Union which our common hope. I believed he should continue be patient. I said I was surprised find him so much more discouraged than when I last talked to him. In any case I hoped he could return soon Vietnam where he could be his people’s best advocate.
13. Bao Dai said he not discouraged merely inclined question fundamentals. He would see what happened and then he would act. (He did not indicate what action.) We obviously placed too much importance on Interstate Conference. It would not deal with the important questions and French would play off Laotians and Cambodians against Viets claiming latter were potential imperialists, so that trivial results would be obtained. He did not plan attend because it would be said Viets trying dominate conference. He seemed impressed with our arguments but by no means convinced.
14. Legation comment: I had not previously seen Bao Dai in this mood. In my first meetings with him he talked strongly about French shortcomings but not with so much discouragement. During government crisis he seemed move closer to French position. There is always possibility that his mood is transitory, brought on by ill health, fatigue and perhaps some pangs of self-doubt about installation Huu Government. In addition he has been exposed to Nguyen Phan Long’s embittered but cogent arguments for ten days which Long spent in Dalat. Yet fact remains he is seriously considering a “stay away” strike which would embarrass the French. His overall attitude is disconsolate and far from that of convinced single-minded leader of anti-Communist crusade. This interview is reported at inordinate length so that Department may have sense of atmosphere and of Bao Dai’s disposition [Page 827] before be leaves for France.2 I shall comment further on its relation to Interstate Conference and its wider effects in brief following telegrams.
Department pass Paris. Sent Department 476, repeated information Paris 232.
- An interstate conference involving France, Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia convened at Pau, France, on June 29, in an effort to reach agreement on common policies toward a variety of economic and administrative matters.↩
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Gullion commented further on Bao Dai in telegram 505, June 23, which concluded as follows:
“7. I believe it would be mistake underestimate Bao Dai. It is possible he would like to run but on a job which is distasteful to him but he also thinks he finds political justification for his withdrawal and some genuine nationalists believe it is his only recourse. He has, I think, a long-range goal of independence for Vietnam and sense of tactics to that goal. For all his faults he is intelligent, patriotic and easily dominates type of politician Vietnam Government possesses. He is still only person capable holding together or fronting for any non-Commie government in Vietnam. Malcolm MacDonald now here on holiday, although he found Bao Dai somewhat less pessimistic than he was with Blum and me, talked with him at length and confirms opinion he is ‘proper man to back, only man capable of holding job and knows where he is going’. Of course Bao Dai ought to get in front lines more and do more village visiting and would do so if he had better advice. He has bad press because he has taken few pains to have better one, because few American correspondents speak French, because for first thirty minutes with any stranger he freezes into traditional impassivity of an Annamite Emperor combined with oriental diffidence, because he is an easy scapegoat for new political involvement which many Americans mistrust, and because he is not an American, French, not a European, not a typical Vietnamese, not a ‘good Joe’. He is also thoroughly unhappy man with no friends, a lonely man, with personality split between Europe and Asia. His nervous constitution does not stand isolation he imposes on himself and his all night jeep hunts after tigers are escapades of man possessed. Yet until his country gets some kind of democratic set up he remains, for that part of it which Commies have not suborned, its constitution, spiritual leader, substitute for parliament, for popular consent and national sovereignty. This is hard job for man brought up as puppet Viceroy and not as Thomas Jefferson.” (751G.00/6–2350)
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