Office of the Historian

611.51G/5–1650: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State

secret
Paris, May 16, 1950—4 p. m.

2329. Re Saigon’s 351 to Department, London 38, Paris 164.1

1.
Schuman’s May 8 remarks were in no way related to activities of Legation. Those of us who have been in close association on Indochinese matters over past fortnight in Paris and London with Pignon, Du Gardier, Baeyens, etc., have heard nothing but praise of Gullion’s understanding and handling of highly ticklish situation.
2.
There has been no criticism of actions or utterances or attitudes in Indochina of Jessup (Schuman paid personal tribute to his objectivity May 8) Griffin mission or naval or military personnel.
3.
Effect on Viets of American diplomatic recognition and ensuing interest in Indochina which resulted in what appears from Europe as prolonged period of intoxication during which Vietnam was missing component while important decisions were being made about Vietnam’s future caused deep concern among French and produced complex of contradictory reactions some sound, some silly.
4.
USDel in London during preparatory talks (and concomitantly Blum in Paris discussions re economic aid formula) grappled successfully if at times brutally with ill-founded expectations or basic misconceptions of French.
5.
May 8 talks resulted in recognition by US that Indochina was essential to defense of SEA and that defense of SEA was closely connected with defense of western world; in acknowledgement by France that defense Indochina was primarily responsibility France and associated states and that US aid was supplementary to, not in substitution of, Franco-Vietnam effort.
6.
As seen from Paris principle of American support of joint Franco-Vietnam effort and renunciation of any spirit of substitution cuts two ways. In addition to putting quietus on French attempts to “share” burden of IC war with US, principle can be used to allay French fears as to our taking sides with Viets and we can avoid Vietnam efforts to involve us on their side in differences. It does not preclude possibility of honest brokerage if and when necessary.
7.
Obvious that all US representatives in Indochina will be under instructions to reflect US policy and principles emerging from May 8 talks and if French return to charge on this point, Embassy plans to tell them off in so many words.

Dept pass Saigon sent Saigon 109 repeated info London for Merchant 657 Department 2329.

Bruce

  1. Telegram 2185 from Paris, May 8, describing the Acheson–Schuman conversation of that morning, read in part as follows: “He [Schuman] then made this final point. French had enjoyed good relations with our special missions in Indochina and owed them a lot. French thanks were particularly due to Jessup for his objective assessment of tangled situation. In future, however, it would be useful if instructions were given to mission inspired by, and based on, our common objectives and members should be guided thereby with Viets, lest contrary attitude be exploited and contribute toward maintaining Indo-Chinese in present state of passivity and watchful waiting. Viets are too prone to avoid their responsibilities under present agreements in hope of getting something better. They must be told to get on with their business—administrative and military—abide by present agreements and expect to achieve further powers on basis of experience gained and accomplishments achieved. US representatives could be most useful in driving these ideas home.” The full text of telegram 2185 is scheduled for publication in volume iii.

    Telegram 351 from Saigon, May 14, read in part as follows: “Trust Schuman’s remarks about degree of docility proper U.S. missions will not go altogether unchallenged [telegram 2185 from Paris, May 8, scheduled for publication in volume iii].… I formally request French be advised immediately at high level in writing that there is absolutely no need issue me any instructions of kind solicited and this mission has Department’s confidence (if indeed it has). Also request Bruce, Bohlen, Bonbright or Wallner ask Dugardier or Pignon what it is they think they are talking about and set them right or I will.” (611.51G/5–1450)

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