Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

751G.00/5–650: Telegram

The Chargé at Saigon (Gullion) to the Secretary of State ¹

top secret   niact

Saigon, May 6, 1950—6 p. m.

334. Following is summary situation Indochina and implications for US policy as I see them after three months service here and on eve FonMin conference.

A. Strategic Concept

1. In context of world-wide conflict of interest between ourselves and Soviet Union policy making must begin with appreciation consequences installation of Communist Government in Vietnam either by invasion or by infiltration. So far as I aware Bangkok conference² did not spell these but nor am I informed that JCS or NSC has completed a reexamination.

2. In sense US entry into World War II became inevitable when Japs went into southern IC. After initial wavering our attitude stiffened at that point and Japs reacted against Pearl Harbor.

3. We not now faced with great power capable of exploiting IC bases so rapidly, but opposing power does have strategic air force, more submarines, an ally in China, and mighty fifth column in SEA. After installation Communists there would be time lag before resources of Asia could be organized against us which warrants our concentration on more decisive European theatre, but also means Communists can delude us with hopes of Asiatic Titoism.

4. Menace of Communists military bases in SEA not as important as danger that most of colored races of world would in time, fall to Communists’ sickle if Vietnam were taken over.

5. As in case of Greece, threat of spreading Communist political contagion East and West from lost battlefields should influence our action, at least as much as classic but changing South Seas and Mediterranean strategy originally developed by British. IC is one other neuralgic focus like Greece. As Soviet power flows up to margin, where it must be contained, key points are fewer and stand in bolder relief. Twilight zones in which we would not know what to do in case of attack (or what to propose to Congress) have either been eliminated by Soviet action or by decisions taken by American strategic planners. I fear that IC may still be in Twilight zone and as long as it is it will remain temptation to Chinese Communists and Soviets.

6. In IC is European holding force of high quality disposed to resistance which can be supplied, air cover permitting. Terrain difficult for invader and local population hates Chinese.

7. My formulation of strategic concept for IC would be as follows:

(a) Installation of Communist Government in Vietnam by infiltration or by Chinese and Soviet aid to Ho Chi Minh short of use of armed forces should be resisted by US by all means short of use of armed force and specifically by:

(1) Persuading French to accelerate transfer of sovereignty to Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos at fastest rate consistent with maintaining morale of French army and secure Love-of-Charlie [sic].

(2) Military and economic aid to French Union and Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos which would be generous immediately, but consistent with US over-all commitments.

(3) Other means include covert activity and psychological warfare, black grey and white; as part of this program, statements of US concern for integrity of area.

(b) These measures should be sufficient prevent installation of Ho Chi Minh and to forestall invasion; but invasion or use of armed force by Chinese or Soviets which is opposed by French and Vietnamese should be met by all means including use of such US armed force as needed to enable French and Vietnamese to resist.

8. This flexible concept envisages possibility limited use of US force, takes account possibility checking threat by display determination and reckons with twilight zone in our constitutional system between war making power of executive and legislative branches. It envisages our going as far as we did in Greece and farther than was ever announced we would go. It is derivative of Truman doctrine. Its execution at any given time depends on relative military posture of ourselves and potential enemy, particularly in atomic weapons.

B. Strategic and Regional Plans

1. In my opinion French at FonMin conference will expect us to propose or be receptive to unified strategic concept for SEA. They interpret our decision to give aid here in this sense. They far more interested in strategic aid than economic. Many French officials consider latter merely token or means of relieving French payments situation and believe project has already caused more trouble in IC than it may be worth in view controversies over its nature and distribution.

2. Regardless French expectations, I believe situation calls for strategic conversations among ourselves British, French and later the associated states. Extent to which such conversations would develop decisions depends upon degree strategic concept of US is firm, far reach. In view fall Hainan and reinforcements of China in aircraft, position requires at least theater conferences to consider exchange of intelligence and hypothetical operational plans whether or not these are approved on government level. I believe ABDA command was first conceived in some such way. French now giving intelligence information freely, probably in expectation strategic understanding.

3. Believe joint planning and administration economic and military aid on regional basis preferable and consistent with unified strategy and efficient use of means would advance regional consciousness in SEA and give desirable multilateral aspect to what we do. Realize that difficulty getting massive over-all appropriation and danger of losing time may make regional action impractical now, but this should be our goal.

C. Present Position

1. military

(a) French army of 150,000 making precarious but satisfactory progress against VM only because absence of more opposition (French have only 70 FWX 63’s, 20 Spitfires, some JU–52’s, Legtel 89 to Paris March 14).³ In Tonkin situation particularly satisfactory with clearing of Delta area completed last week. Tens of thousands Vietnamese returning to villages from areas once dominated by VM while political commissars and coercion detain many able-bodied combatants. Armed bands and some deserters also coming over to Bao Dai. On balance terrorists activity in north declining. VM clearly suffering hardships in mountain area deprived rice supply.

(b) Situation outside Tonkin delta not nearly so favorable. Delivery arms from Canton area to VM in mountain sectors daily increasing. Chinese Communist reinforcements arriving vicinity Tonkin, but not frontier itself. Occupation Hainan grave menace facilitating VM supply operation and furnishing potential fighter base outflanking Annam. VM hold coast opposite Hainan. French fear undertake easy clean-up operation because unwilling strip Tonkin frontier or commit sole operating reserve consisting parachutists.

(c) Situation in south still less favorable. VM “general offensive” proceeding in Cochin China and from plain Desjoncs. Regimental scale actions severely tried France at Travinh and Soctrang although victories were obtained. Terrorist activity mounting to high level Saigon and elsewhere. Nevertheless, French and Vietnamese have lost no terrain this area. Morale good, troops and equipment tired.

(d) Recruitment and use of 60,000 Vietnamese army proceeding rapidly. Efficiency depends on US aid and establishment officer cadres.

(e) If airplanes not delivered to Ho Chi Minh and if political situation does not crumble, over-all situation precarious but satisfactory. Balance sheet of military operations terrain and roads cleared since return of Bao Dai being compiled by French at my request, will be available during London phase of FonMin conference.

2. political

(a) Vietnamese from Bao Dai down united on wanting independence, willing string along French Union only for protection and cultural sympathy. Independent instincts indicated by outgoing Vietnamese Cambodian governments stimulated by prospects US aid and expectation dealing with outside powers directly. This excessively frightened French who feared premature end of influence, unhinging political and military situation. Because of this and because Long government failed take energetic action to establish administration and to combat Communist, French helped ease Long out Huu in. Political situation may worsen to detriment military situation unless new government and French achieve union principal non-VM elements, accelerate transfer of powers to Vietnamese, step up publicity within country and abroad on concessions made by French and conduct effective political warfare against VM. If US is in position of pulling French chestnuts out of fire may earn Vietnamese resentment.

(b) As to Viet Minh, Communists have dropped mask and begun violent propaganda against US of America recognition and prospects aid have had damaging effect on Viet Minh partly responsible for intensifying purges and Communist Party discipline.

(c) Great power recognition, promise US aid, war weariness of Viet Minh have hurt Ho’s cause but delay in US aid delivery, Viet Minh propaganda reaction, Chinese Communist successes, beginning Chinese Communist aid Viet Government crisis and alleged French intervention hurt Bao Dai. Yet over-all Western side has gained slightly in three months and wider participation fence sitters seems probable. Intensified terrorism Cochin China sign Viet Minh weakness as much as it is of strength.

(d) French dug in heels on March 8 agreement during government crisis, issued Letourneau statement,⁴ pulled wires on government changes creating trend to discouragement which must be rapidly reversed.

(e) French show tendency make US whipping boy for difficulties as if US aid were blackmail operation motivated, by desire to displace French. This would be disavowed officially but manifests itself in nit picking e.g., stories of US interference leaked to French journalists; French attitude on acceptance US technicians, US military attachés; contacts between Cambodian and US representatives etc. Also partly responsible for French decision adopt some kind aid program of their own.

3. economic

Short term position satisfactory. Food sufficient except liberated areas in north. French military expenditures sustain fair level business activity and French have kept up consumer goods imports program. Rice exports still only 20 percent of normal due mainly blockade imposed on southwest area by French and Viets to prevent Ho from collecting squeeze or clandestine profit on exports. Production will increase with agricultural aid proposed Griffin mission restoring pumps, mills etc. Ho Chi Minh piastre declined in last five weeks from 17 percent parity to 5 percent parity Bao Dai currency. Legal currency holding up well, is over-valued at least 50 percent in terms of franc and dollar.

Exports can recover fully only after (1) country is pacified, (2) piastre devalued, (3) production costs cut. Griffin long term aid may help secure latter objective.

Real want is in welfare and rehabilitation in north, clothing, some medical supplies, housing, agricultural rehabilitation etc. as assessed in Griffin mission recommendations.

D. Some Elements of Proposed US Program

(Without Trimmings)

1. Staff talks. With French, British (possibly under cover NAP Council) to evolve joint strategic concepts or short of that theatre level talks for limited ends without commitment. Foreign Minister’s conference might consider coordinating intelligence. We Saigon getting anything we want from French but ad hoc. They apparently have arrangement with British. Another American agency is to operate here and I recommend it should be notified to French. Carpentier talks with MacArthur⁵ planned (Deptel unnumbered April 27, 1 p. m.).⁶ Recommend it cover wide field and I included.

2. Public declaration by US of aid intentions. Should be made within one week. Outline by Jessup in London Secto 112, May 3,⁷ satisfactory with suggestions mytel 322, May 6.⁸

3. Vis-à-vis French. They should be told informally, frankly at Foreign Ministers conference that we recognized Associated States as independent in framework of French Union as defined by March 8 accords. We not going back on that formula, wish French all luck in world with it and will render loyal assistance. Have our own reservations as to whether it will stick indefinitely and we trust French will not cling to Foreign Ministers preference to substance to point where position is endangered. We recognize moreover that sorely tried French Army is principal instrument Western policies left in Asia which is touchstone by which we judge our policies. We believe French agree that military solution alone not sufficient Indochina. Therefore Viets should be given all independence consistent with maintaining effective front to Communists. As French aware, we have thought a statement by France of their past concessions and future intentions would be useful. We still think so but we leave timing and disclosure up to them. (I still maintain we in Saigon can bring French to make some kind of statement and this approach better than gearing down inter-governmentally.) We would like to be of assistance publicizing evolution Associated States thus far in Indochina and in world.

We hope new Cabinet of Tran Van Huu will deliver results but it must contend with suspicion it is French instrument. It will presumably furnish necessary concrete achievement Viet part March 8 agreement but all more reason for quicker transfer sovereignty more publicity and accelerated evolution. Note French intend establish Ministry of Associated States (we had understood Foreign Office would get assignment) to which Indochinese Affairs would be transferred and that Ministry of Overseas France cites British dominion example. Indochinese states far from possessing dominion status as we know it and declaration may be harmful to French case not only in Vietnam unless followed up by real concessions.

We believe time now come for Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos to send own diplomatic representatives to Washington and propose invite them at time announcement US aid is made. Trust French agree.

Schuman knows Ave not out to undermine French position but not all French accord us confidence due an ally. We will hold our missions in Indochina to minimum, judge all policies in light alliance with French and make that clear to Viets. In return we hope, we can send enough technicians to do the aid job and that our motives won’t be distorted.

4. Propaganda and political warfare. We should suggest not push transfer of HC palace to Bao Dai. We should attach American public relations expert to Bao Dai under cover. Book unmasking Communist Viet Minh should be published written by American under Vietnam cover. Plans for giving Viet administration “new look”, e.g. native uniforms, postage stamps, government forms street signs, bank notes, seals etc. should be pushed. Efforts to insure sympathy youth, labor, religious groups systematically energetically promoted exchange of persons increased. American know-how drive advertising techniques should put to use of French.

Psychological warfare committees should be organized informally Saigon with ourselves and British as silent partners.

“Black” political warfare should be aggressively pushed—playing on dispersed character Viet Minh promoting discord, defeatism, confusion using all media borrowed or bought—radio pamphlets, press agents word of mouth with all shades of allegiance tailored to fit all target groups. Sponsoring friends of Vietnam should be organized immediately as well as league for Viet Minh. American experts for these purposes should be assigned Saigon immediately closely geared to military operations.

5. US aid (briefly). Economic aid should follow terms Griffin proposals documented and refined. It must be immediate as far as possible “direct” to associated states but coordinated among the three and synchronized with military operations. (For example, inhabitants of a liberated village should immediately enjoy such improvement in their condition as to attract envy of neighboring unliberated village.)

Military aid should immediately include fighter planes and ammunition without which situation is lost. French should be encouraged turn over more areas to autonomous native troops and policing. Spirit of offensive must be stimulated in French troops perhaps with aid US MAAG. Some arms must go directly to native units but French must have main control.

6. Miscellaneous.

(a) UN. Problem is not one for UN discussion unless Bao Dai solution totally fails. If UN is seized with matter, it merely means Reds champion Ho who gets cloak of legality. Ground lost cannot be made up and delay will favor Communists’ cause weaken democracies. Do not know how Department will head off Communist maneuvers this regard but believe UN might be used for border and smuggling control.

(b) Arms traffic. We should put pressure on Thailand and Philippines for effective control and also encourage multilateral action useful in building up SEA regional consciousness. Topic should be broached at Foreign Ministers’ conference.

(c) China. Recognition of China would dangerously confuse our position here as even some trade would do. Projects for famine relief should be carefully reviewed in light blockade considerations, possibility whether could be effective enough to diminish Chinese yearning for SEA rice bowl. Chinese communities here so far undeclared for Peiping alienated by reports condition South China but shaken by Communist successes.

E. Over-all Situation

Prospects warrant vigorous US policies in full awareness precariousness situation. Speed essential. We, French, and Bao Dai are in race for confidence of mass of Vietnamese with Communists who may be first to announce substantial outside aid. In coming weeks we should know whether any hon-Communist government can exist in Vietnam and whether France can hold.

Sent Department Tosec 1, Department pass Tosec Paris 155, London 31.

Gullion

1. This telegram was transmitted in three parts.
2. See footnote 3, p. 698.
3. Telegram 179 from Saigon, March 14, passed to Paris as 89, not printed.
4. In telegram 1657, April 11, not printed, Ambassador Bruce reported on a press statement by Jean Letourneau, French Minister of Overseas Territories. The statement included the point that France did not intend to modify the political framework established by the March 8, 1949 accords. (751G.00/4–1150)
5. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief, United States Forces, Far East Command.
6. Not printed.
7. Secto 112, May 3, is scheduled for publication in volume iii.
8. Telegram 322 from Saigon, May 6, is not printed.