751G.00/5–1250
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Minister in the Embassy in France (Bohlen)1
The following are the points in regard to Southeast Asia and Indochina at the forthcoming London conference and U.S.-French bilateral relations thereto made by M. Pignon, French High Commissioner for Indochina.
1. General Southeast Asia Area.
M. Pignon said that in Indochina and he believed in other areas of Southeast Asia the tripartite conference in London has aroused great expectations among the people of that area. At the present time he felt the dominant feeling of the masses of people in Southeast Asia was one of fear and a sensation of the absence of protection against the communist advance in Asia which they tend to regard as an expression of Chinese and Soviet imperialism. The people in that area see the relentless and coordinated Soviet-communist advance in progress, but on the side of the west they see good intentions but indecision and vacillation. He felt therefore it was of cardinal importance that out of this tripartite meeting should emerge a clear indication of the intention and determination of the three Western Powers to concert their policies and efforts in order to prevent Southeast Asia from falling into the communist network. A vague declaration in generalities would not be enough; there must be some indication that the West would be prepared to counter the Soviet-communist thrust with effective action. He thought personally it would be wise if at the meeting in London in addition to a declaration of policy of that nature it could be announced that there would be staff talks at some place in Southeast Asia such as Singapore. He was aware of the views held in some quarters that any such declaration by white nations might be coolly received by the native populations, but in his considered opinion [Page 799] this was secondary to the local feeling of fear and lack of protection against the communist menace. He emphasized very strongly that if nothing of this nature came out of the London meetings, he felt the psychological effect in Southeast Asia and particularly Indochina would be very bad.
2. The Situation in Indochina.
Pignon stated that the military situation in Indochina was quite satisfactory but that terrorism and fifth column activities had shown a sharp increase and he was convinced that this was a prelude to large-scale action on the part of Vietminh forces based upon increased assistance from the Chinese communists when the dry season began in October. According to French information, it is doubtful if Mao would use Chinese troops, but a large increase of military supplies with possibly some planes piloted by Chinese or even Russians is definitely to be expected. He said that he genuinely felt that the masses of people on the whole were not favorable to the Vietminh position; that they wanted above all peace and tranquility and therefore they were not unfavorable to the French but he admitted that the elite were still vacillating and sitting on the fence. He said that there had been a marked shift in Vietminh propaganda from a nationalist to a strongly Cominform-Stalinist basis.
3. The forthcoming Schuman–Acheson Meeting in Paris.
Turning to the question of U.S.-French discussions and American assistance to Indochina, Pignon very strongly emphasized his belief that the French Government must and he believed would produce for Mr. Acheson a political program indicating with complete frankness and sincerity how the French Government viewed the progressive development of their relations with the associated states in Indochina, what France was prepared to do immediately, and what France was prepared to do progressively as the situation permitted. He felt that this was absolutely essential if American assistance was to be effective in the area and the only way he could see of avoiding the danger of having the Vietnamese attempting to play off the United States against France. He said that if the French Government produced such a political program and it received general U.S. approval, it could then form a basis to guide the actions of both the French officials in Indochina and the American representatives there. Without some such agreed perspective as to future political developments and programs to be followed, M. Pignon seemed to be convinced that the Vietnamese would succeed in keeping the French and the Americans in Indochina divided and working against each other.
On the economic side, M. Pignon expressed himself as very pleased and satisfied with the agreement on economic assistance reached in [Page 800] the talks with Mr. Blum here in Paris and the manner of its handling.2 He felt that this formula for assistance would be workable and would help maintain a common position in this field of activity in Indochina. He emphasized that although the amount of economic aid was small, it represented not only psychologically but also on the spot economically a very important factor, particularly in regard to any counterpart funds which might result from American assistance which in his opinion should be used by the associated states to pay the Vietnam forces which otherwise could constitute a severe drain on the resources of these states and of France.
The London Discussions.
M. Pignon said that he did not feel that the difficulties which had been encountered in London over the draft estimate of the situation were too serious.3 They related, he understood, only to paragraph 7 and particularly paragraph 8 of the draft. It was felt by the French here that in view of the gravity and importance of the situation as set forth in the first six paragraphs, paragraph 8 dealing with U.S. attitude was “feeble.” He was confident, however, that this question which he regarded more as wording would be straightened out.
Military.
M. Pignon did not go into any military details of requirements but stated that the formula which had been worked out for the reception of arms between him and Gullion (concerning whom he spoke very highly) was a satisfactory formula. He said he thought it was a mistake to dwell upon aid being direct or indirect since those terms could be misleading. The important thing was to handle it on the spot so as to accomplish the maximum psychological and military results. He mentioned in this connection his intention to have the arms for the Vietnam battalions turned right over to the units at shoreside on arrival and that the Vietnam commanding officer would become direcently responsible for this matériel. He said what he and General Carpentier did not wish to happen was to have the military equipment turned over on any generalized vague basis to the Vietnam administration.
In general, Pignon appeared to attach maximum importance to the following points.
- 1.
- A strong declaration of intention which he felt should come from the three powers with indications of future action for the psychological effect throughout the area.
- 2.
- The cardinal importance of a French political program which should be communicated to the U.S. in order to insure harmony of approach in this field in Indochina.
- 3.
- Military preparation for a Vietminh offensive backed by the Chinese communists this fall.
He seemed quite optimistic that if action on the above lines could be taken this spring the chances were good in Indochina.
- Transmitted to Washington in despatch No. 1061, May 12, 1950.↩
- Regarding the existing status of the economic aid negotiations, see telegrams Ecato 488, May 5, infra, and Ecato 495, May 6, p. 809.↩
- Preliminary conversations among representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France took place in London during the first week of May in preparation for the Foreign Ministers meeting. The difficulties under reference involved a draft paper on Southeast Asia in which France was to accept prime responsibility in Indochina; scheduled for publication in volume iii.↩