Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

751G.02/4–1250: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

secret

New Delhi, April 12, 1950—2 p. m.

503. During conversation with Bajpai, Secretary General External Affairs, April 11, I brought up question Indochina.

1. After again going over reasons for our recognition Bao Dai, I told him in confidence we had been hoping that French would issue series announcements which would make clear her intentions gradually to entrust more power to Vietnam Government. I asked whether in his opinion there was any kind of announcement which French Government could make at this juncture which might cause change in Indian feelings or in GOI policies toward IC.

2. Bajpai replied in negative. He said he had discussed IC on April 10 with Pannikar, Indian Ambassador designate to China. Pannikar had asked what he should say in case Chinese Government should inquire re GOI policies towards IC. Bajpai had suggested that he state that GOI favored full independence for all Asian nations including IC; that GOI would not recognize any government of Asia which in its opinion did not have popular support. Bajpai added he had been reading reports from Gupta, Indian representative in Saigon who had been visiting various parts of country. These reports indicated that majority Vietnamese people including many Roman Catholics had no use for Bao Dai or his government. Gupta’s views were supported by other impartial observers. No matter what kind announcement French Government might make India would not recognize Bao Dai until it had reason believe that he had support majority Vietnamese people.¹

3. I said that several days ago high French official in friendly and personal conversation had told me that if he had his way he would order all French military and civilians leave IC immediately, that French blood and limited resources should not continue to be spent to defend independence of people of IC; particularly since French efforts were apparently not being appreciated. Bajpai said that he could understand such views and he personally could not see why French did not leave IC. I said that if France should abandon IC, Ho Chi Minh with backing Communist China would probably take immediate possession and set up a government which would take orders from Moscow direct or from Moscow via Peiping. Bajpai agreed. He feared it was too late to save IC. He doubted possibility checking tide of Asian communism by attempts to hold weak bastion like IC. He thought most effective way stop expansion communism in Asia would be to give adequate and immediate economic assistance to Burma and to strengthen Japan politically. Malaya might possibly be held. He made no reference Thailand and his omission caused me believe he had little hope for that country.

4. I told Bajpai that in spite of difficulties involved we could not, it seemed to me, cold bloodedly abandon peoples like those of IC to Communist tyranny. They had struggled long for freedom and were just as much entitled to working out their own destinies as peoples of larger or stronger countries. Disastrous consequences could flow from creation impression that democratic powers were not prepared to assist, defend integrity and independence small, weak nations in dangerous geographical positions. Such impression would give new confidence to aggressors and profound sense discouragement to their potential victims.

5. I asked what Bajpai meant by “to strengthen Japan politically”. He said Japan could still be force in Asia—not as military force necessarily but powerful stabilizing factor. Everything possible should be done to make Japanese people feel their country was again respected member community of nations. I pointed out US was endeavoring to pursue such policy. He said his remarks were not intended as critical of US; he was not even advocating withdrawal of American troops at this juncture from Japan. He had been somewhat shocked recently in reading minutes of Far East Commission to see how UK and Australia appeared to be dragging their feet in matters pertaining to rehabilitation Japan. Apparently British were worried about potential Japanese trade competition and Australians about their security. Considerations this character should not be permitted to slow up return of Japan to international stage.

6. Bajpai emphasized his remarks were personal and should not be considered as representing the policies of GOI. Nevertheless I believe that in making them he had in mind views of Nehru.

Henderson

1. In telegram 507, April 13, Henderson stated the following in regard to the above exchange: “Bajpai’s statements strengthen our belief that no announcement made by French at present likely to cause any important change in present GOI policies toward Indo-China or in personal attitude of Nehru who, in our opinion, would be more disappointed than pleased if Bao Dai experiment should succeed.” (751G.02/4–1350)