PSA Files: Lot 54D190
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Philippine
and Southeast Asian Affairs (Lacy) to the
Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth)1
confidential
[Washington,] March 13, 1950.
I asked Bob Folsom,2 recently returned from Saigon,
to give me his views on the composition of economic missions in
Indochina and on Ho Chi Minh. He has embodied those views in the two
memoranda which I attach and recommend to your attention.
[Annex 1]
Memorandum by Mr. Robert S.
Folsom to the Director of the Office of
Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Lacy)
confidential
[Washington,] March 9,
1950.
Subject: Comments on Ho Chi Minh
I am completely amazed that there is any longer a question of whether
Ho Chi Minh is a communist. I, personally, am completely convinced
that he is a communist in the sense that he is the head of the
Soviet Fifth Column in Indochina. I see no reason to believe that he
is a “native communist” or a “true communist”. The Soviet Union, the
Comintern, and the Cominform have assiduously propagated such myths
for years. That, after the Tito episode, anyone can suggest that a
communist leader approved by Moscow is other than a Moscow agent,
seems to me absurd.
That Ho Chi Minh will make a deal with Bao Dai or vice-versa appears
to me to be highly unlikely.
-
a)
- In such a deal Bao Dai would be relegated to a back seat and
if not eventually liquidated, at least deprived of all
authority.
-
b)
- Bao Dai recognizes the danger of any “cooperation”.
-
c)
- Past violent mutual denunciations would in themselves almost
preclude any such settlement of differences.
[Annex 2]
Memorandum by Mr. Robert S.
Folsom to the Director of the Office of
Philippine and Southeast Asia Affairs (Lacy)
confidential
[Washington,] March 10,
1950.
Subject: Composition and Size of Economic Missions
in Indochina.
It is my opinion that such economic mission or missions as may be
established in Indochina should be kept to a minimum size and
relieved of administrative functions to the greatest extent
possible.
[Page 759]
Contrary to the practice under which the head of the ECA ranked all except the Chief of the
diplomatic mission, any new economic mission should be clearly
subordinated to the Legation.
Personnel should be confined to technical staff who are capable of
and willing to get at the problems without fanfare. The housekeeping
problems of the staff, including housing, office space, motor pool
arrangements etc., should be handled by the Legation thus permitting
control and avoiding the usual inflationary effects caused by
large-scale operations by the new missions which in almost every
case have caused rents and prices to soar.
JCRR operations in China constitute
a model in that they were unobtrusive, economical and by and large
very effective. In contrast, ECA
operations have generally been characterized by magnificent offices,
expensive homes, large motor pools and excessive emphasis on
administration. These operations have aroused the resentment not
only of the relatively poorer American and foreign diplomatic
establishments but also of the local populace. To the extent that
this resentment has reached sizeable proportions it has defeated the
basic purpose of the programs.
