751G.00/2–1150: Telegram
The Consul General at Saigon ( Abbott ) to the Secretary of State
confidential
Saigon
, February
11, 1950—4 p. m.
106. Presented Gullion to Pignon February 9 on return from visit to Bao Dai at Dalat. Pignon departing February 12 for Paris, returning February 26.
- 1.
- With respect military situation Pignon said it would be mistake be over-optimistic. Combined effect US–UK recognition Bao Dai and Communist endorsement Ho extremely helpful but lines now drawn sharper than ever before. With present equipment and balance of opposing forces situation could be held but not much more. Weak spot was now Annam where French and Vietnamese spread thin and troops somewhat fatigued. Vietminh making strong effort this area. Pignon had just returned from there where he had extended talks with military and civilian leaders. On other hand situation Tonkin relatively good.
- 2.
- When substitution Vietnamese troops for French could be made results were good. Vietnamese satisfactory soldiers when things went well. Limiting factors on substitution were officer training and equipment. Former being slowly overcome; latter pretty much up to US. Recruitment and manpower not problem although French had to insist on careful security screening.
- 3.
- In response to question he indicated there had been no substantial reports of consultation between Chinese Communists and Ho. There were unverified reports that this or that Chinese unit was earmarked [Page 727] for thrust into Tonkin. There were slightly more reliable reports of Chinese-equipped convoys destined for VM. It was his opinion that if Russian or Chinese envoys to Ho were actually dispatched they would probably locate in a South China province.
- 4.
- Pignon uninformed Gullion’s talk with Parodi. Although he an official Ministry Overseas France he was for transfer Vietnamese affairs to Foreign Office now only because effect Vietnamese and world opinion but because situation no longer one for Overseas France. He indicated he and latter not exactly speaking same language at present. Transfer to new Ministry of Associated States would not have same moral effect and besides he foresaw difficulty treating Vietnamese in same package with Moslem states if they became associated powers. Foreign Office solution would require at least a “sous direction” under a “sous secretaire”.
- 5.
- Time had come for interested powers to examine SEA situation together and as a whole. He was going to Paris (a) for preliminary discussion this aspect, (b) for matters relating to Vietnam Interstate Conference and (c) land equipment Vietnam. His friend General Charriére had written him that American aid for military supplies was probability. Pignon did not indicate any knowledge Bao Dai’s request for supplies. At this point Dugardier1 got permission from Pignon to hand US-French internal memorandum on finances summarized in Contel 108, February 11.2
- 6.
- Pignon appeared believe western policy in Vietnam would be successful largely depending on US interest and moral and financial aid.
Sent Department 106. Department pass Paris 50.
Abbott