Executive Secretariat Files: NSC 92
Note by the Executive Secretary (Lay) to the National Security Council
top secret
Washington, December 4,
1950.
The Position of the United States Regarding a
Blockade of Trade With China
| References: |
A. NSC 41 Series1
|
|
B. NSC 91/12
|
The enclosed memorandum by the Department of State on the subject is
submitted herewith, as recommended therein, for urgent consideration by
the National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, the
Secretary of Commerce and the Economic Cooperation Administrator of the
statement of policy recommended in the last paragraph thereof.
Also attached for background information in this connection, at the
request of the Secretary of Commerce, is an Appendix containing a report
by the Department of Commerce of actions taken by the Department of
Commerce, in consultation with the Department of State, the Department
of Defense and other Government agencies, on trade with China.
It is recommended that, if the statement of policy contained in the last
paragraph of the enclosure is adopted, it be submitted to the President
for consideration with the recommendation that he approve it as an
interim short-term policy and direct its implementation by all
appropriate departments and agencies of the U.S. Government.
[Annex]
Memorandum by the Ambassador at Large
(Jessup)
to the Executive Secretary of the National
Security Council (Lay)
top secret
Washington, December 2,
1950.
Subject: Interim Recommendation Regarding a Blockade
of Trade With China.
It is requested that the following memorandum be circulated to the
Members of the National Security Council for urgent consideration.
There has been considerable inter-departmental study and exchange
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of views regarding the
question of immediate imposition of an embargo on air United States
exports to Communist China. The following considerations bear upon
the decision as to whether this course of action is now desirable:
- 1.
- No exports of munitions or items on the United States
Positive List are now being permitted to Communist
China;
- 2.
- United States imports from Communist China include items
of strategic value to the United States;
- 3.
- Unilateral United States export embargo would have little
effect on Communist China. To achieve the maximum effect of
unilateral United States action would require freezing of
Chinese assets in the United States and possibly an import
embargo on other than the direct shipments from China. Even
these combined measures, if taken unilaterally, would not
seriously injure the Chinese Communists;
- 4.
- Economic sanctions applied by all or most of United
Nations countries supporting the Korea and China resolutions
would provide an important countermeasure of substantial
effectiveness which could be applied against China.
Unilateral application of such sanctions prematurely by the
United States would, however, contribute to the fear of a
large number of friendly governments that the United States
intends, at this juncture in the Korean crisis, to take
steps, economic or military, which they are not ready to
support. This would give the Soviet sphere the satisfaction
of witnessing a rift in the unity of the free nations of the
world and possibly militate against the achievement of that
unity in the Far East and elsewhere.
- 5.
- The Department of Commerce is desirous of having a policy
recommendation by the National Security Council on this
subject.
The situation is an extremely fluid one which, so far as the United
Nations is concerned, should be clarified within a very short time.
It is, therefore, recommended that this problem continue to be kept
under review and that the National Security Council as an interim
short term recommendation submit to the President the following
statement of policy:
The United States should not at this moment undertake full unilateral
trade embargo and financial freezing measures against Communist
China.
Appendix
[Washington,] December 4,
1950.
Report by the Department of Commerce of Actions
Taken by the Department of Commerce, in Consultation With the
Departments of State and Defense and Other Government Agencies,
on Trade With China
unclassified
“Effective 12:01 a. m., eastern standard time, December 3, 1950,
General Licenses GRO, GLR, GMC, and GCC, authorizing exportation
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of any commodity, whether
or not included on the Positive List of Commodities (S 399.1), are
revoked to the following destinations: Manchuria (including the Port
Arthur Naval Base area and Liaoning Province), and China (including
the provinces of Suiyuan, Chahar, Ningsia, and Jehol, sometimes
referred to as Inner Mongolia; the provinces of Chinghai (Tsinghai)
and Sikang; Sinkiang; Tibet; and Outer Mongolia), and Hong Kong and
Macao, but excluding Taiwan (Formosa) as described in Schedule C of
the Bureau of the Census.
“This order also applies to shipments through United States foreign
trade zones to the foregoing destinations. It shall not apply to
exportation to the above destinations which have been laden aboard
the exporting carrier prior to its effective date.”
The effect of this regulation is that all persons and firms wishing
to export any commodities to mainland China, Hong Kong and Macao
must submit applications for export licenses. It is probable that
the additional work-load which this requirement imposes will mean
there will be some delay in the processing of most license
applications for that area.
The Department of Commerce, through its interdepartmental Advisory
Committee on Export Policy, is now developing specific licensing
criteria on shipments to China. It may be anticipated that under
these criteria only such goods as can be clearly demonstrated to
have no strategic importance will be permitted to move to communist
China. Shipments to Hong Kong and Macao will be screened to prevent
the transshipment to the mainland of goods which would not be
permitted to move directly from the United States.
