890.00/5–1150
Record of an Interdepartmental Meeting on the Far East at the Department of State, May 11, 1950, 11:30 a. m.1
Mr. Rusk opened the meeting and expressed to Mr. Griffin the Department’s gratitude for the very useful work his mission had accomplished.2 Mr. Griffin listed the members of the Mission as follows:
- Department of State:
- Mr. Samuel P. Hayes, Jr.
- Mr. William McAfee
- J. C. White Engineering Co.—Mr. Henry Tarring
- ECA—Dr. Raymond Moyer
- Agriculture—Dr. Ross Moore
- Public Health: Dr. Howard M. Klein
The purpose of the Mission had been the development of a program of economic assistance on an emergency basis which would remove impediments to economic development in Southeast Asia and strengthen the governments there by making it possible for them to assist their peoples in economic rehabilitation. The Mission, Mr. Griffin said, also was charged with pointing out specific needs for technical assistance and advising on necessary consultants for top-level planning in the various countries. Mr. Griffin paid tribute to the industry and cooperation of the members of the Mission.
In Indochina the Mission had walked a very tight rope in an endeavor to avoid becoming involved in difficulties between the French and Bao Dai, between the French and Ho Chi-minh, and between Bao Dai and Ho Chi-minh. The Mission had travelled in the Red River area where the members saw the depravations [depredations] of Ho’s forces. All of the buildings between villages have been destroyed and 40 to 60% of the buildings within villages in the Red River area have been demolished. The incidence of malaria and trachoma in the area had never been equaled. The people of the area who had been forced by the Viet Minh to flee to the hills were thoroughly antagonistic toward Ho Chi-minh but, on the other hand, have no love for the French.
Mr. Griffin described a welcoming arch leading to one of the villages in Indochina—“Communism, no; Colonialism, never”. He said that this sentiment was characteristic of all of Southeast Asia but that it undoubtedly represented the spirit of at least 90% of all of the Indochinese. He commented favorably on recent articles in the New York Times by Mr. Sultzberger3 concerning Indochina.
Mr. Griffin stated that in his judgment the French had not yet decided to make a success of Bao Dai while, at the same time, they realized that military means alone could not subdue Ho Chi-minh. While accepting the fact that the solution must be political, the French had not been working wholeheartedly to make a success of their chosen successor, that is, the Bao Dai government. Mr. Griffin described a meeting with the staff of M. Pignon, the French High Commissioner, which developed into an embarrassing wrangle over the possibility of U.S. technicians going to Indochina, the French pointing out that the March 8 agreements provided for exclusive French, technical assistance. They had retreated from this position only at a later meeting. Mr. Griffin said that the French were slowly defeating Ho Chi-minh but at a vast expense to both the French and the U.S., with over 50% of the French Army in Indochina. Native armies being trained by the French have far to go before they become effective.
Mr. Griffin described the situation in Indochina as amorphous but [Page 89] urged the rapid dispatch of American teams into the field to test out the program just developed and work out on the spot relations with the French. He described as essential the immediate manifestation of American encouragement for Bao Dai and his people.
From Indochina the Mission travelled to Malaya where consultations were held with the British preparatory to visiting Burma. During long consultations with Mr. MacDonald, the British High Commissioner for Southeast Asia, Mr. Griffin learned that the British analyses of the situation in Indochina and in Southeast Asia as a whole were similar to those which he and his mission developed. The Burmese, MacDonald had informed him, do not wish to receive British technical or military advice, and the British Army mission in Burma never appears in public in uniform. In this connection, Mr. Griffin remarked that the U.S. military personnel in the area would be well advised to follow this precedent and put a stop to the unnecessary display of American military uniforms.
Mr. Griffin described the Burmese government as unstable and cockeyed, unprepared and shaky. Nonetheless, he had not found the situation as bad as he had expected it to be. The depravations [depredations] of the “bandits” had not been nearly so severe or permanent as the guerrilla operations in other parts of Southeast Asia. The opposition is not terroristic nor anti-foreign. Mr. Griffin felt that stabilization could be achieved, both rapidly and satisfactorily, in Burma if a change of attitude on the part of the government could be brought about. Following gentle persuasion by the Griffin Mission, the Burmese government finally submitted the exact proposal for economic assistance which the Mission had wanted it to do. Mr. Griffin stated that this proposal could be implemented by the U.S., certainly not by the British, and might well prove to be the necessary element which would lead to rapid improvement in the whole situation in Burma.
The situation in Thailand had been much more encouraging. The Mission developed very quickly successful team work relationships with officers of the Embassy at Bangkok. The program for Thailand had been designed to help retain the present favorable conditions and to prevent the development of crises, A critical problem in Thailand is the powerful Chinese minority.
Many disappointments had been found in Indonesia, Mr. Griffin reported. The Indonesians, like other Southeast Asian peoples, had not been prepared for self-government and recognized the need for moral leadership and skills from the West. Indonesian leaders had expressed their concern over the departure of experienced Dutch personnel. Originally, the Mission had been favorably impressed with the Dutch in Indonesia and had considered the desirability of subsidizing Dutch efforts. The original impression, however, had been gradually [Page 90] overcome when it was discovered that the Dutch would not recommend any proposals for improvement until “law and order” had been established. No justification had been prepared by either the Dutch or the Indonesians for projects under the $100 million Export-Import Bank loan.
Ambassador Cochran had arranged a conference for Mr. Griffin with Mr. Djuanda, Minister of Economic Affairs, who had confessed that he felt constantly frustrated by the lack of Dutch cooperation, although he admitted that there were some “good” Dutch who were trying to help. The small Indonesian government, Mr. Griffin found, was terribly overworked and he recommended the assignment of a top-level group of American engineers and planners, not to supersede the Dutch but to bridge the gap between the Indonesians and the Dutch advisers.
For both Burma and Indonesia, Mr. Griffin recommended the establishment of schools for training government administrators and suggested that they be located in Rangoon and Djakarta. He described the lack of trained bureaucrats and the pressing need to provide training for the young people in public administration.
Mr. Griffin reported that the members of the mission had not returned from its tour in a pessimistic frame of mind. They were hopeful that a small group of good men and the expenditure of small amounts of money could accomplish wonders in the area. Although some of the Southeast Asian governments had developed peculiar attitudes toward westerners and their neighbors, and although there was a very active hot war in Indochina, the situation in the area was not basically unsound. Mr. Griffin stated that it was most important that workmen-like groups be sent to the area and given authority to make adjustments in the program to fit changing conditions in the field.
In response to a question by Mr. Rusk, Mr. Griffin stated that men with enterprise, initiative and determination must be placed in charge of carrying out U.S. programs in the area and must be given full authority. He stated that the proposals and programs which his mission had developed will of necessity be changed as they are worked out, but he believed that the changes should be made in the field and reported to Washington, not requested. He said that the heads of the economic mission must be field commanders with general directives, and stated that the heads of our diplomatic missions in the area all feel the sense of great urgency.
Mr. Rusk then introduced Mr. McConaughy4 who has just returned from his post as Consul General at Shanghai. Mr. McConaughy reported [Page 91] that the Russian influx into China is continuing and estimated that more than 3,000 Soviet agents have arrived straight from Moscow. At the time of his departure from Shanghai, Mr. McConaughy reported the trend in China was completely unpromising and he considered that the situation would deteriorate further. He believed, however, that a modicum of trade would probably continue with the West and that a few American businessmen and missionaries might be able to carry on in China for some time. The trend, however, was to squeeze out all Western influence.
Mr. McConaughy reported that the last word he had received from the American business community in Shanghai was the request that the U.S. Government prevent funds from being remitted to China from the U.S. While recognizing that the freezing of funds had many ramifications, the American businessmen believed that this help was needed to prevent their being held for ransom or as hostages. Mr. McConaughy suggested that the UN” Commission on Human Rights might be the best forum for raising the issue of exit permits for foreigners desiring to leave China. He said that the Chinese Communists considered it a privilege and not a right to leave Communist China.
In conclusion, he stated his conviction that the top command of the Chinese Communists was thoroughly indoctrinated in Soviet theory and practice and completely loyal to Moscow. In the near future, therefore, he would expect all high policy to be directed by Moscow. Implementation, however, of the policy may well develop along Chinese lines as distinguished from Soviet practice.
- Drafted by Windsor G. Hackler, executive staff officer, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs.↩
- The Griffin Mission completed its work in Southeast Asia on April 22 in Indonesia and returned to Washington via Paris. On May 2, Griffin participated in a conference at the Department of State which dealt in large measure with the subjects under consideration at the May 11 meeting. His memorandum on the May 2 meeting is not printed except for his record of the discussion on Indochina, for which see p. 794.↩
- Cyrus L. Sulzberger, correspondent for the New York Times. ↩
- Walter P. McConaughy.↩