795.00/12–3050
The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Officer in Charge of India-Nepal Affairs (Weil)1
Dear Eliot: I wish to thank you for your thoughtfulness in sending me a copy of Mr. Mathews’2 memorandum of December 14 to Mr. [Page 614] Rusk3 regarding the change in the degree of frankness with which Sir Girja Bajpai discusses with us the activities of the Indian Ambassador at Peiping. I agree in general with the statements contained in the memorandum. I am convinced that Sir Girja’s attitude of genuine friendliness towards the United States has not changed. He at times indulges in fits of pique from which he rapidly recovers. He has had these fits for many years, and I do not take them too seriously.
I do not believe, however, that he is giving us as frankly as he did formerly the contents of messages received from Panikkar. A number of reasons, in my opinion, are responsible for this reserve on Sir Girja’s part, some of which I shall set forth below.
- 1.
- Some of the material which he gave me in confidence, and which I believe he was not authorized to give to me, has on occasions appeared in the American press, particularly Newsweek, with resultant embarrassment to himself and to the Government of India. He therefore does not trust fully the discretion of the Department of State. The person in the Department who is supplying Weintal of Newsweek with secret information from Delhi is doing us and the American Government a distinct disservice.
- 2.
- Sir Girja has made it clear to me on several occasions that if the United States Government should be aware of all of the contents of Panikkars telegrams, United States attitude towards Communist China might stiffen. He therefore is withholding some of these contents, since the policy of the Government of India is to prevail on Communist China and the United States to come together. From various quotations from Panikkar’s telegrams which Sir Girja has read to me from time to time, with the understanding that I am not to repeat them to the Department, I am inclined to believe that Panikkar is denouncing the United States in his telegrams almost as much as Communist Chinese leaders, and that Sir Girja does not like for us to know how far Panikkar is going in trying to sell to his Government the Communist Chinese point of view. I have been particularly strict in keeping my word about not repeating some of Panikkar’s statements to the State Department, because if I should repeat them in confidence and they should later be published in the American press, I would have no credit left in New Delhi.
- 3.
- Another reason for Sir Girja’s reserve, in my opinion, is that he believes the United States Government would not relish some of the arguments which India is using in its discussions with Communist China, and it is not easy to tell me part of these discussions without disclosing some of the features which might cause irritation of the United States.
- 4.
- It is clear that the British and the Indians are engaging in a number of maneuvers vis-à-vis Communist China with which they do not wish us to be acquainted. We might as well face the fact that the United Kingdom shares much responsibility for India’s attitude towards the Far East problem during the last four months, and the [Page 615] British and Indians do not care to have us know the extent to which they have gone in order to placate the Chinese Communists.
Sir Girja, on a number of occasions, has told me in confidence that he is not at all satisfied with the policies of his Government with regard to Communist China. In fact, I am inclined to believe he is almost as much ashamed of some of the instructions which have gone to Panikkar as he is of some of Panikkar’s reports.
An interesting feature of Indian-British collaboration with regard to China is that the British tell us in Washington and London that one reason for their inability to give us full support in our Korean policy is that they must take into consideration the views of their Asian allies and friends. At the same time the British have been making great effort to prevail upon their Asian friends to adopt policies with regard to the Far East opposed to ours. For instance, Sardar Patel4 told me last spring that Nehru would not have rushed so quickly into the recognition of Communist China if he had not been convinced by the retiring British Ambassador to China, and: Other Britishers who came to Delhi, that China should be recognized and that the United Kingdom expected to recognize China. Nehru, therefore, according to Sardar Patel, took the position that since under British leadership the whole Western world would eventually recognize Communist China, India should move first. In fact, the British, according to Sardar Patel, told Nehru that they had informal assurances from high American officials that just as soon as a suitable set of circumstances could be brought about, the Government of the United States would recognize Communist China.
During the last month, as you are aware, Mr. Dening, British Ambassador at Large, spent some time in New Delhi. During a chat which I had with him he made no secret of the fact that in British opinion the United States had made a great error in not recognizing Communist China and favoring its admission into the United Nations. He was particularly caustic, in a friendly way, at the American attitude towards Formosa. When I intimated to him that Formosa might be to us what the Suez was to Great Britain, he said that responsible British military authorities did not believe that Formosa had any great military value and that many American military experts agreed with the British military point of view. He said that he had been assured in the United States by high American officials, when he was there some months ago, that after elections the United States would proceed to recognize Communist China and to permit it to take over Formosa. He was afraid, however, that as a result of [Page 616] the elections, internal, political exigencies would prevent the Americans from following a sensible course. He also referred to the unfortunate hysteria in the United States and indicated the fact that emotion rather than reason seemed to be dominating the course of American foreign policies.
I have been told by American newspaper men here that in his discussions with Indian journalists Dening followed a somewhat similar line. I do not know what he said to Nehru during his various conversations with the Prime Minister, but I have little doubt that he talked to him in the same way. If he followed such a course in talking with Nehru, he undoubtedly found a sympathetic listener.
Dening was also extremely critical of General MacArthur during his conversations with me. He said that he failed to understand why General MacArthur put the South Koreans in the center of the line during the offensive, because General MacArthur had told him personally in Tokyo that the South Koreans could not be depended upon. He also was highly critical of American military intelligence, as well as the failure of General MacArthur’s staff to give proper evaluation to intelligence reports received not only from American but from other sources. While Dening was here, some of the newspapers carried criticisms of General MacArthur of a character so similar to those made orally by Dening to me that it is difficult for me not to believe that he did not inspire them either directly or through conversations with Indian officials.
I am writing this to you in the utmost confidence, with the idea that various members of the Department might be interested in my remarks. I do not want these remarks, however, to be made a part of the Department’s files. As you know, I am convinced that unless there can be basic cooperation between the British and ourselves, the world outlook will be extremely dark; and therefore I do not wish to be guilty of sending in material to the Department which might stir up anti-British feelings. Nevertheless, I believe that it would be helpful for members of the Department who have a broad view of the situation to realize that the British sometimes utilize the special position which we help them to hold in South Asia in criticizing our policies and belittling our efforts. I suppose it is sometimes a temptation for the British, when they do not wish to give us offense by opposing some of our policies openly and frankly, to create a screen of opposition to those policies among the members of the Commonwealth and among other countries over which they have influence, behind which they can operate with some effectiveness.
With kindest personal regards, I am
Sincerely yours,