Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

792.00/4–1250: Telegram

The Ambassador in Thailand (Stanton) to the Secretary of State

[Extracts]

secret

Bangkok, April 12, 1950—10 a. m.

319. From Griffin. After extensive discussion American Embassy, UN Thai officials and American businessmen, following conclusions reached:¹

I. Political Factors

A. Thailand, oldest free independent country SEA, possesses high degree administrative stability continuity not seriously affected by recent political turnovers. Country’s stability not seriously threatened by traditional political rivals. Neither two opposition groups pro-Communist or anti-American or likely threaten present government near future. Government anxious cooperate with West, particularly, US.

B. Thailand like rest SEA threatened by Communist imperialism controlled from China, which makes no secret designs SEA.

Principal factors

(1) Large Chinese minority about 3 million dominating important segment country’s economy and susceptible use by Peiping Government which already exerting pressure.

(2) Urgent Communist China need Thai rice.

(3) Possible opportunistic switch by Thai people if feeling develops Communist victory inevitable and West support too little and too late.

(4) Possibility Communists will bypass Burma, IC attempting seize Thailand first.

C. Immediate economic aid definitely needed achieve US political objectives Thailand for following reasons:

(1) Improvement conditions people will make them less susceptible Communist propaganda and convince them our interest based genuine good will.

(2) Position Thailand strengthened through encouraging non-Communist Chinese resist pressure threats blandishments of Chinese Communists.

(3) Strengthening Thai economy lessens chance Communists’ efforts seize control before Burma IC.

(4) Aid will not be opposed by Thai opposition parties.

(5) Aid will convince Thai they not abandoned by West, thus reducing chances opportunistic volte-face.

(6) Due large number visitors missions talking economic aid in last months and due non-materialization, many Thai regard aid plans as so much talk. Actual aid now necessary politically to fulfill some expectations and hopes.

D. Serious deterioration in Thailand unrelieved by sizeable US-Western aid, would likely start wave defeatism in all SEA. Aid to Thailand obviously in accord our expressed interest independent nations SEA.

II. Economic Factors

A. Thai economy based principally on rice although country important exporter of tin, rubber, teak. Country has no capital goods industries and no large-scale production of consumer goods.

B. Steady and increased flow rice from Thailand vital political stability in Asia and hence of great US concern. Moreover, Chinese Communist eyes certainly set on Thailand and make it undoubted economic prize in SEA.

C. Thai favorable dollar trade balance in 1949 of about 33 million due primarily ECA rice purchases for China; with cessation such purchases Thai now estimate total official 1950 dollar income only about 12 million with estimated necessary dollar expenditures 32 million although Embassy estimates 14 and 26 million respectively. Thailand, while ostensibly enjoying relatively prosperous economy, unable pay substantial dollars for capital goods, equipment and services, thus seriously handicapping rehabilitation development. Moreover, UK unable promptly supply capital goods and equipment urgently needed. Only speedy solution for resulting bottle-necks is dollar assistance.

D. Notable shortage Thai officials trained and experienced economic planning administration and organization and Thai earnestly desirous assistance these fields. US technical advisers would have immediate political and economic effect particularly in convincing Thai we seriously interested their independence and welfare.

E. Substantial requirements remain resulting from wartime demolition deterioration not yet replaced. Some US demolition including Bangkok power.

[Here follow Part III, Program recommendations; Part IV, Local currency for program; and Part V, Field organizations.]

VI. Urgency of Action

Although emergency comparable IC and Burma not existing here, nevertheless, immediate start implementing recommendations imperative both for political effect on government and people and to indicate reality American protestations of interest welfare this country. Precise character some projects subject modification, but less than in neighboring countries. First personnel arriving for programs should be competent continue planning help negotiate project agreements and be prepared remain on job. Although limitations authority this mission carefully explained, nevertheless, Thai officials expect earliest action and top planning and operating personnel should arrive within 90 days at outside.

Representatives American Embassy have participated practically every meeting with Thai officials and drafting this cable. Total contents this cable discussed with Ambassador Stanton who concurs. [Griffin.]

Stanton

1. For the text of the report prepared by the Griffin Mission during and after its visit to Thailand, April 4–12. regarding the needs of that nation for economic and technical aid, see Hayes, The Griffin Mission, pp. 223–267.