793.00/10–2650
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Clubb) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)
Subject: Project for Organization of “Free China Committee”
The history of overseas Chinese communities, which are discovered in greatest number in Southeast Asia, is of major relevancy to any study of the desirability of projecting the organization of something on the order of a “Free China Committee”. The overseas Chinese contributed substantially to the Chinese revolution against the Manchu Dynasty, gave expression to their interest in the welfare of the motherland at the time when the Kuomintang–Communist Party coalition was driving (1924–1927) toward the overthrow of the warlords, and contributed to the downfall of Chiang Kai-shek by withdrawing their support in the post World War II years of civil strife.
There appears to have been in overseas Chinese communities an initial enthusiasm for a Chinese Communism which first made serious bid for power under the banner of a nationalism opposed to the Japanese control of China. It gained strength from the common disillusionment with the administration of the corrupt Kuomintang and the general hope that the advent of the Chinese Communists to power would represent in China the dawning of a new day when there would be more of probity and efficiency in government and a more rapid progress of the country toward the status of a modern, industrialized state.
The Chinese Communist display of themselves in their true colors in the year and a half since their occupation of Peiping and Tientsin has brought about much disillusionment in overseas communities. This is attested by recent reports from consular offices of the Department of State regarding the celebrations held in local Chinese communities variously on October 1 and October 10, when the non-Communist elements showed surprising strength and vigor in their turnouts. This is not to say that the Chinese overseas communities abroad have any further substantial hope in the future of the Kuomintang. The expression of independence manifested in the non-Communist demonstrations on October 10 was not to be taken as a manifestation of support for the Nationalist cause or for any particular cause so much as a reaction against the extreme policies of the Chinese Communists which, in the eyes of overseas Chinese, are operating to the detriment of the Chinese people and the Chinese State. The demonstrators would presumably sometimes carry Nationalist banners for want of a better one, or as a symbol of their resistance. At the present time there seems to be lacking both in China Proper and abroad ideology, leaders, and organization [Page 538] for a movement of opposition to the Chinese Communists. The “resistance”, therefore, still is manifest primarily in the persons of the Chinese bandits and guerillas who are literally struggling for existence.
The advisability of organizing any such “Free China Committee” should be determined only after reference to (a) American overall policy respecting China and (b) the state of Chinese overseas opinion regarding China. American policy faces imminently at least partial new crystallization due to the operation of the following factors: (1) the impending manifestation, positive or negative, of Chinese Communist intentions with respect to Korea; (2) the UN decision regarding criteria for accrediting to the UN of representatives of a member State in which two parties alike claim authority; and (3) possibly, renewed consideration of the question of the advisability of recognition of Peiping. The value to the United States of a “Free China Committee” would obviously be dependent in good part on the political elements currently dominating Sino-American relations.
A native Chinese movement which took on the outward aspect of a committee such as that under consideration could of course do us no harm, and might in fact contribute substantially to the overall campaign against world Communism. It does not, however, at this state appear clear that the overseas Chinese have in them the conviction and determination that would be requisite to make such a general committee a going concern. It is certain that overseas activities can have real effect only in so far as there is a real relationship of the movement with the home-land. There appears to be lacking now any strong connections between the overseas Chinese communities and anything approaching a genuine “resistance movement” in China; it appears, in fact, that there is as yet no integrated resistance force either at home or abroad, and that a “Free China Committee” would therefore be an artificial apparatus introduced into the situation—by the United States. If that is true, it would fail to affect the outcome of the struggle in any substantial way.
It is of course not as yet certain that there are nonexistent the elements of real anti-Communist resistance in the overseas Chinese communities and in China. It is only to be pointed out that, as indicated in Air Intelligence Information Report of July 7, 1950 from Hong Kong,1 it was early expected that, “the overseas Chinese communities in general are expected to serve effectively the interests of a Communist-dominated Government in China” and it remains uncertain that the Chinese communities in Southeast Asia are strong [Page 539] enough to resist the temptation to take the easy way of compliance. Many Chinese in China did just that. The surveys now being undertaken by field offices will shed considerable light on the feasibility of such a project. It is recommended, however, that at least pending receipt of those surveys and collation of that new data we should limit our activities to work with existing organizations, both in Southeast Asia and in the United States. The organizations selected obviously would not serve our purpose well if they were of the Kuomintang machinery. The Kuomintang itself has proven how ineffectual it can be by following the lines of its barnacled policy and there would be little hope of our capturing Kuomintang organizations and molding them to our own purposes for so long as we continue to recognize and support the National Government at Taipei. It would be much more probable that the Kuomintang organization would capture our own efforts in so far as we put them within reach of Kuomintang chapters. The organizations that we should select for our first work would best be, it would seem, Chinese secret societies, Chinese chambers of commerce, and Chinese social organizations designed for non-Kuomintang ends. The framework for action would be the local Chinese community and its relationships with the home-land, China. The aim for the present stage would be restricted to (1) the obtaining of information regarding existing political relationships affecting the Chinese community and the trends in such relationships, and (2) thus, the assessment of the feasibiliay of contributing to such a coordination of native Chinese sentiments as would in turn be of value to the strengthening of the anti-Communist front. Such an effort, it should be stressed, will be of real value only in so far as it can affect the situation in China itself; and, further, such a project could properly be undertaken only with due regard for local conditions, including the attitudes of friendly governments, in the areas of intended action.
American contacts in this preliminary stage could be effected through local Chinese newspapers and other publicity channels which had their ultimate outlet on the mainland and by approaches to Chinese chambers of commerce and social organizations. The experience and information gained through our first contacts would obviously present us with guides for future efforts and the data supplied by consular offices should facilitate further defining of the lines of the subject in point. If events in the eastern Asiatic area so determined, and our research made clear the feasibility, we could then proceed to the next step. The first steps, it is suggested, should be taken carefully and the projected “Free China Committee” would not seem, on the basis of the scanty data in hand, best designed to serve our purposes. [Page 540] Further survey and some initial experience with Chinese overseas thinking and attitudes would seem to be the basic prerequisites.2
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On October 30, John P. Davies of the Policy Planning Staff sent the following memorandum to Assistant Secretary Rusk:
“I concur in Mr. Clubb’s memorandum of October 26, ‘Project for Organization of “Free China Committee”’.
“I would only add that to set up a Free China Committee at this stage would probably be to establish a gravy train. Given the almost supernaturally sensitive Chinese nose for this type of institution, we would find ourselves with a typically overflowing Chinese load of passengers, among whom few, if any, would be willing to get out and walk off into the countryside, where the struggle must begin if it is to be won. I would recommend waiting until (a) we discover a handful of selfless, dedicated, hard-bitten souls, and (b) we ourselves acquire some political sophistication about such operations before we undertake to bring a ‘Free China Committee’ into being.” (793.00/10–2650)
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