330/9–1550: Telegram
The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Gross) to the Security Council
551. Report of developments re establishment of SC commission on Formosa complaint and related matters.
1. Confirming my telecon with Bancroft,1 I had lengthy, inconclusive discussion with Quevedo (Ecuador) re his government’s position on inviting Chinese Communists to table during SC consideration Formosa question. Stating he had instructions from his government to vote in favor of invitation to Chinese Communist representative to attend SC sessions under rule 39, and frankly admitting his strong personal agreement with his government’s instructions, Quevedo was anxious to explain reasons for Ecuadoran position. As small L.A. state, which itself had been invaded nine years ago, his government and people attached utmost importance from standpoint of national security that SC door always be wide open to complainants of aggression or invasion. Liberal parties in Ecuador would strongly criticize action by Ecuadoran delegate in SC inconsistent with this fundamental principle. Ecuador went to limit in abstaining on vote to invite Chinese Communist representative to table in connection with the Yalu River bombing complaint and had been strongly criticized for doing so. In that case a way out was found on basis that US had offered to pay indemnity, thereby recognizing its obligation in advance in event of adverse finding by a commission of investigation. However, even this was considered by Ecuadoran Government to be tenuous and artificial distinction.
At the same time Ecuador, fully realizing importance of matter to US and possible bearing upon Korean war, was anxious not to take position adverse to our interests, particularly because of their realization they would be 7th vote. I explained fully seriousness of problem from our standpoint, stressing political and strategic factors leading us to conclusion that it was neither necessary nor desirable at this stage of Formosan case to invite Chinese Communists under rule 39. In addition to outlining points made paragraph 4, Deptel 224, September 7, I pointed out possibly confusing consequences upon Chinese representation issue in GA if Chinese Communist delegation were actually at Lake Success during opening phases of Fifth Assembly. Latter point appeared to impress Quevedo, who was also impressed by argument that we were not advocating denial of forum but rather [Page 505] selection of more appropriate means of taking testimony; i.e., before a fact-finding commission.
Despite all the foregoing, however, Quevedo made clear serious problem his government facing. As way around dilemma, we discussed possibility of postponing SC vote until after Chinese Communist representation issue had clarified itself in GA. Quevedo seized upon this, saying he felt we might be in a better position to discuss the matter again after GA had decided Chinese representation problem one way or the other.
Quevedo reiterated his government’s willingness to support fact-finding commission but was unwilling to sponsor resolution on ground it was known to be US idea and hence Ecuadoran sponsorship would, simply be assailed as a satellite operation.
Comment: Tactic of delaying vote September 18 appears to us to offer best visible solution for present. Although we have no assurance that Ecuador will indeed change its position, there is a possibility that it may be prevailed upon to do so after GA vote has shown the sentiments of UN majority against taking any action at this time which might enhance prestige Chinese Communists at expense of UN effort in Korea. Ecuador Government would then have added justification for following our lead.
2. Following discussion with Quevedo, I requested Jebb to place complaint of aggression upon Korea as item 1 on the agenda for September 18 meeting, which he agreed to do. Jebb, who had been present at fourth FM meeting on Thursday afternoon, September 14, said that UK and French FonMins favored SC reaching vote upon Chinese Communist invitation at September 18 meeting. Jebb indicated Fon Mins believed invitation would be defeated, apparently being unaware of Ecuadoran position. For the moment I did not think it appropriate to advise Jebb of Ecuadoran position.
Re fact-finding commission, Jebb said Bevin had not considered matter. However, Jebb has talked to Dening and does not think UK will support proposal. Apparent UK objections are: (1) They do not perceive such a commission would serve any useful purpose; (2) It is “not evident what it would investigate”; and (3) UK does not believe commission proposal should be considered or acted upon in absence Chinese Communist representative. Jebb repeated Bevin “had virgin mind on subject.”
Comment: It appears from foregoing that in order to obtain UK support, it may be necessary for Secretary to speak with Bevin and to this end I suggest Department brief Secretary without delay. It will be apparent from summary at end this message that without UK support there will not be seven votes in favor of resolution.
3. Bebler (Yugoslavia) advised me in discussion today he had instructions from his FonMin that Yugoslavia could not back proposal [Page 506] to establish. 11-member fact-finding commission and would vote against any commission which included in its composition Chinese Nationalist Government representative.
4. Sunde (Norway) “sees no objection to commission” and will vote for it. At my request he agreed to consider sponsorship but expressed doubts that Lange would permit him to do so because Norway did not perceive that “there were any facts in dispute” and was not enthusiastic about the commission idea. Moreover, Sunde assumed idea would be opposed by Peiping regime and would be vetoed by USSR.
5. I discussed fact-finding commission with Chauvel (France) and received his commitment to support.
6. Fawzi (Egypt) advised Hyde today Egypt does not like the commission idea well enough to sponsor it and refused to commit himself definitely to vote for it. At the moment Egypt must therefore be listed in the doubtful category.
7. Blanco (Cuba) advised Hyde view of Cuba was to vote against commission inasmuch as Cuba had voted against placing item on agenda. Hyde persuaded him to reconsider and Blanco agreed to discuss matter with Cuban Minister in NY on Sunday.2 Accordingly, Cuba must also be placed in doubtful category.
Comment: Summary of apparent voting situation re fact-finding commission.
- (a)
- In favor: US (unless we abstain under article 27), Ecuador, Norway, France.
- (b)
- Opposed: China, Yugoslavia, USSR (probably), UK (probably).
- (c)
- Doubtful: Cuba, Egypt, India (uninstructed with Rau out of town until Monday).