Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

790.5/3–2450: Telegram

The Ambassador in Australia (Jarman) to the Secretary of State

secret

Canberra, March 24, 1950—4 p. m.

92. The tone and content of Deptel 50, March 21, appear so inadequate as response to Spender’s approach re Pacific Pact that we cannot believe Department has fully appreciated sincerity of his intention and importance new Australian Government attaches to US phase of its foreign relations. Possibly we are at fault in failing stress in Embtel 71, March 10, that, granted limitations imposed by Australia’s size and strength, every known act of government since taking office indicates it really means business. We had supposed Embtel 71 would be read in general context Spender’s public statement plus our numerous telegrams and despatches indicating Menzies Government,¹ in sharp contrast to its predecessor, has gone out of its way to strengthen US-Australian relationship. In particular, it is endeavoring meet our position re friendship treaty, encouragement American firms here, joint basis in Pacific, and Chinese Communist problem. Moreover, it conceives Colombo plan for economic aid SEA as complementary our own plans and policies including Point Four. Even in connection Jap problem, touchy domestic political issue, views expressed by Spender in speech of March 9 (Embdes 67, March 10²) represent concessions to US position. Again; Spender spoke to me yesterday concerning encouraging prospects for double taxation agreement. New government has been in office only three months but has shown in these and other matters that it repudiates uncooperative attitude of Chifley Government and unrealistic foreign policies of Evatt.³

Spender told me yesterday on eve departure for good-will visit Manila that he wished impress upon me that his Government was anxious come to grips soonest with Communist problem in Asia. He hoped Colombo plan for economic aid to SEA would serve useful purpose in that regard, a purpose which ECAFE could not serve as well because its members included the USSR and the SEA countries for which aid intended. Realizing however, that economic aid is not enough, Australia, while fully realizing its limitations as small power, desired do everything possible promote Pacific Pact with military commitments.

As to Baguio Conference, Australia had not so much turned down invitation as questioned value of conference which India and others would not support and whose purposes seemed unclear to Filipinos themselves (Embtel 62, March 2²). He was perfectly willing discuss pacts with Filipinos but thought such discussions futile for these reasons and in absence of a lead from US.

Spender’s speech of March 9 constitutes first serious Australian attempt to evolve a rational foreign policy taking into account nation’s geographic position, declining fortunes of UK, crisis in SEA and position of US as leader of non-Communist world. It is clearly Spender’s view that prerequisite to any meaningful Pacific Pact is a clear indication of what support it would ultimately find in the US. He appears consider that no single Pacific nation, or any combination of such nations, can be expected, unless it has reason to believe it will be backed by the US, to commit itself to a course which might prove futile and even disastrous. (Yesterday Spender mentioned Secretary’s San Francisco speech with appreciation but in a way which showed that he did not construe it as touching upon basic issue implicit in two questions conveyed in Embtel 71.)

Embassy appreciates that from US viewpoint it would be preferable if initiative for Pacific Pact came from Asiatic country and it would be inadvisable place primary reliance upon Australia. Nevertheless it seems to us that we should not let this offer of closer cooperation go by default. If this is so, we believe that what is needed at the moment, leaving aside consideration of long-term measures or ultimate policies, is some manifestation of responsiveness from the US at a high level and in reasonably sympathetic and encouraging terms.

Jarman

1. Robert G. Menzies, leader of the Liberal Party, formed a coalition government on December 19, 1949.
2. Not printed.
3. Joseph B. Chifley was Prime Minister of Australia from 1945 to 1949; Herbert V. Evatt served as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for External Affairs in the Chifley Government.
2. Not printed.