Without taking a position on these recommendations at this time, I am
submitting them to you now in order that the military point of view may
be considered in the joint planning of this fund. From this planning
there will presumably be developed a joint recommendation which you and
I may make to the President on the program called for in NSC 48/2.
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Johnson)
top secret
Washington, 20 January
1950.
Subject: Program of Assistance for the General Area
of China.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered your memorandum, dated 10
January 1950,2 wherein
you request that they submit a statement of recommendations
concerning the position which the Department of Defense should take
with respect to programming assistance in the general area of China
to carry out the provisions of Section 303, Mutual Defense
Assistance Act of 1949.3
The problem has been examined and there has been prepared, from the
military point of view, a statement of recommendations for your
[Page 6]
consideration and such action
as you deem appropriate. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff are becoming concerned as to the increased military liability
which apparently is developing in the Far East. Future allied
military requirements in that area, which must of necessity be
underwritten if not furnished directly by the United States, will
surely increase if the Communist advance continues its penetration
into Southeast Asia. Section 303 of the Act is an immediately
available vehicle which could be used advantageously to alleviate
this situation.
In the preparation of the statement of recommendations in paragraph 6
below the Joint Chiefs of Staff have recognized that overt
assistance from the United States in the political field, and
perhaps in the economic and psychological fields, to certain
countries or regional leaders who are resisting Soviet-led
Communism, may be pre-eminent in furthering the objectives
established for the United States in Public Law 329—81st Congress
(Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949). However, since such matters
are beyond the purview of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it is intended
only to take cognizance of the importance of the nonmilitary factors
and how they may ultimately affect the military position of the
United States in the Far East. The attainment of minimum U.S.
objectives in that area will require of the United States and all
like-minded peoples, the integration of those political, economic,
psychological as well as purely military means which are essential
to prevent the domination of the Far East by Soviet-led
Communism.
The statement of recommendations herein is consistent with and is
believed to fall within the scope of NSC 48/2 and the Presidential statement in connection
with his approval of that paper. However, because of the terms of
the legislation authorizing the $75,000,000 and the President’s
statement, it has yet to be determined whether any or all of the
funds will be available for the implementation of a program.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff further wish to point out that the
preparation of recommendations for the utilization of the
$75,000,000 is rendered extremely difficult by the lack of official
political guidance as to where in Asia the United States will direct
its efforts toward preventing the spread of communism. NSC 48/2 explicitly establishes as one
of the basic U.S. security objectives with respect to Asia the
“development of sufficient military power in selected non-Communist
nations of Asia to maintain internal security and to prevent further
encroachment by Communism.” It would appear that military aid must
be directed toward these selected nations. The selection will
presumably be materially affected by political considerations. Firm
guidance
[Page 7]
on this subject will
allow for definitive recommendations from a military standpoint as
to the ultimate utilization of the $75,000,000 fund.
Meanwhile, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, from a military point of view,
believe that a program utilizing the $75,000,000 appropriation for
the general area of China is desirable, is entirely feasible, and,
although limited when considering the problems of this huge area,
can be most effective as an initial investment for a long-range
program to deter or prevent the further encroachment of Communism in
the Far East. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend
that:
a. A program of overt assistance and …
operations in the general area of China be initiated as early as
possible.
b. The program of assistance be conducted
concurrently in the countries below with emphasis in the order
listed:
Indo-China,4 Indonesia,5 Thailand6 and Malaya.
Although Burma is in a critical position, political chaos in that
country might well preclude realization of any effective results
from an aid program. However, the possibilities of ameliorating the
situation in Burma should be investigated, and if considered to
contain possibilities, Burma could be allotted funds from the
reserve fund.7
c. Concurrently with the program of
assistance, the possibility of initiating covert operations directed
towards China including Taiwan (Formosa) and Tibet be studied.8
d. Cognizance be taken of the discretionary
powers accorded by the legislation to the President to execute a
program for the general area of China without adherence to the
administrative procedures established for the other portions of the
Mutual Defense Assistance Program.
e. Tentatively, the allocation of funds be
approximately in the amounts shown below, but subject to change as
actual programs are developed:
(1) For direct and immediate usage in accordance with the above:
Indo-China |
$15,000,000 |
Indonesia |
5,000,000 |
Thailand |
10,000,000 |
|
$30,000,000 |
[Page 8]
(2) As a contingency reserve of $45,000,000 the exact use of which
will be determined later, but which might be allocated in the
following amounts in accordance with the above:
Malay States |
$5,000,000 |
Burma |
10,000,000 |
9 China
(including Taiwan and Tibet) |
30,000,000 |
|
$45,000,000 |
f. A director be appointed who, with a small
staff, will be responsible for the detailed development of the
program for the general area of China and the supervision of the
implementation of the program by all appropriate executive
departments and agencies of the U.S. Government under the
coordination of the Secretary of State.
g. Final determination as to the programs and
the exact nature and magnitude of projects for specific countries or
locales be made as early as practicable after the preparation by the
director of a tentative detailed program.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Omar N. Bradley
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff