330/9–450: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

top secret

551. 1. I discussed China again with Bajpai, Secretary General MEA, on evening September 3 along lines indicated in Deptel 330 September 1. We discussed various points in considerable detail and in order that Bajpai might be able give more accurate account of our views to Prime Minister, I gave him paraphrase of more important sections.

2. Bajpai considered that contents of this telegram were helpful and [Page 483] asked if there would be objection to despatch of excerpts to Peiping to be used in discussions with Peiping Government. I told him he could use his judgment but he should bear in mind that what I gave him in writing was not a formal document but merely my oral statements reduced to written form. These statements were for information of GOI and should not be considered message from US to Peiping regime.

3. Bajpai referred to President’s “Fireside Chat” of September 1 and said in his opinion it was most useful statement made by US re Far East since hostilities began. He was, however, still personally concerned at what reaction in China would be if Chinese Communist delegation should go to Lake Success, apply for admission into GA, and be rejected. The reaction in China would be much sharper than it had been when SC voted against admission Communist China. It would be more humiliating for Communist China representatives on spot to be rejected. Nevertheless, it would in his opinion be still worse for US to refuse visas. He had no sympathy for Communism, or for ideology of Peiping Government. Nevertheless, he was convinced that continued ostracism of Peiping would result in strengthening Russian influence in China and in making more difficult efforts to those free nations which were trying to encourage Communist China to remain independent. He understood, he thought, US position, but he still was of opinion that if pros and cons would be added up unemotionally and balanced it would be found that admission of Communist China into UN would be to advantage free world.

4. Bajpai told me in confidence Rau had been instructed unless some unexpected development should take place, not to vote in favor admission of Communist China into discussion Korean situation. These instructions had been issued on his initiative on ground that India was striving to find solution to Korean problem and presence of Communist China might not at this stage facilitate such solution. Rau would probably abstain.

Henderson