794A.5/9–250: Telegram
The Chargé in China (Rankin) to the Secretary of State
387. Eyes only Rusk from Rankin. Urtel 204, August 31 arrived at same time with press report of President’s statement that if Korean question settled no need retaining Seventh Fleet in Formosa area. While this statement obviously subject various interpretations, depending opinions re date and nature eventual Korean settlement, we must expect many Chinese Nationalists to take it as confirming fear described penultimate sentence paragraph re Part II in mytel 273, August 18. Unless we can establish greater degree mutual confidence with whatever government may be in power on Formosa I believe only prudent hold serious reservations re chances either hold Island militarily against attack or carry out successfully ECA program envisaged mytel 331, September 1.1 Mutual lack of confidence seems to me close to root of our difficulties with Chinese during recent years. I hope, therefore, that early occasion may be found to allay fear mentioned above which President doubtless had no intention of aggravating.
I expect avoid trouble with FEC survey group and to spare Department from complaints that score. Have had considerable experience dealing with military and realize one either has authority or has not. In latter case it worse than useless attempt exercise authority. Phrases used in Part III Deptel 144, August 14 clearly mean to any military officer heading survey group that Embassy has no authority over him. Gen. Conklin and I have had friendly discussion this point (without reference Deptel 144 of course); he described our relations as “purely social” which I was in no position deny.
Foregoing does not mean I have changed opinions expressed last paragraph mytel 273, August 18 re what ought to be done. I believe in unity of command, that FEC representatives should make full use of our Service Attachés if only as check on information obtained from Chinese, and that Embassy can fulfill political responsibilities effectively only if conversant with military plans and policies. In absence [Page 482] full exchange of information between Embassy and military without which mutual confidence also lacking, we shall do best we can but must expect further surprises resulting from actions by military with possibly grave consequences.
- Not printed; it related principally to a recommendation from Messrs. Rankin and Moyer for informal United States participation in an economic stabilization board to be set up by the Chinese Government (894A.00–R/9–150).↩