794A.00/9–150

Memorandum Prepared in the Preliminary Tripartite Meetings for the Tripartite Foreign Ministers Meeting1

top secret

Document 11 [D–6/2a]2

Formosa

a. areas of agreement

1.
The Cairo Declaration must be taken into consideration in any study of the ultimate status of Formosa.
2.
The problems of temporary “military neutralization” and of ultimate disposition of Formosa are distinct.
3.
The charge of aggression laid by the Peiping regime, is now properly in the United Nations Security Council. The U.K. and French [Page 478] support the present American action in the Security Council. The long-term disposition of the question would best be handled through the United Nations General Assembly.

b. questions requiring ministerial consideration

1.
Agreement was lacking respecting the relative importance that the Cairo Declaration bore for determination of the ultimate status of Formosa. In the U.K. view the Cairo Declaration is fundamental.
2.
There remained open the question of the most desirable long-term political solution for Formosa. Mention was made of various alternatives, including consolidation with the mainland, independence, and UN Trusteeship. The feasibility of a plebiscite was questioned by the U.K. and French delegations. In the U.K. view independence was irreconcilable with the Cairo Declaration and unacceptable to both Chinese parties.
3.
Discussion was inconclusive regarding the subject of making the “military neutralization” equally effective in its application to both Chinese parties. In the U.K. view certain actions of the National Government since June 27 were inconsistent with the President’s declaration.
4.
The question of whether, and how, action in the UNSC and UNGA could get sufficient support from other governments to bring about a solution led to no conclusion. In the U.K. and French views chances of success would be increased by (a) the issuance of a unilateral and/or multilateral statement reiterating the Cairo Declaration respecting the future of Formosa and (b) the implementation of the President’s statement of June 27 in a manner to bring about an effective bilateral “military neutralization”.
5.
There remained open the question of the procedure and action to be adopted in the event of a Chinese Communist attack against Formosa prior to some settlement through UN action. It was suggested that the present process in the Security Council could be continued, with a new orientation.
6.
The precise manner in which the matter should still be pursued in its immediate phase in the Security Council, and in its later stages in the General Assembly, remained an open problem, but with general agreement that the matter was at present in the proper channels and that future action could be determined in the light of events.

  1. Complete documentation on the Foreign Ministers meeting and the preliminary meetings is scheduled for publication in volume iii. This document was approved on September 1 by the French, British and United States Delegations headed by Ambassador Bonnet, Sir Derick Hoyer Millar, and Philip Jessup, respectively, and referred to the Foreign Ministers who took up the question of Formosa on September 14; see p. 500.
  2. Brackets appear in the original.