790.5 MAP/3–1150
Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program (Ohly) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Rush)
Military Assistance Programs for the Far East and Their Priority in Relation to Other Programs
I am becoming increasingly concerned over the following developments which have occurred during recent weeks in connection with the Department’s consideration of various military aid programs for the Far East:
- (1)
- The apparent belief of many in the Department that the programs under consideration can be firmed up and physically implemented within any short period of time. This belief is also reflected in despatches from personnel in the field, particularly those from Paris, Saigon, and the members of the so-called Griffin Mission.
- (2)
- The extent to which possible recipients of military aid are being led to believe that they will receive aid quickly aid in large amounts.
- (3)
- The apparent belief in the Department that the requirements of Far Eastern military aid programs can be met without serious effects on the rate of delivery of goods under programs for North Atlantic Treaty countries, Turkey, Greece, Iran, and the Philippines.
- (4)
- The failure to face squarely the issue as to priorities from a delivery standpoint of the proposed Far Eastern programs in relation to other MDAP programs.
I think it is imperative to disabuse our own personnel, both here and abroad, of any belief that early deliveries can be anticipated under the programs now under consideration. Programs cannot be developed without a minimum of information, and in many instances reliable information is lacking. It takes time to get this information and it takes time to develop a program when this information has been received. Not the least time-consuming feature of programming is the necessity of determining, from an examination of service stocks, what equipment is available to meet a recipient nation’s requirements. This is a complicated process and the time elements involved can best be illustrated by the fact that although MDAP legislation was enacted late in 1940, we are just now receiving firm programs from the Department of Defense. Even when a program has been approved and processed through the Bureau of the Budget, there follows the long process of actual supply. This may involve, successively, rehabilitation (and the letting of contracts for, or the employment of personnel in connection with, such rehabilitation), packing and crating, inland [Page 53] transport and ocean transport. Shortcuts are possible up to a point, but usually only at the expense of regular Defense activities or other MDAP programs. Thus, contrary to the apparently widespread belief, the submission of a list of desired equipment by a nation, followed by a decision to assist that nation, does not ordinarily result in the delivery dockside in Saigon, or some other Asian port, of any or all of the equipment asked for in any period such as 30 to 60 days. We had best revise our calculations and plans to accord with these hard facts.
Because of the foregoing misconceptions, I have the impression that the actions of our representatives abroad have given rise to expectations on the part of other nations which are wholly unjustified by the facts. I believe this is a dangerous situation. We cannot fulfill these expectations, and I visualize serious political repercussions when this fact becomes apparent to them. I get the feeling that bad as the situation may be in Southeast Asia, we are generating unnecessary additional problems for ourselves by giving the impression that large amounts of military aid are practically on the way.
Although long delays will result, under an circumstances, before currently proposed Far Eastern programs result in actual deliveries, the length of these delays can be cut down if, but only if, we are prepared to sacrifice delivery rates for other current MDAP programs, Present matériel availabilities, as well as the existing limited capabilities of depots, modification centers, etc., to do work incident to military assistance programs, makes such a result inevitable. While I express no view as to the priority of the several Far Eastern programs in relation to other military assistance programs, I do want to point out that this issue must be faced quickly by the Department of State, and, subsequently, by the Department of State in conjunction with the Department of Defense. Satisfactory programming by Defense will be contingent on these priority determinations, since the ability to supply the goods required will often depend upon whether they are to be taken out of other competing programs.
I believe that you should give the problems set forth above your urgent personal consideration.