Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

Executive Secretariat Files: NSC 37 Series

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense ( Johnson )

top secret

Washington , 27 July 1950.

Subject: General Policy of the United States Concerning Formosa

1. This memorandum is in response to your memorandum, dated 6 May 1950,¹ concerning military assistance to the Chinese Nationalists and to your memorandum, dated 14 July 1950,¹ dealing with United States policy concerning Formosa.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have made a reexamination of the United States military position with respect to Formosa in the light of the world situation generally and the situation in the Far East specifically and reaffirm their views that:

a. The island of Formosa is strategically important to the United States (memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, dated 17 August 1949);²

b. The strategic consequences of a Communist Formosa would be seriously detrimental to United States security (memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, dated 24 November 1948);³

c. Continued successful resistance on the part of the Chinese Nationalists, particularly in the Formosa area, is in the military interests of the United States (memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, dated 2 May 1950);¹ and

d. Future circumstances extending to war itself might make overt military action with respect to Formosa advisable from the over-all standpoint of our national security (memoranda for the Secretary of Defense, dated 22 March 1949⁴ and 17 August 1949).

3. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have received the following communication from the Commander in Chief, Far East:

[Here follows the text of the Memorandum on Formosa by General MacArthur, dated June 14, 1950, concerning which see telegram 605, June 22, from Tokyo, page 366.]

4. The present United States position with respect to Formosa is contained in the following statement from the announcement by the President on 27 June 1950:

“The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war. It has defied the orders of the Security Council of the United Nations issued to preserve international peace and security. In these circumstances the occupation of Formosa by communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area.

Accordingly, I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa. As a corollary to this action I am calling upon the Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the mainland. The Seventh Fleet will see that this is done. The determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations.”

5. In light of all of the foregoing, and in view of the fact that the state of the United States military position in the Far East, now and in the foreseeable future, will have a direct impact upon the United States position throughout the world generally and in the Far East specifically, the Joint Chiefs of Staff strongly recommend that, irrespective of the situation in Korea, the United States plan to continue the present policy of denying Formosa to communist forces, as lease until the future status of Formosa has been determined in accordance with the above announcement by the President. Such planning, however, should not prejudice United States initiative and freedom of action as to possible future courses of action with respect to Formosa.

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are cognizant that implementation of the above policy in the future may involve specific requirements for military forces. They would point out, further, that the continuation of a policy of solely defensive measures of a passive nature cannot halt communist aggression. There must come a time, if the expansion of communism under Kremlin domination is to be halted, when adequate forces in being must be provided and placed in position to counter that expansion even though the risk of war be increased. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will take these requirements into consideration in their future periodic recommendations as to the strength and composition of the United States Armed Forces.

7. It is recognized that the Seventh Fleet may not be able to continue to participate in current operations in Korea and at the same time insure the denial of Formosa to communist forces. In any event, the Chinese forces on Formosa must be prepared, within reason, to resist attack. It is imperative, therefore, that the capabilities of the Chinese Nationalist forces be assessed at the earliest possible date; that immediate and positive steps be taken to insure that such of their military equipment as requires maintenance be rendered usable; and that deficiencies of matériel and supplies essential to the Chinese Nationalist forces be met.

8. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are cognizant that Chinese forces on Formosa are in urgent need of matériel and supplies. If these Chinese forces are to be enabled to resist attack, they must be provided with that matériel. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff urge that the present United States policy of withholding United States military aid from the Chinese forces on Formosa be so modified, as a matter of urgency, as to permit the granting of such aid, the more urgent needs, now known, to be met immediately and the remainer to be determined from the reports of a military survey team.

9. Complete determination of the needs of the Chinese forces on Formosa can only flow from a comprehensive military survey. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, therefore, recommend that they be authorized to direct the Commander in Chief, Far East, to cause a survey to be made forthwith of the Chinese Nationalist Government’s military requirements which must be met if the capture of Formosa by the communists is to be prevented. It is further recommended that the State Department be requested to make the necessary political arrangements for the survey.

10. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that after the authorization for the military survey recommended in the foregoing paragraph has been approved, the Department of Defense and the Department of State offer to General MacArthur the services of the Joint State–Defense Military Assistance Mission⁵ under Major General Erskine (Department of Defense), Mr. John S. Melby (Department of State), and Mr. Glen H. Craig (Economic Cooperation Administration), for the purpose of translating the results of the military survey into a military assistance program. The mission should be directed to proceed to Formosa as General MacArthur may desire; thereafter to proceed in accordance with its present instructions.⁶

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Omar N. Bradley

Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. Not printed.
1. Not printed.
2. Text in Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. ix, p. 376.
3. Text ibid., p. 261.
1. Not printed.
4. Not printed.
5. For documentation on this Mission, see pp. 1 ff.
6. The National Security Council discussed the above memorandum at its 62nd meeting on July 27 with President Truman presiding. The President approved in principle the recommendations of the JCS memorandum subject to agreement by the Secretaries of State and Defense on the specific content and wording thereof (NSC Action 325b).