792.5 MAP/3–950
Memorandum by the Secretary of
State to the President
1
top secret
[Washington,] March 9, 1950.
Memorandum for the President
Subject: Allocation of Funds to Provide Military
Assistance to Thailand and Indochina under Section 303 of the Mutual
Defense Assistance Act
The Department of State and the Department of Defense have agreed that a
program of military assistance for Thailand and Indochina should be
undertaken for the purpose of providing military equipment to assist in
maintaining the security and independence of these countries against
communist aggression from without and subversive activities from within.
(Annexes A and B, attached, give supporting background prepared by the
Department of State.) In reaching this conclusion, the two Departments
are aware that the major responsibility for attaining the objectives of
the program rests with the recipient governments, and not with the
United States. However, it is clear that supplemental military materiel
assistance from the United States is required. The duration of such
assistance, and the total cost thereof, is not now known. The National
Security Council is presently considering this question, with a view to
estimating the probable overall magnitude and duration of United States
assistance to Southeast Asia.
The staffs of the two Departments have estimated that funds in the amount
of $25 million for Thailand and Indochina are needed as initial
installments for this purpose, this sum to be divided approximately $10
million for Thailand and $15 million for Indochina. The two Departments
believe that for urgent political considerations military equipment
should be made available as quickly as possible and propose that the
funds mentioned above be provided under the authority of Section 303 of
the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949.
While the general objectives of the proposed programs of military
assistance have been jointly agreed upon between the two Departments,
the exact details of the programs have not as yet been formulated by the
staffs of the interested agencies. It is accordingly requested that
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the President at this time
approve military assistance to Thailand and to Indochina, and that $25
million be reserved for this purpose under Section 303 of the Mutual
Defense Assistance Act.2 It is proposed that this assistance be administered by the
Secretary of State under the provisions of Executive Order No. 10999
[10099] of January 27, 1950.3
In addition to the aforementioned programs for military assistance, the
Secretary of Defense recommended to you on February 15, 1950, the
allocation of $6,524,721 to accomplish the improvement of airfields in
Japan.
The Departments of State and Defense are also considering under Section
303 of Public Law 329 a proposed program of supplementary military
assistance to Korea in the approximate amount of $9,800,000 which is
additional to the program authorized as a part of the regular Mutual
Defense Assistance Program. This latter sum is needed to provide a
further strengthening of the security of that republic against communist
encroachment, both internal and external.
The Department of State is also developing the details of a program to
provide assistance to Burma to hasten the development on the part of the
Burmese of a national capability for maintaining their independence.
Tentative plans for use of Section 303 funds in this connection include
a project to furnish ten patrol vessels for use on the Irrawaddy River
to enable the Burmese Government to keep that river clear of rebel
forces which have hitherto prevented a free exchange of goods between
the northern and southern parts of the country. The cost of this
proposed project is estimated at $3.5 million. In addition, other
tentative plans are under consideration to provide assistance to Burma.
These are not yet developed to a point where it is possible to give an
estimate of their total cost.
In summary, the aforementioned programs for Thailand and Indochina, for
which authorization is requested herein, together with the initial
allocation of $5 million which you have already approved to provide
equipment for the Indonesian constabulary, will result in a total
authorization, when approved, of $30 million. The above-mentioned
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projects for Japan, Korea and
Burma will, if approved, be in excess of $20 million.
Annex A
secret
[Washington, undated.]
Paper Prepared in the Department of State
Military Assistance to Thailand
We are recommending immediate military aid to Thailand because of the
serious internal communist threat to it brought about by communists
within the nation who are being strengthened daily by events
favorable to communism occurring on all of Thailand’s borders.
The Thai Government has publicly declared itself in opposition to
communism and has sought to align the Thai nation with those nations
opposing the advances of communism. Military assistance is needed by
Thailand to enable it to oppose communist advances.
Externally, Chinese and Vietnamese communist-led forces are in
control of the areas to the north and east of Thailand. It is
believed that the Vietnamese communist leader, Ho Chi Minh, is being
materially strengthened by the Communist Chinese. Chinese communist
forces have infiltrated northeastern Burma on the northern frontier
of Thailand and are threatening the security of that area. Burma
itself is kept in a turmoil by communist forces which are presently
in action along the western border of Thailand. In Malaya on the
south, there are strong Chinese communist-led guerrilla bands which
are presently in revolt against the British authorities and whose
principal sphere of action lies along the Malaya-Thailand border. As
communist forces in neighboring parts of Asia are victorious, it
seems certain that these forces surrounding Thailand will be able to
bring greater pressure to bear, especially through the communists
already in Thailand, to align Thailand with the communists.
Internally, Thailand is threatened by Chinese communists who are
attempting to gain control of the more than three million Chinese
there. The Chinese within the nation are strongly armed and are
unfriendly to the declared intentions of the Thai Government. Some
Thai political elements are showing evidence of preparing to swing
over to the communist side if the pressure should become too great.
It is clearly apparent that unless Thailand is given military
assistance it cannot hold out against communist pressure. A sample
of such pressure
[Page 43]
is the
strong protest reportedly made by the Chinese Communist Vice Foreign
Minister, Li Ken Nung, to the Thai Government demanding the end of
oppression of Chinese in Thailand and requiring the immediate
release of Chinese in prison with guarantees of no further
mistreatment.
If Thailand should be lost to the communists, then it would be
unlikely that Malaya could be held. This would mean that from Korea
to India, there would be no place on the Asian mainland where the
United States would have an open friend and ally. Furthermore, there
would be no place on the Asian mainland in that area where U.S.
policy could be freely expressed as at present. In addition, the
United States would lose its last independent listening post in the
area. Aside from these political considerations, it is probable that
the United States would be unable to secure such strategic materials
as tungsten, tin, and rubber in their present quantities. It is
clear, therefore, that it is of considerable political and economic
importance to the United States to support Thailand with military
aid in opposition to the forces of communism.
Annex B
top secret
[Washington, undated.]
Paper Prepared in the Department of State
Military Assistance for Indochina
Immediate military assistance for Indochina is recommended because of
the communist threat to the newly created States of Vietnam, Laos
and Cambodia, resulting from the existence of an obviously
Russian-sponsored communist anti-government force under Ho Chi Minh,
which is in conflict with the legal government for control of
Vietnam.
On February 7, 1950, the United States extended diplomatic
recognition to Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, This action followed
British recognition and many other anti-communist nations of the
world are expected to take similar action. Since USSR, Communist
China and several other Soviet satellites have recognized the
communist movement of Ho Chi Minh as the legal government of
Vietnam, the issue becomes more clearly defined as an anti-communist
versus communist effort.
The whole of Southeast Asia is in danger of falling under communist
domination. The countries in the area of Southeast Asia are not at
present in a position to form a regional organization for
self-defense,
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nor are they
capable of defending themselves against military aggression without
the aid of the great powers. Despite their lack of military
strength, however, there is a will on the part of the legal
governments of Indochina toward nationalism and a will to resist
whatever aims at destroying that nationalism.
The French are irrevocably committed in Indochina and are supporting
the three states as a move aimed at achieving non-communist
political stability. The failure of the French-sponsored governments
of the three states therefore would mean the communization of
Indochina under Ho Chi Minh, a Moscow-trained communist. The choice
confronting the United States is to support the legal governments in
Indochina or to face the extension of communism over the remainder
of the continental area of Southeast Asia and possibly farther
westward. We would then be obligated to make staggering investments
in that part of Southeast Asia remaining outside of communist
domination or to withdraw to a much contracted Pacific line of
defense.
France needs aid in its protection of the legally constituted
anticommunist States in Indochina. We know from the complex
circumstances involved that the French will make every possible
effort to prevent the victory of communism in Indochina and
consequently in Southeast Asia. We would, accordingly, be backing a
determined protagonist. The French military leaders are soberly
convinced that, in the absence of a mass invasion from Red China,
the French could be successful in their support of the
anti-communist government in Indochina. French, native and colonial
troops are presently engaged in military operations in Indochina
aimed at defying the southward expansion of communism from Red China
and of destroying its power in Indochina. The military aid which it
is proposed to furnish in support of the anti-communist governments
of Indochina would be tailored to meet materiel deficiencies toward
which the United States can make an effective contribution.
The urgency of the need for immediate military assistance is
reflected by the ease with which communist-supplied arms and even
troops may now pass across the China-Tonkin border. With this
assistance, Ho Chi Minh’s forces present a more immediate and
dangerous threat to the existence of non-communist governments in
Indochina. By taking advantage of an already existing guerrilla army
within Indochina, the potential invader may avoid the consequences
of border violations but still actively advance the communist cause.
It is to help contain this pseudo-nationalist form of invasion that
immediate aid is recommended under the provisions of Section 303 of
the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949.
