Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

794A.00/5–3150

Memorandum by the Deputy Special Assistant for Intelligence (Howe) to Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research

top secret

[Washington,] May 31, 1950.

For P.A. only. At Rusk’s invitation I attended a meeting yesterday (May 30—holiday) afternoon for two hours, with Rusk, Jessup, Mtze, Merchant and Sprouse on the subject of Formosa. Rusk is still working toward raising the question of Formosa, basing his thinking generally along the lines that world opinion and US opinion are generally unhappy at lack of a forthright action on our part in the Far East; that Formosa presents a plausible place to “draw the line” and is, in itself, important politically if not strategically, for what it represents in continued Communist expansion.

Rusk has been drafting and redrafting papers with a view to presenting them to the Secretary. Our Estimates Group assisted in one analysis which is a Tab in Rusk’s current documentation.¹ I believe that the representation at this meeting, plus Dulles, constitute the only ones who are aware of this move on Rusk’s part. The talks at the meeting were based first on a brief paper in which Rusk pointed up the desirability of “packaging” three problems: (1) Formosa; (2) Recognition of Communist China; (3) Seating in the UN.²

Subsequent discussion explored the various possibilities in the Formosa move, based on Rusk’s rather lengthy documentation of past policy, changed circumstances, and alternative courses. The documentation was limited by not having any appraisal of the possible consequences—militarily and politically within the area and throughout the world—of a US move involving force to prevent the fall of Formosa. I urged Rusk to give us a green light on such a study as soon as it was possible to let more people know that the subject was in the wind.

The net result of the discussion was a general agreement to go ahead with the following proposition which Rusk hoped to document that evening to discuss informally with the Secretary today:

The Gimo would be approached, probably by Dulles in the course of his trip to Japan on June 15,³ with the word that (a) the fall of Formosa in the present circumstances was inevitable, (b) the US would do nothing to assist Gimo in preventing this, (c) the only course open to the Gimo to prevent the bloodshed of his people was to request UN trusteeship. The US would be prepared to back such a move for trusteeship and would ready the fleet to prevent any armed attack on Formosa while the move for trusteeship was pending. It was generally agreed that the trusteeship would probably have to include Russia and that the negotation over the trusteeship agreement might be extremely difficult and prolonged, but it would give the US a chance to prevent the fall of Formosa under circumstances sponsored by the UN. Such a course, if adopted by the US, would be discussed with the British and possibly others before it was formally taken up.

(Note: My concern, which Rusk accepts as valid, is that the Russians may well welcome a partial commitment of US forces in the protection of Formosa, which would give them an opportunity for pushing the Chinese Communists into a clash with us, aided probably by some direct if unidentifiable Russian effort such as submarines. It is therefore important that as soon as possible we get some considered speculation, assisted by the military, on what the probable consequences would be of a US commitment of even partial force, such as the fleet, in the area.)

1. Much of the documentation referred to is in files 611.94A/5–3050 and 611.93/6–950. Both of these files contain copies of memoranda from Mr. Rusk to Secretary Acheson, but the file copies are not signed or initialed by Mr. Rusk, and there is no indication that Mr. Acheson saw them if they were forwarded to him. An extract from one of these draft memoranda is printed as an annex to this document.

2. A memorandum by Charles Yost, Director of the Office of Eastern European Affairs, dated June 1 (not printed), indicated that Mr. Rusk, on behalf of Mr. Acheson, requested assistance from other Offices and Bureaus in the Department in preparation of a memorandum regarding recognition of a government in China and seating in the United Nations; no mention was made of Formosa (793.02/6–150).

   A further memorandum by the Deputy Legal Adviser, Jack B. Tate, to Mr. Rusk on June 6 summarized the thrust of Mr. Rusk’s and Mr. Acheson’s thinking on recognition:

   “Your memorandum of June 1 states that the Secretary has asked that consideration be given to the following suggestion on United States recognition policy in regard to China:

   ‘to tie our policy on recognition to such realistic and well understood factors as (a) the exercise of de facto control, (b) the consent or acquiescence of the people concerned, (c) attitude toward normal relations with others, including the treatment of foreigners, both official and private, (d) acceptance in good faith of international obligations. The United States should announce that, pending clarification of the situation in China: (1) it takes account of the fact that the Peking regime exercises certain de facto control in parts of China. In accordance with established international law, the United States will therefore hold that regime responsible for the discharge of international obligations wherever in China its actual authority extends; (2) that it (the United States) continues to acknowledge that the Nationalist Government of China is the recognized government with which the United States maintains diplomatic and consular relations.’” (793.02/6–650)

   The unsigned memorandum addressed to Mr. Acheson on June 9 by Mr. Rusk dealt with the three Questions: Formosa, recognition, and U.N. representation (611.93/0–950). As indicated above, the file copy shows no indication that it was forwarded or that the Secretary saw or acted on it. No policy decision on these three questions was made prior to the outbreak of hostilities in Korea.

3. Mr. Dulles, whose primary area of responsibility was the Japanese peace treaty, visited Japan and Korea during his trip, June 14–29, but he did not go to Formosa. For documentation on Japan, see pp. 1109 ff.