794A.00/4–2750: Telegram
The Chargé in China (Strong) to the Secretary of State
658. For Department’s use only. No distribution. As anticipated, psychological reaction to Hainan defeat is severe.1 Main outward manifestation [Page 336] is universal criticism of government for making premature victory claim. Real reaction is not outwardly expressed: each mainlander now believes the days of Taiwan are numbered, that loss of Chusans and then of Taiwan is matter of time. Gloom and pessimism generally prevailing are matched by weather which for past three weeks could compete on almost even terms with Chungking’s lowering winter skies.
There is no excitement or panic. It is generally believed that Communists unable attack Taiwan for some time. But many persons are already known to be considering how to get out and where to go. Should Chusans fall, mainlanders will feel matter of haven to be urgent. Others will begin to calculate how best to make their peace with Communists.
Reaction of Formosans is not so well-known. It is felt that they will react in several different ways: independence groups will probably redouble their efforts, the poorer classes will probably become more susceptible to Communist blandishments, and upper classes will probably straddle fence.
Despite any qualifying remarks which could be made in regard to situation on Hainan prior to Communist success, remarks which might tend to detract somewhat from that success, facts remain that (1) Communists did cross water barrier to invade defended island, and did so without air and naval support; (2) former Nationalist troops (Fu Tso-yi’s)2 did remain loyal to Communists and performed duty without defecting; (3) there are already stories that defections occurred among defenders; and (4) Communists proved able continue dictate fate of Nationalists.
Thus the pattern of events on mainland held true although element of water was introduced into the formula: after previous victory, lull ensued in which Communists made thorough preparations; during lull morale of Nationalist upper crust rose because of lack of Communist offensive activities; in addition to strictly military preparations Communists utilized time to increase strength behind Nationalist lines including arranging defections; when they picked their own time to hit with intent to win they hit hard and Hainan, comparable to mainland walled city traditionally defended by Nationalists, collapsed like house of cards in a windstorm; Nationalist morale plunged to new low; officials, and families, and officers and families being evacuated to next base further back, in this case Taiwan from which there is no further retreat for a great majority, and where new problems of housing and maintenance will have to be faced.
It appears doubtful that lost of Hainan will be followed by long [Page 337] lull. Communists will wish utilize own heightened morale as soon as possible. Although theory exists that Communists will by-pass Chusans, and attack Formosa soon it seems highly improbable. Whereas Hainan of technical lesser strategic value to Nationalists, Chusans of vital importance. If Communists by-pass Chusans, portion their small navy and air force needed in toto for Formosa campaign would be tied down; Communist troops would benefit from training received in Hainan invasion; air force and navy would benefit from combat experience there; it would further lower morale in Taiwan and enable Communist subvert important segments Nationalist forces Taiwan.
In my opinion Nationalist defenders of Chusans are even more open to subversion than were Nationalist troops in Hainan. Steady traffic with mainland has laid them open to frequent contacts by Communist agents. Although conditions in Chusans may have been superior to conditions Hainan, they are still undesirable, and prolonged relative idleness mixed with tension cannot be favorable to morale.
Communist invasion of Chusans must follow different course from Hainan campaign. Long coastline does not exist; there are no interior Communists to support invading forces. Area is compact with entire perimeter strongly manned. Thus there is no point in numerous small landings; attack must be all-out from beginning with goal of winning on first try. Defeat would set Communists back months, thus they must be sure of success before engaging.
If Communists successful in Chusans they can expect eventual success on Taiwan. Planning, preparation of equipment, building of stockpiles, organization, and training will necessarily consume some time. From May, August weather is a dangerous factor until end of typhoon season in late October or November. Although junks may be used in invasion of Formosa, majoriy of men and supplies will probably be transported in variety of powered vessels from good-sized steamers to coastal vessels to river vessels, LSTs, and landing craft of their own construction, protected by own naval vessels (few and small) and aircraft. Vertical envelopment may occur on small scale.
Should Chusans fall it is difficult to predict course and intensity of internal developments on Taiwan. Mutual distrust will prevail; plots and counterplots will be numerous; many persons will flee; anti-American sentiment will spread; yet it may be expected Generalissimo will hold onto power. There will be tenuous hopes that November elections in US will change US policy before Taiwan’s final catastrophe, that Communists will meet unsurmountable troubles on mainland which will require their full military power to combat and thus divert attention from Taiwan, and that third world war will erupt. [Page 338] These hopes may well be punctuated by CAF and Chinese naval defections.
Loss of Chusans within next month will probably seal doom of Taiwan within nine months thereafter or even sooner, depending on capabilities of Communists, which will be hard to judge. In meantime, Nationalist closure policy will break down, Nationalist naval and air activity against mainland will lessen, and Nationalist Government will probably become almost completely isolated. Internal pressures and Communist air activity may well wreck the economy despite greatly reduced military costs.
To my mind fall of Chusans should be signal for second warning to American citizens to evacuate (on grounds probable air raids and fact Taiwan then an area of military operations) and for early decision by US Government to reduce drastically its establishment in Taiwan. USIS and ECA–JCRR should be liquidated in orderly fashion over period of two to three months (on assumption Communists cannot within that time follow up against Taiwan); attaches should be cut to one officer each service plus one aircraft based elsewhere for supply purposes and possibly for evacuation (attaches should be consolidated on Consulate General premises and have bare minimum ex-enlisted personnel); Embassy and Consulate General should be cut to three officers and three clerks or even better to two officers and four clerks (provided all visas Vice Consuls are suspended); US Government office and living quarters furniture and equipment gradually should be shipped out to maximum degree including cryptographic machines; coding in OTP; final understanding should be reached with Manila Liaison Group on evacuation procedure; if possible some type of hold should be retained on Nationalist Government to prevent interference with these reduction activities and with personnel remaining behind for time being, and all preparations for speedy turnover to British should be completed. As long as attaches remain would seem advisable have diplomatic representative from Department; also useful for protection purposes.
If, by any chance Communists prove content to permit Chusans to wither on vine by merely maintaining air superiority, and consequent naval superiority there, our decisions and actions as outlined above should be taken at such time as that Communist strategy becomes apparent, and at a more rapid tempo.
Perhaps foregoing is too pessimistic a view, but there are few grounds for optimism.
Would be useful for my own thinking to have indication of Department’s preliminary views with regard to proposed method and timing of reduction. Believe we should avoid precipitate and undignified flight by taking early and gradual measures.
[Page 339]Shall forward further evaluations in relation to warnings to civilians and own evacuation as events unfold.
Sent Department 658. Repeated Hong Kong 200.
- The Communist invasion of Hainan Island had begun on the night of April 16–17. By April 27, the Kuomintang forces were evacuated to Formosa and the abandonment of Hainan was officially announced in Taipei on May 2, 1950.↩
- General Fu Tso-yi, Commander in Chief of the Northeastern Kuomintang Army, had been expelled from the Kuomintang in January 1949 for accepting the Communist peace terms in Peking.↩