661.93/4–1850
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk) to the Secretary of State
Subject: Renewed Proposals by Service Attachés in Hongkong and Taipei for Further Military Aid to Chinese Nationalists
It is believed that you will be interested in a summary of two recent telegrams1 received from our Service Attachés in Hongkong and Taipei urging immediate assistance to the Chinese Nationalist Government in an effort to hold Taiwan and divert the Chinese Communist military strength from Southeast Asia.
In their telegrams of April 14th and 22nd respectively our Assistant Naval Attaché in Hongkong (with the Air and Military Attaches concurring) (Tab A) and the Assistant Military Attaché in Taipei (with the Assistant Naval Attaché and Acting Air Attaché concurring) (Tab B) state that in view of widespread Soviet aid to the Chinese Communists the chances for a successful defense of Taiwan by the Nationalist Government are very slight. They argue that the Nationalists are now absorbing the major attention and efforts of the Communists’ military forces, which if Taiwan falls may be expected to exert [Page 334] full pressure on Southeast Asia. Declaring that U.S. efforts to hold the Indochina–Thailand–Burma line will be very expensive and difficult, they ask that we take immediate steps to maintain the remaining Nationalist military forces in order to gain time for strengthening the defences of Southeast Asia.
The Attachés at Hongkong claim that the Nationalist military forces on Hainan and Chushan Islands “have repeatedly shown the will to fight” and that the Chinese Navy and Air Force “are doing their most effective work since the end of World War II with morale and reliability the highest in years”. However, they point out that present stocks of ship and aircraft ammunition and maintenance parts will be exhausted within a few months at the present rate of military activity.
The Assistant Naval Attaché’s telegram calls for immediate aid to the Taiwan regime in the form of small shipments of ammunition and plane parts, while the Assistant Military Attaché at Taipei proposes that the U.S. at once announce an unrestricted loan of $10 million a month to the Chinese Nationalist Government, “to be paid as long as Taiwan is held or until such time as a different method of aiding China should be deemed advisable”. Both men assert that such steps would give a tremendous boost to the morale of anti-Communist forces. However, the Assistant Military Attaché frankly describes the proposed move as “a pure gamble” which might well turn out to be another “operation rathole”.
The message from the Assistant Naval Attaché in Hongkong stated that our Consul General there concurred in his recommendations.
In a telegram of April 22 (Tab C)2 our Chargé in Taipei said that he did not agree with the recommendations made by the Attaches at that place and had so informed them, giving reasons.3
Comments:
The foregoing information is being given you for background, as the President’s statement of January 5 regarding Formosa does not [Page 335] contemplate the supplying of military aid to the National Government in Taiwan beyond the scope of present programs. The verified appearance of many military type planes (in addition to reports that some of them are jet types) on the Chinese mainland has raised the definite possibility of increased and highly effective Russian military assistance to the Chinese Communists, and may prompt further strong recommendations, official and otherwise, for countervailing aid to the National Government.
- Neither printed.↩
- Not printed.↩
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In a letter dated April 20, 1950, to the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Sprouse), the Charge in China (Strong) made the following observations:
“I am concerned that the representatives of the other agencies of the U.S. Government are lining up solidly behind this regime, are emphasizing the minor improvements and overlooking the major failures, and are not considering the mainland and its potentialities.…
“To my present state of mind we might provide greater aid if (or, putting it in the negative, should not provide greater aid unless): (1) the Commies fail to take the Chusans, (2) the economy of Formosa is not expected to be wrecked by bombings, (3) it can gain us considerable vital time in Southeast Asia, and (4) doing so will not conflict basically with our objectives on the mainland as viewed in the light of the present situation. I might add a fifth proviso: if we are about to enter a shooting war. Even this raises questions which I have not taken time to think about. Perhaps a shooting war does not automatically mean immediate large scale aid to the Nationalists.
“I do not believe the foregoing considerations can be met favorably, but I realize my view from here is seriously limited.” (794A.5/4–2050)
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