793B.00/3–850: Telegram

The Ambassador in India (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

top secret

301. In accordance Deptel 192 March 1 asking Embassy approach British for specific information regarding GOI military aid to Tibet, following obtained from Roberts, Acting UK High Commissioner yesterday. He requests information be protected with special care as it was given UK by GOI for its use.

1.
Tibetan Government has asked and GOI agreed supply:
  • 38 2-inch mortars.
  • 63 3-inch mortars.
  • 150 Bren guns.
  • 14,000 2-inch mortar bombs.
  • 14,000 3-inch mortar bombs.
  • 1,000,000 rounds. 303 ammunition.

Ammunition is quantity estimated to be required for one brigade group in action for six months. One complication, however, is that animal transport is only practical means of delivery and foregoing quantity is equivalent to 7,000 mule loads. As insufficient mules available, some or all of 3-inch mortars and ammunition therefore, may not leave India.
2.
Foregoing is material increase over small amount provided in past. However, GOI prefers regard this and any future reasonable requests from Tibet as merely continuation routine practice of meeting Tibetan requirements small arms and not as something in nature of military program directed at Chinese Communists.
3.
British have no definite information as to what steps GOI have taken reference training Tibetan military units. They have suggested GOI send demolition experts to Tibet but GOI reactions negative as such action might have appeared as part of a plan to oppose Chinese Communists. Roberts professed not to know of plan mentioned to Embassy by British officer in Indian Army to replace present personnel Indian contingent Gyangste with personnel ostensibly regular soldiers but actually qualified instructors.
4.
British have constantly encouraged GOI extend military assistance and present assistance being given at their suggestion. They have [Page 318] told GOI that if latter has difficulty sparing equipment in short supply they would take sympathetic attitude towards requests for help. However, GOI has so far not asked British assistance.

British doubt Tibet has any real military plan for resisting organized Communist incursion as Tibetan Army Commanders know virtually nothing of tactics modern warfare. British regard dispatch of military assistance more in nature measure raise Tibetan morale and assist in combatting infiltration and subversion which they regard as greatest present danger than as measure which could conceivably halt full-scale invasion. They point out, however, that if 7,000 mule loads cannot be delivered Tibet from India in one season it would also be difficult for Chinese mount sizeable invasion.

Embassy doubts Tibet in position make use of members [?] military assistance of other types than outlined above until Tibetans have some more advanced military training. Simple demolition equipment and supplies would probably be practicable and useful if GOI permitted transit through India and training in use thereof could be arranged.

GOI reaction to suggestion US collaborate with India in meeting Tibetan needs likely be somewhat unfavorable because (1) GOI itself providing what Tibetans want and can use (2) political undesirability from GOI viewpoint in collaborating with US in apparent joint program directed against Chinese Communists and (3) US has been unable meet GOI’s own requests for US military assistance such as tank spare parts.

Sent Department 301, Department pass London.

Henderson