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Memorandum by John P. Davies of the Policy Planning Staff1

top secret

One can conclude from Shanghai’s telegram No. 4472 that the feelers allegedly put out by General Chen Yi (Communist Commander for East China) and our response to them have come to naught, at least for the time being. The unsavory middle man, Chou, may have fabricated out of whole cloth his reports that Chen Yi was contemplating revolt in alliance with other Communist elements dissatisfied with increasing Soviet control in China. On the other hand, Chou’s story to us may have had considerable foundation in fact at the time he approached us but in the meantime Chen Yi has for any of a number of reasons become much more cautious.

One learns after long dealing with China affairs that the facet of Chinese character perhaps most confusing and exasperating to the logical Western mind is a tendency toward irresponsible garrulity. In attempting to analyze the Chinese situation, the Western observer must deal with a plethora of reports and rumors, some of which are surprisingly candid and accurate, others highly embroidered and many which are plausible but airy concoctions of private political enterprise.

In these circumstances, the safest course for the Western observer is, while always keeping an open mind and not losing the faculty of wonder, to rely primarily on analysis of the larger political, economic and sociological developments and from that move to tentative conclusions regarding the reactions of individual Chinese in this broader framework.

Against such a background, we may conclude with respect to Chen Yi’s alleged overtures, which now appear to have vanished into thin air, that the objective facts of the situation in China are such that by spring or summer of this year, two major forces will be influencing the thinking and behavior of the individual Chinese Communist leaders, including Chen Yi. One is that Soviet imperialism will probably become more onerous in its exactions on Communist China. The second is that Communist China will feel with increasing severity its present food shortage and general economic difficulties. The pressure of these events will tend to inspire nationalistically-inclined leaders in the CCP to break with those elements in the leadership who have sold themselves but completely to the Kremlin. Whether this will mean [Page 306] an open split in the leadership and an attempted coup d’état we cannot now prophesy. All we can say is that if there is to be a revolt against the Chinese Stalinists and if there is to be any hope that such a revolt will be successful, it will have to come from an alliance of military men like Chen Yi with some of the more nationalistic political leaders in Peking. We should, of course, be ever on the alert for symptoms of such a break-away and should judiciously do all within our power to foster such a split.

John Davies, Jr.
  1. A copy of tills memorandum was addressed to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Paul H. Nitze, with a note from Mr. Davies saying that it was prepared at the request of George F. Kennan, Counselor of the Department of State, for possible presentation to Mr. Acheson and Mr. Rusk.
  2. Dated January 27, p. 300.