Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI

790.001/2–2750: Telegram

The Ambassador in Thailand (Stanton) to the Secretary of State

top secret

Bangkok, February 27, 1950—7 p. m.

182. Summary report Jessup’s remarks in his final summation conference discussions Communist problem Asia.¹

1. Jessup convinced SEA vitally important to US although equally convinced necessity US special emphasis on Europe.

2. Discussions indicated definition of area in NSC/4[48/2]² not valid for all purposes as conditions India, Pakistan, Ceylon differentiate them from remainder area.

3. If USSR push into Asia diversionary or just seeking soft spot, then US problem to prove to USSR area not soft.

4. US committed demonstrate value American way life in Japan, Korea, Philippines republic, and lesser extent Indonesia and failure will greatly lower our prestige and effectiveness Asia.

5. Therefore generally agree[d] by conference US must support friendly Asian governments and cannot afford withhold such moral, economic, military aid in our power to give and which likely stiffen non-Communist governments, despite knowledge that some aid will be wasted.

6. We not alone but have friend[s] and must insist on UK, Commonwealth, France, Holland bearing fair share burden.

7. In this effort we justified regard our interests as generally coinciding those of area and as we have dispassionate as well as selfish interest in maintenance independence SEA countries.

8. Consensus opinion situation Burma and IC constitutes gravest and most immediate danger. Commie threat to Thailand no less grave but slightly less immediate. This is British view also. Thus most urgent US effort should be devoted these three countries.

9. In determining specific steps we limited by availability funds and political impossibility guaranteeing independence territorial integrity countries this area.

10. Nevertheless following measures possible:

(a) Military and economic aid within limits funds presently or in future made available.

(b) New declaration or statement by President, Secretary or Congress along lines of (1) US adherence principal [principle] territorial integrity and gravity with which we would view any violation thereof; (2) our desire and interest in maintenance freedom independence countries of area and (3) our willingness help countries help themselves in maintaining their freedom and to improve the well-being of their people within the limits of US capabilities and commitments elsewhere. Conference deemed statement vary desirable since Secretary’s Press Club speech did not have hoped for effect SEA.

(c) Secretary to call in diplomatic representatives SEA countries, except India, and reaffirm our sincere interest their freedom independence also give some indication plans help them.

11. Desirable hold joint discussions with UK plan political economic measures SEA but no conference in area due implication west powers ganging up maintain colonial privileges. Should be held privately in London, Washington.

12. Consensus opposed US attempt sponsor regional conference of area states at this time.

13. Consensus use of ECAFE undesirable in planning aid because of presence USSR and general ineptitude.

14. Discussion issuance policy statement revealed some thinking that although statement could not include specific guarantee countries SEA backed by US armed force nevertheless US should make own private determination that invasion IC by Chinese Communist armies resisted by French army should also be resisted by US using its armed forces if necessary. Seven members conference supported that view and others opposed, thus indicating substantial division views on vital question US policy.

15. Generally agreed USIE materials designed for world-wide or even area-wide distribution not satisfactory. Strong emphasis on material directed toward specific groups within specific countries written in simple language. Conference urged new media such as comic strips, posters, cartoons.

16. Conference opposed recognition China Communist regime until it gives undertaking respect treaty rights and international obligations.

17. We have made Asian Governments fully aware our reasons recognition Bao Dai.³ Not advisable press these governments unduly.

18. Majority view we should press French hard immediately give Bao Dai further powers and full independence without much delay. This essential to increase prestige popularity Bao Dai and win recognition other Asian countries.

Stanton

1. The remarks summarized here were delivered on February 15 by Philip C. Jessup, Ambassador at Large, at the Bangkok Conference of United States Chiefs of Mission.
2. In NSC 48/2, “The Position of the United States with Respect to Asia,” December 30, 1949 (for text, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. vii, Part 2, p. 1215.), “Asia” is defined as “that part of the continent of Asia south of the USSR and east of Iran together with the major off-shore islands—Japan, Formosa, the Philippines, Indonesia and Ceylon.”
3. For documentation on United States recognition of the government of Bao Bai, Chief of State of Viet-Nam, February 7, 1950, see pp. 690 ff.